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Disclosure: Potential Limitations of Apple ADE in Corporate Usage Scenarios

Apple Automated Device Enrollment (ADE) is presented as a way to automate and simplify the enrollment process of Apple devices within Mobile Device Management (MDE) solutions. This blog post is aimed at organizations currently planning or even already using this feature and making you, the reader, aware of potential limitations of this process that might otherwise not be clearly addressed in your companies’ device management process.

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Disclosure: Apple ADE – Network Based Provisioning Bypass

Mobile Device Management (MDM) solutions are used to centrally manage mobile devices in corporate environments. This includes the monitoring of the device, automatic installation/removal of apps or certificates and restrict the functionality. Even though MDM solutions exist for multiple vendors, we will look specifically on Apple devices enrolled via Intune. When an Apple device is registered for Automated Device Enrollment (ADE), it will automatically download and apply these policies during the initial setup and prior to the first boot.

During a customer project, we identified a network-based provisioning bypass which prevents the iPad to fetch and apply the provisioning profiles. Continue reading “Disclosure: Apple ADE – Network Based Provisioning Bypass”

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Security Advisory: Achieving PHP Code Execution in ILIAS eLearning LMS before v7.30/v8.11/v9.1

During my Bachelor’s thesis, I identified several XSS vulnerabilities and a PHP Code Execution vulnerability via an insecure file upload in the learning management system (LMS) ILIAS. The XSS vulnerability can be chained with the code execution vulnerability so that attackers with tutor privileges in at least one course can perform this exploit chain.

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Vulnerability in Jitsi Meet: Meeting Password Disclosure affecting Meetings with Lobbies

During a customer project, we identified a logic flaw in Jitsi Meet, an open-source video conferencing and messaging platform for secure video conferencing, voice calls, and messaging. The vulnerability affects password protected Jitsi meetings that make use of a lobby. This logic flaw leads to the disclosure of the meeting password when a user is invited to the call after waiting in the lobby.

Jitsi offers two security options to meeting moderators. Firstly, the meeting can be assigned a password that must be entered when joining. Secondly, a lobby mode can be activated, which first adds joining users to a lobby, from where they can then be added to the meeting by a user with moderation permissions.

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Breaking GLS Parcel Tracking

Recently, we held a talk at the Winterkongress1 of the Digitale Gesellschaft Schweiz in Winterthur, Switzerland, about our research project on breaking German parcel tracking sites. We could not name all the parcel services for which we identified vulnerabilities respecting disclosure timelines. Today, we describe our findings at GLS, another player in the German parcel market, and the disclosure process of corresponding vulnerabilities.

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I know what you ordered last summer @ Winterkongress 2024

Dennis and I already published blog posts about our research project dealing with vulnerabilities in parcel tracking implementations at DHL and DPD. At the Winterkongress (winter congress) in Winterthur, Switzerland, we had the great opportunity to give a talk about the matter. The talk was recorded and can be watched here.

DigiGes held the Winterkongress, which took place in Winterthur on 01.03. till 02.03.2024. The main topics are ethics, threats, and opportunities of IT. This year, many talks looked at AI in some way. Continue reading “I know what you ordered last summer @ Winterkongress 2024”

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Lua-Resty-JWT Authentication Bypass

I was writing some challenges for PacketWars at TROOPERS22. One was intended to be a JWT key confusion challenge where the public key from an RSA JWT should be recovered and used to sign a symmetric JWT. For that, I was searching for a library vulnerable to JWT key confusion by default and found lua-resty-jwt. The original repository by SkyLothar is not maintained and different from the library that is installed with the LuaRocks package manager. The investigated library is a fork of the original repository, maintained by cdbattags in version 0.2.3 and was downloaded more than 4.8 million times according to LuaRocks.

While looking at the source code I found a way to circumvent authentication entirely.

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Breaking DPD Parcel Tracking

This blog post is the continuation of our parcel research. We already reported about how we broke parcel tracking at DHL and the disclosure process of the identified problems. As DHL is not the only parcel service in Germany, we also investigated the other available parcel services. In this blog post, we want to talk about DPD, also called Geopost, which belongs to the French Post Office.

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All your parcel are belong to us – Talk at Troopers 2023

At Troopers 2023, we gave a talk on how to attack DHL parcel tracking information based on OSINT. Since we previously had an exemplary disclosure process about this attack with DHL, Mr. Kiehne (from DHL) joined us to provide interesting background information and insights on how they addressed our findings.

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