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Disclosure: Authentication Bypass in VERTIV Avocent AutoView (Version 2.10.0.0.4736)

The VERTIV Avocent AutoView switches are analog keyboard, video, and mouse (KVM) switches used in data center servers. They also expose a web server in the network, which allows for some configuration.

During a penetration test for a customer, a device of this type was identified in the infrastructure and analyzed, revealing an authentication bypass in the web application.

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Vulnerability Disclosure: Stealing Emails via Prompt Injections

With the rise of AI assistance features in an increasing number of products, we have begun to focus some of our research efforts on refining our internal detection and testing guidelines for LLMs by taking a brief look at the new AI integrations we discover.

Alongside the rise of applications with LLM integrations, an increasing number of customers come to ERNW to specifically assess AI applications. Our colleagues Florian Grunow and Hannes Mohr analyzed the novel attack vectors that emerged and presented the results at TROOPERS24 already.

In this blog post, written by my colleague Malte Heinzelmann and me, Florian Port, we will examine multiple interesting exploit chains that we identified in an exemplary application, highlighting the risks resulting from the combination of sensitive data exposure and excessive agency. The target application is an AI email client, which adds a ChatGPT-like assistant to your Google Mail account.

Ultimately, we discovered a prompt injection payload that can be concealed within HTML emails, which is still interpreted by the model even if the user does not directly interact with the malicious email.

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Windows Hello for Business – Faceplant: Planting Biometric Templates

We are back from Black Hat USA, where we presented our research on Windows Hello for Business (Slides) once more. In the last two blog posts, we have discussed the architecture of WHfB and past attacks, as well as how the database works and how to swap identities in the database.

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Windows Hello for Business – The Face Swap

In the last blog post, we discussed the full authentication flow using Windows Hello for Business (WHfB) with face recognition to authenticate against an Active Directory with Kerberos and showcased existing and new vulnerabilities. In this blog post, we dive into the architectural challenges WHfB faces and explore how we can exploit them.

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Security Advisory: Airoha-based Bluetooth Headphones and Earbuds

Important note: Some media coverage on this topic falsely or inaccurately depicts the attack conditions. To be clear: Any vulnerable device can be compromised if the attacker is in Bluetooth range. That is the only precondition.


During our research on Bluetooth headphones and earbuds, we identified several vulnerabilities in devices that incorporate Airoha Systems on a Chip (SoCs). In this blog post, we briefly want to describe the vulnerabilities, point out their impact and provide some context to currently running patch delivery processes as described at this year’s TROOPERS Conference.

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Disclosure: Multiple Vulnerabilities in X.Org X server prior to 21.1.17 and Xwayland prior to 24.1.7

The X11 Window System has been used since September 1987 for Unix desktop systems, allowing applications to display their windows. Today, one of the server implementations of the protocol is the X.Org X server and XWayland, which both use the same codebase. While reviewing the X server, several legacy security issues were identified. These appear to originate from earlier design stages when security considerations were less prominent. Despite the project’s maturity and widespread use, some of these issues have persisted.

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Disclosure: Input Validation Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Bookings

In a recent customer project, we discovered vulnerabilities in Microsoft Bookings, an online appointment scheduling tool integrated into Microsoft 365, allowing companies to have customers book meetings in available times themselves. The findings originate from insufficient input validation on the public meeting scheduling endpoint. Although Microsoft has largely mitigated this vulnerability, our analysis provides important insights into potential risks and areas for improvement.

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Full Disclosure: Multiple Rundeck Job Command Injections

During a red-teaming-style customer project, we managed to get access to an Rundeck API token. Rundeck is a job scheduler and runbook automation platform designed to automate routine IT tasks across multiple systems. At first, we were excited about this API token because if we could create new Rundeck jobs, we could execute arbitrary code on the Rundeck nodes and move laterally from there. However, it turned out that with this token we only had permissions to run existing jobs.

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Vulnerability Disclosure: Restricted Shell Breakout (CVE-2025-1950) and Privilege Escalation (CVE-2025-1951) in IBM Power Hardware Management Console (HMC)

We discovered a private key for accessing an IBM Hardware Management Console (HMC) during a recent red team engagement. The IBM Hardware Management Console (HMC) is a dedicated management system used to control and manage IBM servers, especially those running on Power Systems (like IBM Power9/Power10) and mainframes (z Systems). After brief research, we identified two security vulnerabilities that can be leveraged to gain root access to the HMC.

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CVE-2024-11035: Minor Security Issues in VMware Carbon Black Cloud

We recently conducted a security assessment of VMware Carbon Black Cloud, a unified SaaS solution that integrates endpoint detection and response (EDR), anti-virus, and vulnerability management capabilities. As part of our evaluation, we tested the solution’s ability to detect and prevent malicious activity on Windows and Linux systems. Our analysis focused on the Carbon Black agents for these platforms, and although we did not identify any critical vulnerabilities, we want to share some of the findings in this blog post.

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