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Disclosure: Potential Limitations of Apple ADE in Corporate Usage Scenarios

Apple Automated Device Enrollment (ADE) is presented as a way to automate and simplify the enrollment process of Apple devices within Mobile Device Management (MDE) solutions. This blog post is aimed at organizations currently planning or even already using this feature and making you, the reader, aware of potential limitations of this process that might otherwise not be clearly addressed in your companies’ device management process.

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Disclosure: Apple ADE – Network Based Provisioning Bypass

Mobile Device Management (MDM) solutions are used to centrally manage mobile devices in corporate environments. This includes the monitoring of the device, automatic installation/removal of apps or certificates and restrict the functionality. Even though MDM solutions exist for multiple vendors, we will look specifically on Apple devices enrolled via Intune. When an Apple device is registered for Automated Device Enrollment (ADE), it will automatically download and apply these policies during the initial setup and prior to the first boot.

During a customer project, we identified a network-based provisioning bypass which prevents the iPad to fetch and apply the provisioning profiles. Continue reading “Disclosure: Apple ADE – Network Based Provisioning Bypass”

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ManiMed: Ypsomed AG – mylife YpsoPump System Vulnerabilities

Manipulating Medical Devices

The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) aims to sensitize manufacturers and the public regarding security risks of networked medical devices in Germany. In response to the often fatal security reports and press releases of networked medical devices, the BSI initiated the project Manipulation of Medical Devices (ManiMed) in 2019. In this project, a security analysis of selected products is carried out through security assessments followed by Coordinated Vulnerability Diclosure (CVD) processes. The project report was published on December 31, 2020, and can be accessed on the BSI website [1].

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ManiMed: Hamilton Medical AG – HAMILTON-T1 Ventilator Vulnerabilities

Manipulating Medical Devices

The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) aims to sensitize manufacturers and the public regarding security risks of networked medical devices in Germany. In response to the often fatal security reports and press releases of networked medical devices, the BSI initiated the project Manipulation of Medical Devices (ManiMed) in 2019. In this project, a security analysis of selected products is carried out through security assessments followed by Coordinated Vulnerability Diclosure (CVD) processes. The project report was published on December 31, 2020, and can be accessed on the BSI website [1].

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ManiMed: B. Braun Melsungen AG – Space System Vulnerabilities

Manipulating Medical Devices

The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) aims to sensitize manufacturers and the public regarding security risks of networked medical devices in Germany. In response to the often fatal security reports and press releases of networked medical devices, the BSI initiated the project Manipulation of Medical Devices (ManiMed) in 2019. In this project, a security analysis of selected products is carried out through security assessments followed by Coordinated Vulnerability Diclosure (CVD) processes. The project report was published on December 31, 2020, and can be accessed on the BSI website [1].

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ManiMed: Innokas Yhtymä Oy – VC150 Patient Monitor Vulnerabilities

Manipulating Medical Devices

The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) aims to sensitize manufacturers and the public regarding security risks of networked medical devices in Germany. In response to the often fatal security reports and press releases of networked medical devices, the BSI initiated the project Manipulation of Medical Devices (ManiMed) in 2019. In this project, a security analysis of selected products is carried out through security assessments followed by Coordinated Vulnerability Diclosure (CVD) processes. The project report was published on December 31, 2020, and can be accessed on the BSI website [1].

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ManiMed: Philips Medizin Systeme Böblingen GmbH – IntelliVue System Vulnerabilities

Manipulating Medical Devices

The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) aims to sensitize manufacturers and the public regarding security risks of networked medical devices in Germany. In response to the often fatal security reports and press releases of networked medical devices, the BSI initiated the project Manipulation of Medical Devices (ManiMed) in 2019. In this project, a security analysis of selected products is carried out through security assessments followed by Coordinated Vulnerability Diclosure (CVD) processes. The project report was published on December 31, 2020, and can be accessed on the BSI website [1].

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Erlang distribution RCE and a cookie bruteforcer

In one of the last pentests we’ve found an epmd (Erlang port mapper daemon) listening on a target system (tcp/4369). It is used to coordinate distributed erlang instances, but also can lead to a RCE, given one knows the so called “authentication cookie”. Usually, this cookie is located in ~/.erlang.cookie and is generated by erlang at the first start. If not modified or set manually it is a random string [A:Z] with a length of 20 characters. If an attacker gains this cookie, a RCE is quite easy – as I like to describe below.

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Linq Injection – From Attacking Filters to Code Execution

Some of you (especially the .Net guys) might have heard of the query language Linq (Language Integrated Query) used by Microsoft .Net applications and web sites. It’s used to access data from various sources like databases, files and internal lists. It can internally transform the accessed data in application objects and provides filter mechanisms similar to SQL. As it is used directly inside the application source code, it will be processed at compile time and not interpreted at runtime. While this provides a great type safety and almost no attack surface for injection attacks (except from possible handling problems in the different backends), it is extremely difficult to implement a dynamic filter system (e.g. for datatables which should allow users to select the column to filter on). That’s probably the reason why Scott Guthrie (Executive Vice President of the Cloud and Enterprise group in Microsoft, also one of the founders of the .Net project) presented the System.Linq.Dynamic package as part of the VS-2008 samples in 2008. This library allows to build Linq queries at runtime and therefore simplify dynamic filters. But as you may know, dynamic interpretation of languages based on user input is most of the time not the best option….

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