So we got these shiny new BlackBerry Q10 and Z10 device laying on the desk one morning. It’s my first BlackBerry, I have to admit, but never the less, the hole wushy GUI and touchy glass stuff wasn’t my main concern, instead i took a look at the stuff going on while you connect the phone (do i have to call it blackberry? its a phone, isn’t it?) to your computer.Continue reading
This is currently the most frequent search term leading Internet users to the Troopers website.
Probably Sheran Gunasekera’s great presentation “Bugs & Kisses – Spying on BlackBerry users for fun” is the piece they are after. Whatever they look for, this search term may help to shed light to an aspect that seems a bit overlooked in the ongoing debate about governments (U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, India) trying to get their hands on communication acts performed with BlackBerries in their countries.
[For those interested in that discussion this blog entry of Bruce Schneier may serve as a starting point.]
Given that most readers of this blog using a BlackBerry will most likely do so with a BlackBerry Enterprise Server (BES) installation, in this post I’ll focus on those deployments and will subsequently not cover BlackBerry Internet Service (BIS) scenarios.
RIM, very understandably, stresses the fact that in the current BES architecture – presumably – they [RIM] can only process (thus “see”) the data stream encrypted (by symmetric ciphers regarded sufficiently secure) between the BES servers usually placed on corporate soil and the endpoint devices (the Blackberries themselves).
What they don’t mention is the simple fact that cryptographic techniques quite often only secure some data’s transport path, but not elements on the endpoints (where the data is unencrypted and further processed). What if either the (BlackBerry) devices provide means to eavesdrop on the traffic – and Sheran discussed the relevant APIs in his talk, referring to the “Etisalat case” where in 2009 the major U.A.E. telecommunications provider distributed a software application for Blackberries that essentially allowed somebody [who?] to eavesdrop on emails by sending a copy of each email to a certain server – or even the BES itself is “somehow interfered with”? This article from Indiatimes at least suggests the latter possibility for BES servers located in India. Here’s a quoted excerpt:
“Significantly, the only time an enterprise email sent from a BlackBerry device remains in an un-encrypted or ‘readable’ format is when it resides in the enterprise server. ‘Feeding the email from the enterprise server to the ISP’s monitoring systems can, accordingly, help security agencies access the communication in pure text form’, DoT [India’s Department of Telecommunications] proposal said.”
So, in short, just discussing if BlackBerry based communication can be intercepted in transit may be a bit short-sighted. Thinking about the devices and the code they run (and who’s allowed to install applications, by what means/from which sources, yadda yadda yadda) or considering “some countries’ regulatory requirements” when deploying BES servers might be helpful, too.
It should be noted that we do not allege RIM any dishonest motives whatsoever (actually we have a quite positive stance as for the overall security posture of their products, if nothing else see for example this newsletter analysing the over-the-air generation of master encryption keys between the BES and the devices).
We just want to raise some awareness to the mentioned “blind spots” in the current debate.
Have a great day,