While doing heap research on Linux processes (results are going to be published soon), I came across the bot from the Mirai Botnet. As already mentioned in the blog post by Brian, the Mirai bot uses obfuscated configuration data which contains e.g. the CnC server. When now confronted only with a bot (e.g. in the context of a running task or the ELF binary), but without the according source code, the decryption of this configuration data for e.g. incident analysis purposes might not be easily possible (with the python script from the blog post), if the key has been changed.
But in this case that is not a problem at all, because Continue reading “A short Addendum on the Mirai Botnet Blog Post”
Category: Breaking
Analyzing yet another Smart Home device
As you have probably already recognized, some of us here at ERNW are doing research in the area of smart home technologies e.g. KNX. Recently, we took a deeper look into a device which is used to control a smart home system produced by the vendor BAB TECHNOLOGIE GmbH called “eibPort”. This device can be used to control smart home systems based on different technologies e.g. EnoCean or KNX depending on the version of the device. Continue reading “Analyzing yet another Smart Home device”
Continue readingResearch Diary: Blue Coat
As a part of our research time here at ERNW, last week we had an interesting time looking at one of the widespread and commonly adopted proxy appliance by many organizations Blue Coat Secure Gateway.
Continue reading “Research Diary: Blue Coat”
Continue readingSome Notes from the Lab – BlackNurse in the IPv6 Era
Since BlackNurse was released on 10th of November, we asked ourselves whether this problem does also apply to ICMPv6 traffic. To answer this question, Christian Tanck (one of our students) build a lab with several firewall appliances. Kudos to him for testing and the following blog post.
Continue reading “Some Notes from the Lab – BlackNurse in the IPv6 Era”
Continue readingResearch Diary: IP-Cameras Part 2
Hi everybody,
This is the second entry in our research diary on IP cameras. If you haven’t done so yet, you should read the first entry in advance. This time we focused more on analysis and exploitation.
Another entry vector
After running a vulnerability scan on both devices, it was revealed that the M1033 has multiple buffer overflow vulnerabilities (CVE-2012-5958 to CVE-2012-5965), which are readily exploitable via Metasploit. This gave us another shell (in addition to the root shell mentioned in the last post), though this time it was not a root shell. By using the find command, we searched for executables having the setuid or setgid bit set. We hoped to use one of those to escalate privileges. To do so yourself add the parameter -perm -4000 to find and it will search for files having the setuid bit set. If you try that on your own unix-like device, for example it should yield /bin/passwd which is perfectly reasonable as you’re able to change your password without being root.
Continue reading “Research Diary: IP-Cameras Part 2”
Continue readingResearch Diary: IP-Cameras
As you probably know we perform research on a regular basis at ERNW. This post is the first entry on our – Benjamin’s and Pascal’s – research diary. You might already have seen Oliver’s post on setting up an research environment or Brian’s posts on IoT botnets (here and here). With that in mind we want to take a look at one of the market leaders for network camera equipment: AXIS.
Continue reading “Research Diary: IP-Cameras”
Continue readingIoT the S is for Secure – Unknown Administration Interface in Wireless Plug
Dear Readers,
just recently i bought a wireless plug on Amazon with the main use of controlling my coffee machine with an app. The installation of the wireless plug was quite easy and only requires me to set my Wifi SSID and my passphrase – that’s it. But what happened behind the scenes? I visited the control interface of my router and saw that along with the other devices there was a new one with the network name HF-LPB100 and a local IP address in my case 192.168.0.235. First of all i wondered about the name itself, but ignored that and kept on looking for open ports.
Continue reading “IoT the S is for Secure – Unknown Administration Interface in Wireless Plug”
Continue readingReverse Engineering With Radare2 – Part 3
Sorry about the larger delay between the previous post and this one, but I was very busy the last weeks.
(And the technology I wanted to show wasn’t completely implemented in radare2, which means that I had to implement it on my own 😉 ). In case you’re new to this series, you’ll find the previous posts here.
As you may already know, we’ll deal with the third challenge today. The purpose for this one is to introduce
some constructs which are often used in real programs.
Continue reading “Reverse Engineering With Radare2 – Part 3”
Continue readingA Quick Insight Into the Mirai Botnet
As you might have read, I recently had a closer look at how easy it actually is to become part of an IoT Botnet. To start a further discussion and share some of my findings I gave a quick overview at the recent Dayton Security Summit. The Mirai Botnet was supposed to be one of the case studies here. But the way things go if one starts diving into code…I eventually gave an overview of how the Mirai Bot actually works and what it does. As such: Here a quick summary of the Mirai Botnet bot.
Continue reading “A Quick Insight Into the Mirai Botnet”
Setting up a Research Environment for IP Cameras
Embedded devices often serve as an entry point for an attack on a private or corporate network. The infamous attack on HackingTeam, for example, followed exactly this path as was revealed here. Although the attack may have been for the greater good (refer also to this great keynote), such incidents demonstrate that it is important to properly secure your embedded devices. In a recent blog post, Niklaus presented how he analyzed the security posture of a MAX! Cube LAN Gateway. Moreover, Brian reported a few weeks ago on the security posture of IoT devices (and in particular on one of his cameras). With this post I would like to share my experiences with analyzing another embedded device: the IC-3116W IP camera by Edimax. Continue reading “Setting up a Research Environment for IP Cameras”
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