Recently we posted first part of our Bluetooth research diary. Today, we want to continue on that topic and tell you about Bluetooth proxying and packet replay with a new tool.
This time we had a new gadget to play with: our colleague Florian Grunow shared with us a curious IoT device – Bluetooth socks… real socks that you control with an app to heat your feet. The future is here… 😉 Continue reading “Research Diary: Bluetooth. Part 2”
As you probably know we perform research on a regular base at ERNW.
We – Olga and Rafael – started with a research project about Bluetooth. Our first goal was to gain some knowledge about the tools used by most Linux systems to communicate with Bluetooth hardware, such as BlueZ. A good help for that was the amazing Bluetooth hacking workshop we had before (check the link in our blog!)
T-mobile pioneered with the native seamless support for WiFi calling technology embedded within the smartphones. This integrated WiFi calling feature is adopted by most major providers as well as many smartphones today. T-mobile introduced VoWiFi in Germany in May 2016. You can make voice calls that allows to switch between LTE and WiFi networks seamlessly. This post is going to be about security analysis of Voice over WiFi (VoWiFi), another name for WiFi calling, from the user end. Before we get started, let me warn you in advance. If you are not familiar with telecommunication network protocols, then you might get lost in the heavy usage of acronyms and abbreviations. I am sorry about that. But trust me, after a while, you get used to it 🙂 . Continue reading “A Journey Into the Depths of VoWiFi Security”
It’s almost exactly seven years since Enno published the very first blog post on Insinuator.net. Meanwhile, quite a few things changed. It’s not only the ERNW Universe which grew significantly, but also Insinuator’s place within this universe was slightly adjusted. What started as an almost independent IT-Security blog became more and more the major publication medium of ERNW.
Today it is my pleasure to shortly introduce ERNW’s Capture the Flag team, the Kernel Space Invaders. As a long-time CTF enthusiast, I’m really amazed how many of us make the time to tackle IT security challenges also on the weekends or evenings. Even if we cannot participate in all CTFs out there (which would be challenging anyways given the large number of CTF events happening nowadays), we started to compile a repository of some of our write-ups — I hope some of you will enjoy!
Some years ago I discussed the meaning of the term “control” in this post, but at the time I was mainly referring to the noun “control”. Given I’ll extensively use the term “control” as a verb in the next parts of “the DMZseries” and some upcomingtalks I reflected a bit on its meaning (as a verb). In the following I’ll lay out the definition/understanding to be employed at those occasions.
Given there’s quite some speculation and, as we think, misinformation going around we think it’s helpful to add/clarify the following information:
we fully comply with the injunction and we have no intentions to violate it. we do not plan to publish any technical information besides the report (agreed upon with FireEye themselves) and the slides (based on the former) anyway. No 3rd parties except for the ones involved (FireEye, lawyers) have received any additional technical information from our side, let alone an earlier version of the report.
the injunction covers accompanying details mostly within the architecture space, but not the core vulnerabilities themselves. Those are not part of the injunction.
we stand by the timeline as provided below. In particular, the following two points:
– FireEye received a draft version of the report which had the objectionable material (as identified by the cease and desist letter) fully removed on August 11th.
– according to the cease and desist letter FireEye’s lawyer sent us, they were informed – from our side – about the planned talk at 44CON on Jul 23rd.
there’s an injunction, but not a lawsuit. I used the term “sue” after consulting Merriam-Webster which states: “sue: to seek justice or right from (a person) by legal process”, but this might have been misinterpreted by some readers. As stated, there’s a pending injunction, but not a lawsuit.
Please note that we won’t share legal documents with 3rd parties or publish them as we consider this inappropriate.
Please note further that, during the whole process, our goal was to perform a responsible disclosure procedure with its inherent objectives (namely vulnerability remediation by vendor and education of various stakeholders involved, see also here or here). We consider this disclosure process as concluded. We don’t see a need to add technical details from our side as we feel that the objectives of responsible disclosure are met (not least as patches are released since quite some time and both vendor & finder have released reports).
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We’ve just released an ERNW Newsletter titled “Playing With Fire: Attacking the FireEye MPS” which describes several (meanwhile patched) vulnerabilities in FireEye‘s “Malware Protection System” (webMPS) version 7.5.1. Right now Felix gives a talk at 44CON in London on the topic, including some demos. He will release the slides after the talk => to catch the respective announcement you might follow him on Twitter (which is probably a good idea anyway if you’re interested in vulnerability research).
Some of you might use WebEx in their daily life. And some of you might use Linux (as I and many of us do). However, this combination often results in issues with your PC’s sound or microphone use in a WebEx session.
The problem here is that WebEx won’t run as intended with Firefox and JRE x64. But the solution is quite easy! Use the x86-versions of each.
Probably you don’t want to replace your x64 versions of either of them — and neither do I. So I wrote a little script which helps you to quickly switch to the x86 versions, while you still have the x64 versions installed. And here is how to do it:
In this post I’ll discuss some aspects of vulnerability disclosure. I don’t want to delve into an abstract & general discussion of vulnerability disclosure (for those interested here’s some discussion in the context of Google’s Project Zero, this is the well-known CERT/CC approach, this a paper from WEIS 2006 laying out some variants, and finally some statement by Bruce Schneier back in 2007). Instead I will lay out which approach we followed in the past (and why we did so) and which developments make us consider it necessary to re-think our way of handling. The post is not meant to provide definitive answers; it was also written not least to provide clarity for ourselves (“write down a problem in order to better penetrate it”) and, maybe, to serve as a starting point for a discussion which will help the community (and us) to find a position on some of the inherent challenges.