IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) offers many multimedia services to any IP-based access network, such as LTE or DSL. In addition to VoLTE, IMS adds service provider flexibility, better QoS and charging control to the 4th generation of mobile networks. IMS exchanges SIP messages with its users or other IMS and usually these communications are secured by TLS or IPSec. But if an attacker manages to break the confidentiality and the integrity with IMS, he would find it vulnerable to several attacks.
An attacker does not have to overcome transport security to breach confidentiality and integrity with IMS. For example, owning A victim’s User Equipment (UE) could grant an attacker the confidential data he needs to develop many attacks on him. Moreover, motivated attackers, who target IMS itself, can manage to obtain their IPSec ESP Integrity Key (IKESP) from their UE and then manipulate their requests as they like. An example of the latter case is well explained here. This blog post discusses the exploitation of IMS in such cases of integrity and confidentiality loss.
My Master’s thesis “Evaluation of IMS security and developing penetration tests of IMS” discusses the exploitation of IMS vulnerabilities in case its confidentiality and integrity measures are breached. 3GPP specifications and IETF RFCs define how IMS works and therefore can lead us to its vulnerabilities. The attacks to exploit these vulnerabilities are tested and demonstrated on OpenIMS core. Availability attacks on IMS were previously discussed in a previous blog post.
In our talk IMSEcure – Attacking VoLTE Brian and me presented some theoretical and practical attacks against IP Multimedia Subsystems (IMS). Some of the attacks already have been introduced in a former blogpost and Ahmad continued with a deeper analysis of the Flooding and targeted DoS scenario. But still, there are some open topics I’d like to continue with now. The methods I am demonstrating here also help to get a better understanding of VoLTE/IMS and how it is implemented on modern smartphones. Continue reading “VoLTE Security Analysis, part 2”
Last Friday, Brian and I were at the Area41 Security Conference. The conference is a branch of Defcon conference and is more or less a small conference of the Swiss hacker community. Being in a “rock music club”, the speakers presented on a stage where usually the rock stars are performing – which gives the conference a very special flair and an interesting atmosphere. We’ve been at the conference to present our research about VoLTE technology including some attack scenarios we’ve evaluated in the past. More on this later, let’s first talk about the conference itself. Continue reading “Area41 Conference 2016”
Some weeks ago Hendrik explained in his blogpost Security Analysis of VoLTE, Part 1 some attack vectors for Voice over LTE (VoLTE). One attack vector introduced was Denial of Service (DoS), which I also discussed in my Masterthesis “Evaluation of IMS security and Developing penetration tests of IMS”.
In general, DoS attacks aim to prevent a system or a network from efficiently providing its service to legitimate users . The impact of such attacks can vary from a big degradation of quality to total blockage. DoS can occur on users level, where a user or a group of users cannot use the service. But the common conception of DoS is on the service level, where the whole service is broken, unstable or totally down. This blog post is about targeting DoS of the whole VoLTE service by attacking IMS. Continue reading “Denial of Service attacks on VoLTE”
this time I’d like to share some thoughts and results about our telco research last year. We gathered a lot of information out of some projects we’d like to share and discuss with you. The following sections also provide an idea of the upcoming Telecommunication Security Workshop I will give with Kevin Redon at Troopers (click). The workshop will be about Radio Network Security (covered by Kevin) and security aspects of the Core Network (covered by myself), mainly focusing on Voice over LTE (VoLTE). That’s also the topic of today’s post. Continue reading “Security Analysis of VoLTE, Part 1”