This is currently the most frequent search term leading Internet users to the
Troopers website.
Probably Sheran Gunasekera’s great presentation “Bugs & Kisses – Spying on BlackBerry users for fun”
is the piece they are after. Whatever they look for, this search term may help
to shed light to an aspect that seems a bit overlooked in the ongoing debate
about governments (U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, India) trying to get their hands on
communication acts performed with BlackBerries in their countries.
[For those interested in that discussion
this blog entry of Bruce Schneier
may serve as a starting point.]
Given that most readers of this blog using a BlackBerry will most likely do so with a BlackBerry Enterprise Server (BES) installation, in this post I’ll focus on those deployments and will subsequently not cover BlackBerry Internet Service (BIS) scenarios.
RIM, very understandably, stresses the fact that in the current BES architecture – presumably – they [RIM] can only process (thus “see”) the data stream encrypted (by symmetric ciphers regarded sufficiently secure) between the BES servers usually placed on corporate soil and the endpoint devices (the Blackberries themselves).
What they don’t mention is the simple fact that cryptographic techniques quite
often only secure some data’s transport path, but not elements on the endpoints
(where the data is unencrypted and further processed). What if either the
(BlackBerry) devices provide means to eavesdrop on the traffic – and Sheran
discussed the relevant APIs in his talk, referring to the
“Etisalat case”
where in 2009 the major U.A.E. telecommunications provider distributed a
software application for Blackberries that essentially allowed somebody [who?]
to eavesdrop on emails by sending a copy of each email to a certain server – or
even the BES itself is “somehow interfered with”?
This article from Indiatimes
at least suggests the latter possibility for BES servers located in India.
Here’s a quoted excerpt:
“Significantly, the only time an enterprise email sent from a BlackBerry device
remains in an un-encrypted or ‘readable’ format is when it resides in the
enterprise server. ‘Feeding the email from the enterprise server to the ISP’s
monitoring systems can, accordingly, help security agencies access the
communication in pure text form’, DoT [India’s Department of
Telecommunications] proposal said.”
So, in short, just discussing if BlackBerry based communication can be intercepted in transit may be a bit short-sighted. Thinking about the devices and the code they run (and who’s allowed to install applications, by what means/from which sources, yadda yadda yadda) or considering “some countries’ regulatory requirements” when deploying BES servers might be helpful, too.
It should be noted that we do not allege RIM any dishonest motives whatsoever
(actually we have a quite positive stance as for the overall security posture of
their products, if nothing else see for example
this newsletter
analysing the over-the-air generation of master encryption keys between the BES
and the devices).
We just want to raise some awareness to the mentioned “blind spots” in the
current debate.
Have a great day,
Enno