A few days later than planned (sorry about that), but here we go with part 2 (Part1) and the demodulation/analysis part.
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Category: Breaking
Car Hacking Lab – Work in Progress
We just wanted to share some impressions from our car hacking lab:
stay tuned,
The ERNW Car Hacking Team
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Analysis of an Alarm System – Part 1/3
Introduction
This and the following two posts should serve as a step-by-step guide through the whole process of analyzing a radio frequency black box, demodulate and understand the data transfered and finally modulate our own data in order to e.g. perform a brute force attacks.
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Continue readingGeneral Pr0ken Filesystem – Hacking IBM’s GPFS
This post is a short wrap-up of our Troopers talk about the research we did on IBM’s General Parallel File System. If you are interested in all the technical details take a look at our slides or the video recording. We will also give an updated version of this talk at the PHDays conference in Moscow next month.
The IBM General Parallel File System is a distributed file system used in large scale enterprise environments, high performance clusters as well as some of the worlds largest super computers. It is considered by many in the industry to be the most feature rich and production hardened distributed file system currently available. GPFS has a long and really interesting history, going back to the Tiger Shark file system created by IBM 1993.
Of course, this makes it an interesting target for security research. When looking at GPFS from an implementation point of view, the Linux version is made up of three different components: User space utilities and helper scripts, the mmfsd network daemon and multiple Linux kernel modules. We (Florian Grunow and me) spent some time analyzing the internals of these components and discovered critical vulnerabilities in all of them.
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Continue readingApple iOS PIN Bruteforce
Over the past few weeks, multiple news sites have covered some mystical approach to bruteforce PINs on Apple iOS devices. All articles cover a black box called IP Box, the fact that PINs can be broken and that sometimes the automatic wipe after 10 failed tries can be circumvented. Sadly, as often, the what is described but not the how……
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Continue readingXML External Entity (XXE) Injection in Apache Batik Library [CVE-2015-0250]
During one of our latest web application code review projects I came across a vulnerability for which I think it is worth to speak about. It is an injection based attack against XML parsers which uses a rarely required feature called external entity expansion. The XML specification allows XML documents to define entities which reference resources external to the document and parsers typically support this feature by default. If an application parses XML input from untrusted sources and the parsing routine is not properly configured this can be exploited by an attacker with a so called XML external entity (XXE) injection. A successful XXE injection attack could allow an attacker to access the file system, cause a DoS attack or inject script code (e.g. Javascript to perform an XSS attack).
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Revisiting Xen’s x86 Emulation: Xen XSA 123
In my last blog post, I gave an overview about recent vulnerabilities discovered in the x86 emulation layer of Xen. While both of the discussed vulnerabilities only allow for guest privilege escalation, the complexity of the involved code seemed to indicate that even more interesting bugs could be discovered. So I spent some time searching for memory corruption issues and discovered a very interesting bug that resulted in XSA 123 . This post gives an overview about the root cause of the bug and a short description of exploitation challenges. A follow-up post will describe possible exploitation strategies in more detail.
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Continue readingBug Hunting for the Man on the Street
This is a guest post from Vladimir Wolstencroft, to provide some details of his upcoming #TR15 talk.
What do you get when you combine a security appliance vendor, a bug bounty program, readily available virtualised machines, a lack of understanding of best security practices and broken crypto?
Ownage, a good story and maybe even that bounty…
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Continue readingThe Dangers of x86 Emulation: Xen XSA 110 and 105
Developing a secure and feature rich hypervisor is no easy task. Recently, the open source Xen hypervisor was affected by two interesting vulnerabilities involving its x86 emulation code: XSA 110 and XSA 105. Both bugs show that the attack surface of hypervisors is often larger than expected. XSA 105 was originally reported by Andrei Lutas from BitDefender. The patch adds missing privilege checks to the emulation routines of several critical system instructions including LGDT and LIDT. The vulnerable code can be reached from unprivileged user code running inside hardware virtual machine (HVM) guests and can be used to escalate guest privileges. XSA 110 was reported by Jan Beulich from SUSE and concerns insufficient checks when emulating long jumps, calls or returns.
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Continue readingEvasion of Cisco ACLs by (Ab)Using IPv6 & Discussion of Mitigation Techniques
This is a guest post of Antonios Atlasis.
During our blogpost regarding DHCPv6 Guard evasion, one of the side-effects was that Access Control Lists (ACLs) configured to block access to UDP ports 546 can be evaded by abusing (again) IPv6 Extension headers. Having that in mind, we decided to check the effectiveness of Cisco IPv6 ACLs under various scenarios. Our goal was to examine whether the IPv6 ACLs of Cisco routers can be evaded, as well as under which conditions this can take place. To this end, several representative scenarios from enterprise environments or other potential ones are examined.
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