This post by Jeff (@jeffmakes) was delayed due to interferences with other projects but nevertheless, enjoy!
This year, it was my great honour to design the hardware for the Troopers19 badge.
We wanted to make a wifi-connected MicroPython-powered badge; something that would be fun to take home and hack on. It was a nice opportunity to use a microcontroller platform that I hadn’t tried before. I also used the project as a chance to finally migrate my PCB workflow from Eagle to Kicad. Inevitably it was a painful transition, which resulted in quite some delay to the project as I floundered around in the new tool, but it does mean the design files are in an open format which I hope will benefit the community of Troopers attendees and future badge designers!
After the Emotet Incident at Heise, where ERNW has been consulted for Incident Response, we decided to start a blogpost series, in which we want to regularly report on current attacks that we observe. In particular we want to provide details about the utilized pieces of malware, different stages, and techniques used for the initial infection and lateral movement. We hope that this information might help you to detect ongoing incidents, apply countermeasures, and in the best case to figure out proactive countermeasures and security controls beforehand.
Again, Cisco released security advisories for their software-defined networking (SDN) solution called Application Centric Infrastructure (ACI). As before (see blog post here), the published advisories originated from research performed in our ACI lab. Continue reading “Security Advisories for Cisco ACI”
In some organizations we work with a certain state of IPv6 deployment has been reached in the interim which includes, among others, the following aspects:
the network infrastructure is IPv6-enabled (incl. interface addressing, routing [protocols] and the like).
parts of supporting services (security functions, monitoring, system management) include IPv6 in a proper way.
3rd party providers have been contractually obliged to deliver their services in an “IPv6-enabled” mode (as opposed to only being “IPv6-capable” which was the standard requirement in many RFIs during earlier years).
It might then happen that networking people (who often are the initial motivators for deploying IPv6) in such organizations are stating, when asked about IPv6: “it’s [mostly] done”.
Point is that, alas, this does not necessarily mean that a single service or application is *actually using* IPv6, so while the above certainly constitutes an achievement it might not even be halfway through.
The next major release of DirectoryRanger is now available for customers, and for everyone who would like to try it ;-). Current attacks show that quite often the topic of Active Directory Security is not on the security agenda, but it should be, and this was the reason for us to build the tool and, of course, to maintain and improve it. So what are the major new features released with DirectoryRanger 1.5.0? Here we go:
The Windows Insight repository currently hosts four articles on VSM (Virtual Secure Mode):
Virtual Secure Mode: Architecture Overview (Aleksandar Milenkoski): In this work, we discuss the architecture of a virtualized Windows environment.
Virtual Secure Mode: Communication Interfaces (Aleksandar Milenkoski): In this work, we discuss the communication interfaces that VSM implements: Isolated User Mode (IUM) system calls, normal-mode services, secure services, and hypercalls.
Virtual Secure Mode: Protections of Communication Interfaces (Aleksandar Milenkoski): This work discusses implemented mechanisms for securing the above VSM communication interfaces. This includes restrictions on issuing hypercalls, data marshalling and sanitization, and secure data sharing.
Virtual Secure Mode: Initialization (Dominik Phillips, Aleksandar Milenkoski): This work describes the process for VSM initialization activities performed by the Windows loader and the Windows kernel when Windows 10 is booted.
Heise berichtet aktuell öffentlich über die Emotet-Infektion im eigenen Haus, bei dessen Aufklärung ERNW unterstützte. Damit liefert Heise Informationen zum Verlauf aktueller Angriffe, aber insbesondere auch wertvolle Einsichten zu Vorbeugung, Erkennung, Analyse und Gegenmaßnahmen aus eigener Erfahrung, wie sie nur selten der Öffentlichkeit preisgegeben werden.
Ein Team aus Incident-Response Spezialisten der ERNW Research unterstützte Heise bei der Analyse und Rekonstruktion des Vorfalls und analysierte die Schadsoftware, um deren Ausbreitungswege nachzuvollziehen und IoCs (Indicators of Compromise) zu extrahieren. Hierdurch konnten effektive Gegenmaßnahmen entwickelt und gemeinsam mit Heise erfolgreich umgesetzt werden.
Im Zuge dessen unterstützten Active-Directory-Spezialisten der ERNW Heise bei der Konzeption und dem Wiederaufbau eines neuen Active Directory. Im heisec-Webinar am 3. Juli berichtet Heise über den Incident und die wichtigsten Erkenntnisse daraus. Dabei sein werden zwei unserer Active Directory-Security-Spezialisten. Sie werden Konzepte und Verfahren für ein sicheres, resilientes und trotzdem betreibbares Active Directory vorstellen und den Teilnehmern mit Tipps für Containment nach einer Infektion und in gemeinsamer Diskussion zur Verfügung stehen.