We recently identified a security issue in FireEye AX 5400, that also affected other products. We responsibly disclosed the bug to FireEye and a fix that addresses the issue has been released with version 7.7.7. The fix was also merged into the common core and is available as 8.0.1 for other products (i.e. FireEye EX).
The git-shell is a restricted shell maintained by the git developers and is meant to be used as the upstream peer in a git remote session over a ssh tunnel. The basic idea behind this shell is to restrict the allowed commands in a ssh session to the ones required by git which are as follows:
Receives repository updates from the client.
Pushes repository updates to the client.
Pushes a repository archive to the client.
Besides those built-in commands, an administrator can also provide it’s own commands via shell scripts or other executable files. As those are typically completely custom, this post will concentrate on the built-in ones.
Note: This has nothing to do with the also recently fixed vulnerabilities in gitlab  .
This is the 3rd post in the series of Autonomic Network (AN), it will dedicated for discussing the vulnerabilities. I recommend reading the first 2 parts (part one, part two) to be familiar with the technology and how the proprietary protocol is constructed.
Initially we will discuss 2 of the reported CVEs, but later there is more CVEs to come 😉
This is the second part in the Autonomic Network series. We have introduced previously in our first part the Autonomic Network (AN), took a look about the needed configuration to run it on Cisco gear and what is the expected communication flow. In this post, we will dive deeper to have a closer look on the packets and how they are composed. Continue reading “Autonomic Networking – Part 2: Analysis”
This is a 3-part series which introduces and analyzes Cisco’s implementation for Autonomic Network. In the 1st part, the technology is introduced and we have an overview about communication flow. In the 2nd part, Cisco’s proprietary protocol is reverse engineered 😉 then finally in the 3rd part, multiple vulnerabilities will be disclosed for the first time. If you’re aware of the technology, you can skip directly to part 2 where the action begins! Continue reading “Autonomic Networking – Part 1: Overview”
Last year I encountered a slight variation of an internal port scan vulnerability for the CrystalReports component of SAP Business Objects. The original vulnerability was presented and disclosed by rapid7 in the talk “Hacking SAP Business Objects”. The corresponding slides can be found here. Continue reading “Information About SAP Security Note 2336795”
Tavis did it again. As stated in the title it is possible to remotely execute commands via the Chrome extension for the popular meeting software Cisco WebEx. This post summarizes the most relevant information for you.
i´ve looked a bit at the Insomni’hack CTF which took place on the 21st January and lasted for 36 hours.
For the sake of warming up a bit for our Troopers workshop Windows and Linux Exploitation,
I decided to create a write-up of the first pwn50 challenge.
To grab your own copy of the presented files you can also find it in our Github repository:
While doing heap research on Linux processes (results are going to be published soon), I came across the bot from the Mirai Botnet. As already mentioned in the blog post by Brian, the Mirai bot uses obfuscated configuration data which contains e.g. the CnC server. When now confronted only with a bot (e.g. in the context of a running task or the ELF binary), but without the according source code, the decryption of this configuration data for e.g. incident analysis purposes might not be easily possible (with the python script from the blog post), if the key has been changed.
But in this case that is not a problem at all, because Continue reading “A short Addendum on the Mirai Botnet Blog Post”