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How ‘security’ black boxes might corrupt your investment

Usually I’m not the kind of guy who talks about such economic topics. Because I’m an engineer / security researcher who is exclusively concerned with understanding technical problems and if possible, solving them accordingly. My whole education is based on this and contains predominantly technical aspects of information security. This sometimes makes it difficult to understand what the market cares about (and why some products are being developed / exist on the market 😉 ). Nevertheless, a current engagement for one of our customers made me stumble upon such a product.

We were involved in a test where a security appliance (a black box 😉 ) played the core role. As you might know, the test procedure generally depends on the security question to be answered. In this case the question to be answered was, whether the black box provides the promised information security benefit. More specifically, we took a look at the environment / infrastructure, the protocols and the systems around it and checked if the black box does its magic. So the black box itself wasn’t in direct focus of the test. We were quite amazed about the blind trust the product received (but what else can one do, but trust the device they have already purchased ;-)? You can analyze it and that is what we did. Continue reading “How ‘security’ black boxes might corrupt your investment”

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Discover the Unknown: Analyzing an IoT Device

This blog post will give a brief overview about how a simple IoT device can be assessed. It will show a basic methodology, what tools can be used for different tasks and how to solve problems that may arise during analyses. It is aimed at readers that are interested in how such a device can be assessed, those with general interest in reverse engineering or the ones who just want to see how to technically approach an unknown device.

This post will most likely not cover any vulnerabilities per se. However, it outlines weaknesses which affect a wide range of IoT devices so various aspects are applicable to other devices and scenarios.

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Classic Web Vulns Found in Google Search Appliance 7.4

Google Search AppliancesHi all,

I’ve recently found some sort of classic web vulnerabilities in the Google Search Appliance (GSA) and as they are now fixed [0][1][2], I’d like to share them with you.

First of all, some infrastructure details about the GSA itself. The GSA is used by companies to apply the Google search algorithms to their internal documents without publishing them to cloud providers. To accomplish this task, the GSA provides multiple interfaces including a search interface, an administrative interface and multiple interfaces to index the organization’s data. Continue reading “Classic Web Vulns Found in Google Search Appliance 7.4”

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How to crack a white-box without much effort

By: Philippe Teuwen (@doegox)

White-box cryptography is a relatively new field that aims at enabling safely cryptographic operations in hostile situations.
A typical example is its use in digital-right management (DRM) schemes, but nowadays you also find white-box implementations in mobile applications such as Host Card Emulation (HCE) and the protection of credentials to the cloud.
In all these use-cases the software implementation uses the secret key of a third-party which should remain secret from the owner of the device which is running this executable.

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How to test Kerberos authenticated web applications?

First of all: This is not an in-depth Kerberos how-to, nor is this tutorial about the different aspects of web application testing. This tutorial is just to give support in testing Kerberos authenticated web applications. The goal is to hand over the right tools and steps to be able to perform the configuration and be able to test the application.

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Denial of Service attacks on VoLTE

Some weeks ago Hendrik explained in his blogpost Security Analysis of VoLTE, Part 1 some attack vectors for Voice over LTE (VoLTE). One attack vector introduced was Denial of Service (DoS), which I also discussed in my Masterthesis “Evaluation of IMS security and Developing penetration tests of IMS”.

In general, DoS attacks aim to prevent a system or a network from efficiently providing its service to legitimate users . The impact of such attacks can vary from a big degradation of quality to total blockage. DoS can occur on users level, where a user or a group of users cannot use the service. But the common conception of DoS is on the service level, where the whole service is broken, unstable or totally down. This blog post is about targeting DoS of the whole VoLTE service by attacking IMS.
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Damn Vulnerable Safe

A while back Stefan and I held a little crash course/orientation run on hardware hacking at a German Fachhochschule. Planning to use something “real” we went for a simple electronic safe with a bunch of different vulnerabilities. I guess most security guys who spend a fair amount of time in hotels will understand this choice. As we needed something we could rely on would break, we stripped the device and swapped the original electronics for our own. The result was the “Damn Vulnerable Safe”.

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Dynamic IDA Enrichment (aka. DIE)

Last year on the Hex-rays plugin Contest the Dynamic IDA Enrichment (DIE) plugin won first place, so we decided to have a look and play around with it.

DIE extends IDA to add Dynamic Data to the static analysis. So after the installation, we are able to perform the static analysis using a lot of supporting information from the actual execution of the binary under assessment.

Since DIE is purely written in Python you will need at least Python 2.7 and IDA Versions prior to 6.8 won´t work. In the current version DIE will only work on Windows which will hopefully soon be available cross-platform.

To setup the environment for DIE just use pip install –r requirements.txt (requirements.txt are shipped with DIE).
Copy die_proxy.py to the IDA Plugin directory and add an environment Variable named DIEDIR including the path to the DIE directory. Continue reading “Dynamic IDA Enrichment (aka. DIE)”

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Security Analysis of VoLTE, Part 1

Hello everybody,
this time I’d like to share some thoughts and results about our telco research last year. We gathered a lot of information out of some projects we’d like to share and discuss with you. The following sections also provide an idea of the upcoming Telecommunication Security Workshop I will give with Kevin Redon at Troopers (click). The workshop will be about Radio Network Security (covered by Kevin) and security aspects of the Core Network (covered by myself), mainly focusing on Voice over LTE (VoLTE). That’s also the topic of today’s post.
Continue reading “Security Analysis of VoLTE, Part 1”

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