Usually I’m not the kind of guy who talks about such economic topics. Because I’m an engineer / security researcher who is exclusively concerned with understanding technical problems and if possible, solving them accordingly. My whole education is based on this and contains predominantly technical aspects of information security. This sometimes makes it difficult to understand what the market cares about (and why some products are being developed / exist on the market 😉 ). Nevertheless, a current engagement for one of our customers made me stumble upon such a product.
We were involved in a test where a security appliance (a black box 😉 ) played the core role. As you might know, the test procedure generally depends on the security question to be answered. In this case the question to be answered was, whether the black box provides the promised information security benefit. More specifically, we took a look at the environment / infrastructure, the protocols and the systems around it and checked if the black box does its magic. So the black box itself wasn’t in direct focus of the test. We were quite amazed about the blind trust the product received (but what else can one do, but trust the device they have already purchased ;-)? You can analyze it and that is what we did. Continue reading “How ‘security’ black boxes might corrupt your investment”
PowerView does not use the built in AD cmdlets to be independent from the Remote Server Administration Tools (RSAT)-AD PowerShell Module which is only compatible with PowerShell 3.0+ and by default only installed on servers that have Active Directory services roles. PowerView, however, is compatible with PowerShell 2.0 and has no outer dependencies. Furthermore, it does not require any installation process.
He is a security researcher in Google’s Project Zero. He has been involved with computer hardware and software security for over 10 years looking at a range of different platforms and applications. With a great interest in logical vulnerabilities he has numerous disclosures in a wide range of products from web browsers to virtual machine breakouts as well as being a Pwn2Own and Microsoft Mitigation Bypass bounty winner. He has spoken at a number of security conferences including Black Hat USA, CanSecWest, Bluehat, HITB, and Infiltrate. Continue reading “The Joy of Sandbox Mitigations”
In the last few years, attack techniques which fall in the categories of “Credential Theft” or “Credential Reuse” have grown into one of the biggest threats to Microsoft Windows environments. Microsoft has stated more than one time, that nearly almost all of their customers that run Active Directory have experienced “Pass-the-Hash” (PtH) attacks recently. Once an attacker gains an initial foothold on a single system in the environment it takes often less than 48 hours until the entire Active Directory infrastructure is compromised. To defend against this kind of attacks, a well-planned approach is required as part of a comprehensive security architecture and operations program. As breach has to be assumed, this includes a preventative mitigating control strategy, where technical and organizational controls are implemented, as well as preparations against insider attacks. This is mainly achieved by partitioning the credential flow in order to firstly limit their exposure and secondly limit their usefulness if an attacker was able to get them. Although we spoke last year at Troopers 15 about “How to Efficiently Protect Active Directory from Credential Theft & Large Scale Compromise”, we would like to summarize exemplary later in this post Active Directory pentest findings that we classified in four categories in order to better understand what goes typically wrong and thus has to be addressed. For a better understanding of the overall security goals, we classified the findings as to belonging as a security best practice violation of the following categories: Continue reading “TROOPERS16 Training Teaser: Dos and Don’ts of Secure Active Directory Administration”
In this blogpost we will briefly explain a well known Syscall hooking technique (a more detailed explanation can be gathered from e.g. http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/hooking-system-service-dispatch-table-ssdt/) used by multiple malware samples (like the laqma trojan) and right after discuss how some memory analysis tools have trouble in the analysis and/or reporting of these. Continue reading “Investigating Memory Analysis Tools – SSDT Hooking via Pointer Replacement”
This year’s Black Hat US saw a number of quite interesting talks in the context of Windows or Active Directory Security. For those of you too lazy to search for themselves 😉 and for our own Windows/AD Sec team (who couldn’t send anyone to Vegas due to heavy project load) I’ve compiled a little list of those.
Server operating systems with an OS, for which vendor support has ended, come with many risks that have to be considered and addressed. The primary goal should be always to decommission or migrate the majority of end-of-life (EoL) servers to OS versions, supported by the vendor. Here it should be noted that a migration to an up-to-date OS should be preferably done before your organization enters the end of life of that software 😉
Just recently, Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit(TM) (CTU) researchers published details (see http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/skeleton-key-malware-analysis/ ) on a especially nasty piece of malware that bypasses authentication on Active Directory (AD) systems which implement single-factor (password only) authentication. Once deployed the malware stays quite noiseless in the Domain Controller´s (DC) RAM, and the DC´s replication issues caused by it weren´t interpreted – in this case – during months as a hint for system compromise. Probably the malware´s modification on the LSASS process reduced the DC´s ability to perform DC-to-DC authentication, but this is only speculation and not where we would like to go today.
So, what to do? The relevant mitigations, pointed out by Dell´s CTU, as event log monitoring and scanning processes on suspicious systems with the published YARA signature should be applied.
Still, let’s discuss for a second which long-term, preventative measures could come into play as well. Continue reading “Skeleton Key – a Nasty Piece of Malware. Some Remarks.”
After we recently released the “Linux IPv6 Hardening Guide” we got a number of suggestions “could you pls provide a similar document for $OS?” (btw: thanks to you all for the overwhelming interest in the Linux document and the active discussion of ip6tables rule approaches on the ipv6hackers mailing list).