A few weeks ago I gave a presentation with the above title at some corporate
infosec event. Given I’ve been asked for the slides many times now, I’ve
converted them to a PDF which can be found
here.
We hope to contribute to the necessary debate thereby…
That meeting was actually a
great event. Once more, big thanks! to Fernando for organizing it and to
EANTC for providing the logistics.
A couple of unordered notes to follow:
a) The slides of our contribution can be found
here.
Again, pls note that this is work in progress and we’re happy to receive any
kind of feedback.
[given Fernando explicitly mentioned Troopers, we’ve allowed ourselves to put
some reference to it into this version of the slide deck…]
a) if you’re interested in the technical details of these attacks (and
mitigation advice), pls see
this excellent technical
report the Broadband Internet Technical Advisory Group published last year
(apparently Comcast
had observed
such attacks before).
b) Daniel and I gave a
talk on attacking SNMP
at HITB Dubai 2007 (Hi Amy & Dhillon! 😉) laying
out the basic idea for that type of attack and we later described it in a bit
more detail at ShmooCon 2009 where we
even demoed it publicly (camera recording stopped at that point, for obvious
reasons). We used (a slightly modified version of)
this tool.
From the research we did at the time we can confirm this was/presumably still is
a huge problem, at least for European carriers’ broadband segments (acting as
amplifiers).
Reading
this article from
the Guardian, on this guy apparently being
banned from fully discussing research results in
his talk
at upcoming
USENIX Security, leaves me
scratching my head once more. Things might (as so often) be more complex than
they seem, but this looks like yet-another misconception as for the contribution
of security research (and its public discussion) to the greater good of us all.
Which is unfortunate for the speakers (I’ve been in a similar situation once,
receiving a threatening legal letter from a very large organization one day
before one of our Black Hat presentations and can tell you that stuff like that
doesn’t add to one’s anticipation of the talk or the event…), for the audience
(including some ERNW guys who will be a USENIX-SEC, so, btw, expect a summary
post here) and for the whole community of security researchers.
Next to IETF 87 going on in Berlin
in a few days there will be an
informal meeting of the “IPv6 Hackers”
on Tuesday. We really look forward to personally meet a number of people who we
(so far) only know from the associated
mailing list or
similar machine-enhanced exchange. We hope to contribute as well. Based on the
stuff of
this workshop from
the
IPv6 Security Summit
at Troopers13 we might give a short project
presentation along the lines of “Some Notes on Testing the Real-World IPv6
Capabilities of Commercial Security Products”, providing an overview of some
testing done on commercial gear, together with a discussion of testing
approaches, tools and key aspects.
in this post I’d like to share some reflections on the (potentially inefficient)
way some security controls can be observed to be deployed in complex
organisations and what this may mean for the future of those controls.
In general the space of security controls can be categorized according to
different schemes, such as:
By fundamental principle (preventive, detective, reactive, corrective,
deterrent, compensating etc. security controls. see for example this
overview
or this one or
some illustration
here).
By “state of matter” (e.g. components, implementation, operations. again, for
some supplemental information look at
this one).
By type of admission: whitelisting vs. blacklisting (some general discussion
here,
the respective Schneier-Ranum Face-Off to be found
here,
and this
is only Bruce’s half, but with a number of comments).
Related to the overall architecture of implementation: centralized vs.
distributed.
For today’s topic I’ll just focus on the latter two and will introduce those
shortly.
“Nein! Ein von unbeugsamen Galliern bevölkertes Dorf hört nicht auf, dem
Eindringling Widerstand zu leisten.”
This is a famous quote pretty much every German kid used to know. Not sure if
this still applies though, my three haven’t touched Asterix comics so far.
Anyhow, you might ask why I cite this.
Simple answer: see
this recent article
from the Guardian on a Utah-based ISP “resisting some pressure”. That’s the
spirit…
After his great presentations on
IPv6 Extensions Headers
and
security problems related to fragmentation
we had invited Antonios Atlasis to Heidelberg to give
this workshop
at ERNW. It was a great experience with many fruitful discussions between the
participants (mostly security practitioners from very large organizations
planning to have their Internet edge IPv6 enabled within the next 6-12 months)
and him/us. Antonios thankfully decided to make his
slides
and
scripts
available for those interested in further research on the topics (it should be
noted that the scripts have not been tested thoroughly and he’s happy to receive
feedback of any kind at antoniosDOTatlasisDOTgmailDOTcom). Today Marc (Heuse)
gives
his workshop
on pentesting in the IPv6 age. Hopefully such events help to move things into
the right direction in the IPv6 security space…