We recently conducted a security assessment of VMware Carbon Black Cloud, a unified SaaS solution that integrates endpoint detection and response (EDR), anti-virus, and vulnerability management capabilities. As part of our evaluation, we tested the solution’s ability to detect and prevent malicious activity on Windows and Linux systems. Our analysis focused on the Carbon Black agents for these platforms, and although we did not identify any critical vulnerabilities, we want to share some of the findings in this blog post.
Continue reading Continue readingCVE-2025-20908: Use of insufficiently random values in Samsung's Auracast implementation
As part of our research into the Auracast feature set in Bluetooth, we also started looking into vendor implementations. At the time we started with our research, there weren’t a lot of products on the market yet. But new products are coming out pretty frequently now.
One of the vendors that had Auracast implemented pretty early was Samsung. At the time the Samsung Galaxy S23 and S24 phones were able to broadcast Audio, while the Galaxy Buds were able to join these broadcasts.
Continue reading Continue readingWhen Your Edge Browser Syncs Private Data to Your Employer
Recently, one of our customers contacted us to investigate the extent of some unwanted and unexpected behavior regarding browsing data of employees.
Employees started contacting IT support because private browser bookmarks, private login credentials etc. showed up on their work machines. All affected employees stated that they never created these bookmarks on work systems. And interestingly, the data seemed to have been collected over quite some time.
Our customer wanted to understand how private data ended up in their environment. Obviously, private employee data in the enterprise landscape could cause some data privacy trouble (GDPR).
Continue reading Continue readingJigsaw RDPuzzle: Piecing Attacker Actions Together
In a recent incident response project, we had the chance to virtually look over the attackers’ shoulder and observe their activities. The attackers used the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) for lateral movement within the compromized environment and beyond (MITRE techniques T1570, T1021). As a matter of fact, RDP creates cache files that contain tiles of the transferred screen recording data. While this fact is well-known and there are existing tools, we found it worth reporting because of two different aspects:
Continue reading Continue readingPart I: Bluetooth Auracast from a Security Researcher’s Perspective
Auracast, the new Bluetooth LE Broadcast Audio feature has gained some publicity in the past months. The Bluetooth SIG has introduced the LE Audio feature-set to the Bluetooth 5.2 Specification in 2019 and vendors are only now starting to implement it. Auracast facilitates broadcasting audio over Bluetooth LE to a potentially unlimited number of devices. It does not require pairing or interaction between the sender and the receivers.
We also presented this topic at 38c3. This blog post will contain similar contents albeit with some more details.
Continue reading Continue readingVulnerability Disclosure: Command Injection in Kemp LoadMaster Load Balancer (CVE-2024-7591)
While conducting security research, I identified a critical vulnerability in Kemp’s LoadMaster Load Balancer. This vulnerability is a Command Injection and allows full system compromise. It requires no authentication and can be exploited remotely by having access to the Web User Interface (WUI). Kemp found that all LoadMaster versions up to and including version 7.2.60.0 and also the multi-tenant hypervisors up to and including version 7.1.35.11 are affected.
Kemp LoadMaster is a widely used Load Balancing Application that can commonly be seen in customer engagements. Therefore, we decided to take a closer look as part of our regular research projects.
Continue reading Continue readingVulnerability Disclosure: Authentication Bypass in Vaultwarden versions < 1.32.5 - CVE-2024-55225
During a penetration test for a customer, we briefly assessed Vaultwarden, an open-source online password safe. In June 2024, the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) published results1 of a static and dynamic test of the Vaultwarden server component. Therefore, only a partial source code audit was performed during our assessment. However, a quick look was needed to find some glaring issues with the authentication.
Vaultwarden
Vaultwarden is an alternative online password safe server to Bitwarden and exposes the same API so that Bitwarden clients can connect to the Vaultwarden server. Since Bitwarden has a Browser client and Mobile clients, they can all connect to Vaultwarden, too.
Continue reading Continue readingAnnouncement: Progress Kemp LoadMaster CVE-2024-7591
Hey everybody,
during a recent Red Teaming engagement Marius Walter from ERNW found a command injection issue in Progress (Kemp) LoadMaster. It was registered as CVE-2024-7591 and scores a CVSS of 10.0.
The vendor already has patches out, make sure to apply them as this is a high severe issue. You can find the official announcement and the patch references on the official support page.
Marius will follow up with a technical blog post on this issue once we think everybody had a realistic chance of applying the patches.
Continue readingDisclosure: Potential Limitations of Apple ADE in Corporate Usage Scenarios
Apple Automated Device Enrollment (ADE) is presented as a way to automate and simplify the enrollment process of Apple devices within Mobile Device Management (MDE) solutions. This blog post is aimed at organizations currently planning or even already using this feature and making you, the reader, aware of potential limitations of this process that might otherwise not be clearly addressed in your companies’ device management process.
How Apple ADE Is Presented
Looking at the Apple Support pages today, Automated Device Enrollment is described as a process that
Continue reading Continue readingCrowdStrike: What is the worldwide BSOD all about?
This article is about the massive BSOD triggered by CrowdStrike worldwide on July 19. Analysis and information from CrowdStrike or other sources are regularly published, completing what is expressed here. Updates may also be provided in the future.
Friday, July 19, is a day to be remembered in computing history as the day of one of the biggest BSODs (Blue Screens of Death). We have seen air traffic come to a standstill over the USA and people climbing ladders with USB sticks to update giant screens. The impact was still measurable over many days. The question on everyone’s lips is how that all happened. CrowdStrike provided, on a regular basis, an explanation for people to understand what happened. But explanations can be hard to understand, especially for one who would like to read directly within CrowdStrike’s internal wording in their publications and regarding technical driver implementation details. Also, the analysis misses some points we consider relevant for secure software development. This article discusses conclusions from this massive crash, especially the necessity to change our mindset about software. This means we should understand, document, and evaluate independently software provided by vendors to know exactly what we install on our systems and to figure out the risk that may be taken by using the software. The time of naive belief in software magic must end with a third party’s independent review of the software, analysing its reliability, security, and stability. This is an activity we have been doing at ERNW for years, especially for e.g. the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)1.
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