In this post I want to talk about a very essential part of my workflow when dealing with Bluetooth devices, particularly IoT devices with a corresponding mobile app: Live capture of Android Bluetooth traffic with Wireshark.
Before you stop reading because you think you know how to do this already, the method does not involve pulling bug reports off your phone, and it does not require root. And most importantly it gives you a live packet log in Wireshark.
Continue readingGoogle Play Protect is a built-in Android solution that enhances devices’ security. Its main job is to detect and block malware on Android devices. Several malware families were known for bypassing Play Protect checks in recent years. This brings us to an important question: “Is Google Play Protect a Reliable Malware Detector?”. This blog post shows how Play Protect deals with various Android malware in different scenarios. I deal with Play Protect as a black box.
Continue readingSpymax is a mobile Remote Administration Tool (RAT) that enables an attacker to control victims’ devices through an Android malware. Once the malware is installed on a phone, the attacker can execute many attacks that highly impact the confidentiality and integrity of the victim’s data, as well as the victim’s privacy. It is powerful, widely available, and does not require root privileges on the victim’s device. In this blogpost, I show the capabilities of this RAT and analyze how its Android malware works.
Continue readingNowadays, Bluetooth is an integral part of mobile devices. Smartphones interconnect with smartwatches and wireless headphones. By default, most devices are configured to accept Bluetooth connections from any
nearby unauthenticated device. Bluetooth packets are processed by the Bluetooth chip (also called a controller), and then passed to the host (Android, Linux, etc.). Both, the firmware on the chip and the host Bluetooth subsystem, are a target for Remote Code Execution (RCE) attacks.
On November 3rd, 2019, we have reported a critical vulnerability affecting the Android Bluetooth subsystem. This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2020-0022 and was now patched in the latest security patch from February 2020. The security impact is as follows:
Users are strongly advised to install the latest available security patch from February 2020. If you have no patch available yet or your device is not supported anymore, you can try to mitigate the impact by some generic behavior rules:
Continue readingWhen you are working in the area of mobile security, you sooner or later receive requests from clients asking you to test specific ‘Mobile Device Management’ (MDM) solutions which they (plan to) use, the corresponding mobile apps, as well as different environment setups and device policy sets.
The expectations are often high, not only for the MDM solutions ability to massively reduce the administrative workload of keeping track, updating and managing the often hundreds or thousands of devices within a company but also regarding the improvements towards the level of security that an MDM solution is regularly advertised to provide.
If you attack someone, they will defend themselves, but if you tickle them, they will eventually crack open. This surprisingly applies to Android apps as well! Therefore, I created AndroTickler, not to test apps against certain attacks or examine them for specific vulnerabilities, which developers would learn to avoid. However, it helps pentesters to analyze and test apps in their own style, but in a faster, easier and more flexible way. AndroTickler is a Swiss-Army-Knife pentesting tool for Android apps. It provides information gathering, static and dynamic analysis features, and also automates actions that pentesters frequently do and highly need during their pentests. In addition, it makes use of the powerful Frida to hook to the app and manipulate it in real-time.
Continue readingHello again.
Andrei Costin (at http://firmware.re project) is here, and this is the second post from a series of guest postings courtesy of ERNW (thanks Niki and Enno!).
Few days ago, the first CCS’16 summarization post went online: https://insinuator.net/2016/11/introduction-ccs16-day-1-24th-october-2016/
It summarized five presentations of the 6th Annual Workshop on Security and Privacy in Smartphones (SPSM’16). In short, it contained presentations on: over-the-top and phone number abuse, smartphone fingerprinting, apps privacy increase and protection/security, and apps privacy ranking.
Continue readingWe’re using our smart phones every day to manage contacts, calendar entries, e-mail, and social communication (please note that we at ERNW still have a strict “no company data on smartphones/tablets” – which includes email). Everything is easy to use and automated syncing provides access to our data from anywhere. Data is stored in most cases on premises of a cloud service provided by the OS vendor of your smart phone – mostly Google, Apple or Microsoft. You don’t need to pay for this service – and the cloud provider could use your data for personalization and service improvements.
Continue readingHi there,
a few weeks ago I held a talk at UnFUCK, a small University con from students for students. I had decided to give a short talk on “Owning Stuff via USB” aka how to use our TR14 Badge! During the preparations and while building my demos, I tested my new USB RubberDucky. One rather “trivial” demo was actually to use it as a keyboard on an Android phone.
Android has been able to use the USB OTG features for quite a while now, where most people enjoy being able to connect a USB stick to a phone, some others might have already used a keyboard on a tablet. OTG enables a USB device to play master and hence connect two USB devices to each other. For this the fifth PIN on a micro USB cable is used (it’s simply pulled down to ground). To be able to use USB OTG you both need a special cable (micro USB to female USB A) and a master device with all the necessary drivers. Depending on the Android device and the client (USB stick/HDD, keyboard) you want to connect you might need a rooted phone.When trying the RubberDucky on Android for the first time, I had a S3, a Nexus 4, a Nexus 5 and an SE Xperia Z1. All of these devices detected the Ducky as a keyboard and I was able to write stuff on the phone. But I hadn’t aimed at “just typing text”, I wanted to type numbers or rather PINs –> One can use the external keyboard while unlocking the device. The Ducky’s user guide contains an example script for bruteforcing PINs on Android. But how?
Just type!