Breaking

Chiron – An All-In-One IPv6 Penetration Testing Framework

This is a guest post from Antonios Atlasis.

Last week I had the pleasure to give you my impressions regarding my experience about hacking for b33r at Ghent, that is, my participation at BruCON 2014 hacking conference. As I said among else, the reason that I was there was to present Chiron, my IPv6 penetration testing/security assessment framework, which was supported by the Brucon 5×5 program. The first version of Chiron had been presented at Troopers 14, during the IPv6 Security Summit.

Continue reading Continue reading
Events

“Hacking for a B33r” at Ghent

This is a guest post by Antonios Atlasis.

This week I had the pleasure to attend BruCON 2014. While participating at the Brucon 5×5 program, I had also the chance to attend this well-known European Con which is held in the beautiful city of Ghent.

The main event took place two days (on 25th and 26th of September), while some very interesting trainings were given in the previous days. There was mainly one track, plus some workshops that you could also attend, if you wished. You could book your seat at one of the workshops using an on-line scheduling system.

Continue reading Continue reading
Building

MLD and Neighbor Discovery. Are They Related?

This is a guest post from Antonios Atlasis.

Today we had the opportunity at ERNW to have a full-day discussion about MLD. The discussion was led by Jayson Salazar who writes his thesis on the topic.

For the newcomers to IPv6 world, the purpose of MLD, a subprotocol of IPv6, as defined in RFC 2710, is “to enable each IPv6 router to discover the presence of multicast listeners (that is, nodes wishing to receive multicast packets) on its directly attached links, and to discover specifically which multicast addresses are of interest to those neighboring nodes.” MLD was updated by MLDv2 in RFC 3810 in order to “add the ability for a node to report interest in listening to packets with a particular multicast address only from specific source addresses or from all sources except for specific source addresses.”

Continue reading Continue reading
Breaking

ERNW’s Top 9 Burp Plugins

In the context of an internal evaluation, we recently had a look at most of the burp plugins available from the BApp store. The following overview represents our personal top 9 plugins, categorized in “Scanner Extensions”, “Manual Testing” and “Misc” in alphabetic order:

Scanner Extensions

ActiveScan++

This plugin adds some tests for Dynamic code injection, Host header attacks (password reset poisoning, cache poisoning, DNS rebinding), OS command injection and Relative path overwrite. In some internal tests, it seemed to deliver what it promises.

Continue reading Continue reading
Building

Atomic Fragments vs. Fragmentation in the IPv6 “Real World”

This is a guest post by Antonios Atlasis.

Continuing the discussion about the IPv6 Atomic Fragments started at the IPv6 hacker’s mailing list and the freshly proposed draft RFC regarding the deprecation of the generation of IPv6 Atomic Fragments, we decided to check very quickly what is the current situation regarding the acceptance or the rejection of Atomic fragments in the “real world”. Thanks to Rafael Schaefer and the RISC lab at ERNW, we got some first measurements really fast.

Continue reading Continue reading
Breaking

HackRF One the story continues…

Hello fellow frequency hoppers,

once again, we welcomed Michael Ossmann at the ERNW headquarters for fun with SDR. This time with Mike´s advanced SDR workshop. And to be up front about it…it was plain awesome. For everybody who is not familiar with Software Defined Radio (SDR): Let’s regard it as the ultimate tool when working with radio signals. Take a look a this to learn more.

Mike showed us the new revision of his HackRF One and explained us some more advanced techniques when it comes to Radio Frequnecies hacking. Compared to last time, the workshop focused on reversing signals and how to synthesize them. So this time we were crafting RF packets ourselves instead of just replaying a capture. This introduces different attack types which can be carried out over the air for  example bruteforcing or fuzzing of radio devices.

Continue reading Continue reading
Building

Packet Too Big Messages and Atomic Fragments

This is a guest post from Antonios Atlasis.

Taking the chance from a discussion on the IPv6 hacker’s mailing list and the freshly proposed draft RFC regarding the deprecation of the generation of IPv6 Atomic Fragments, I decided to test very quickly what is the current status related with the latest and some of the most poplar Operating Systems (OS) status (whether they send Atomic Fragments in response to Packet Too Big messages, or not). The motivation behind this was to check which one of them is potentially vulnerable to the DoS attack using the technique described in the above proposed RFC and taking it for granted that Atomic Fragments are blocked in the real world (but more about this, in another blogpost in the near future).

Continue reading Continue reading
Events

Wrap-Up: A Memorable Week at Black Hat and DEFCON in Las Vegas

Information security conferences are known to be attended because of several reasons. For some it’s the technical content, for others the networking potential and for some others simply meeting old friends. Pinpointing our motives is clearly a challenging task, but the following wrap-up ought to share our personal highlights of the week we spent visiting Black Hat USA 2014 and DEFCON 22 in Las Vegas.

After somewhat 18 hours of flight, some sleep and with the beautiful scenery of perpetual clear skies above Las Vegas we began what was to be an incredible week.

Continue reading Continue reading
Events

ERNW @BlackHat US 2014

Last week we had the opportunity and pleasure to present some of our research results at BlackHat US 2014 (besides of meeting a lot of old friends and having a great researchers’ dinner).

Enno and Antonios gave their presentation on IDPS evasion by IPv6 Extension Headers, described here.

The material can be found here: Slides, tools (the main tool used was Chiron, authored by Antonios) & whitepaper.

Ayhan and me presented our results of the security analysis of Cisco’s EnergyWise protocol. The protocol enables network-wide power monitoring and control (ie turning servers off or on, putting phones to standby — basically controlling the power state of all EnergyWise-enabled or PoE devices). The main problem (besides a DoS vulnerability we found in IOS, see official Cisco advisory) is its PSK-based authentication model, which enables an attacker to cause large-scale blackouts in data centers if the deployment is lacking certain controls (for example our good old favorite, segmentation…). There will be a longer blogpost/newsletter on this topic soon.
The material can be found here: Slides & tools

Continue reading Continue reading