The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) aims to sensitize manufacturers and the public regarding security risks of networked medical devices in Germany. In response to the often fatal security reports and press releases of networked medical devices, the BSI initiated the project Manipulation of Medical Devices (ManiMed) in 2019. In this project, a security analysis of selected products is carried out through security assessments followed by Coordinated Vulnerability Diclosure (CVD) processes. The project report was published on December 31, 2020, and can be accessed on the BSI website [1].
The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) aims to sensitize manufacturers and the public regarding security risks of networked medical devices in Germany. In response to the often fatal security reports and press releases of networked medical devices, the BSI initiated the project Manipulation of Medical Devices (ManiMed) in 2019. In this project, a security analysis of selected products is carried out through security assessments followed by Coordinated Vulnerability Diclosure (CVD) processes. The project report was published on December 31, 2020, and can be accessed on the BSI website [1].
The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) aims to sensitize manufacturers and the public regarding security risks of networked medical devices in Germany. In response to the often fatal security reports and press releases of networked medical devices, the BSI initiated the project Manipulation of Medical Devices (ManiMed) in 2019. In this project, a security analysis of selected products is carried out through security assessments followed by Coordinated Vulnerability Diclosure (CVD) processes. The project report was published on December 31, 2020, and can be accessed on the BSI website [1].
In the last blog post, we discussed how fuzzers determine the uniqueness of a crash. In this blog post, we discuss how we can manually triage a crash and determine the root cause. As an example, we use a heap-based buffer overflow I found in GNU readline 8.1 rc2, which has been fixed in the newest release. We use GDB and rr for time-travel debugging to determine the root cause of the bug.
NSX-T is a Software-Defined-Networking (SDN) solution of VMware which, as its basic functionality, supports spanning logical networks across VMs on distributed ESXi and KVM hypervisors. The central controller of the SDN is the NSX-T Manager Cluster which is responsible for deploying the network configurations to the hypervisor hosts.
This summer, I looked into the mechanism which is used to add new KVM hypervisor nodes to the SDN via the NSX-T Manager. By tracing what happens on the KVM host, I discovered that the KVM hypervisor got instructed to download the NSX-T software packages from the NSX-T Manager via unencrypted HTTP and install them without any verification. This enables a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacker on the network path to replace the downloaded packages with malicious ones and compromise the KVM hosts.
After disclosing this issue to VMware, they developed fixes and published the vulnerability in VMSA-2020-0023 assigning a CVSSv3 base score of 7.5.
With this blog post I am pleased to announce the publication of a new ERNW White Paper [1]. The paper is about severe vulnerabilities in an insulin pump we assessed during project ManiMed and we are proud to publish this subset of the results today.
Last week I attended ACM WiSec. Of course, only virtually. The first virtual conference I attended. Coincidentally, it was also the first conference I presented at. While the experience was quite different from a “real” conference, the organizers did a great job to make the experience as good as possible with, for example, a mattermost instance to interact with other conference participants.
In the following, I will list a few talks and papers that I either found very interesting or that generally stood out to me:
Digital networking is already widespread in many areas of life. In the healthcare industry, a clear trend towards networked devices is noticeable, so that the number of high-tech medical devices in hospitals is steadily increasing.
In this blog post, we want to elucidate a vulnerability we identified during the security assessment of a patient monitor. The device sends HL7 v2.x messages, such as observation results to HL7 v2.x capable electronic medical record (EMR) systems. A user with malicious intent can tamper these messages. As HL7 v2.x is a common medical communication standard, we also want to present how this kind of vulnerability may be mitigated. The assessment was part of the BSI project ManiMed, which we would like to present in the following section.
Nowadays, Bluetooth is an integral part of mobile devices. Smartphones interconnect with smartwatches and wireless headphones. By default, most devices are configured to accept Bluetooth connections from any
nearby unauthenticated device. Bluetooth packets are processed by the Bluetooth chip (also called a controller), and then passed to the host (Android, Linux, etc.). Both, the firmware on the chip and the host Bluetooth subsystem, are a target for Remote Code Execution (RCE) attacks.
One feature that is available on most classic Bluetooth implementations is answering over Bluetooth pings. Everything an attacker needs to know is the device’s Bluetooth address. Even if the target is not discoverable, it typically accepts connections if it gets addressed. For example, an attacker can run l2ping, which establishes an L2CAP connection and sends echo requests to the remote target.
In the following, we describe a Bluetooth zero-click short-distance RCE exploit against Android 9, which got assigned CVE-2020-0022 . We go through all steps required to establish a remote shell on a Samsung Galaxy S10e, which was working on an up-to-date Android 9 when reporting the issue on November 3 2019. The initial flaw used for this exploit is still present in Android 10, but we utilize an additional bug in Bionic (Android’s libc implementation), which makes exploitation way easier. The bug was finally fixed in the security patch from 1.2.2020 in A-143894715. Here is a demo of the full proof of concept:
