This is the second part in the Autonomic Network series. We have introduced previously in our first part the Autonomic Network (AN), took a look about the needed configuration to run it on Cisco gear and what is the expected communication flow. In this post, we will dive deeper to have a closer look on the packets and how they are composed. Cisco’s AN protocol is a proprietary one and as far as I know, the analysis provided here for the protocol is the first of its kind.

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Puh…it’s been a long time since my last post, huh?
However, let’s get straight back to topic. Today, I want to issue a warning, especially in face of upcoming Troopers 2017 (less than two days to go, wooo! 10th anniversary!): be careful when using wireless equipment (presenters, mouses, keyboards,…), especially during Troopers, but also in daily use.

TL;DR Please take into account that you put your laptop at risk of being hacked by using wireless equipment during Troopers. This could lead to a full system compromise. Wirelessly. Attacks like keystroke injection or sniffing of latter and mouse movements are possible. This, e.g. applies to speakers, using wireless presenters (like Logitech R400/R800, old and new models), as also to any attendee or crew member who might use wireless mouses or keyboards. Be aware of this!

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This is a 3-part series which introduces and analyzes Cisco’s implementation for Autonomic Network. In the 1st part, the technology is introduced and we have an overview about communication flow. In the 2nd part, Cisco’s proprietary protocol is reverse engineered ? then finally in the 3rd part, multiple vulnerabilities will be disclosed for the first time. If you’re aware of the technology, you can skip directly to part 2 where the action begins! 

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Last year I encountered a slight variation of an internal port scan vulnerability for the CrystalReports component of SAP Business Objects. The original vulnerability was presented and disclosed by rapid7 in the talk “Hacking SAP Business Objects”. The corresponding slides can be found here.

Basically, the original vulnerability allowed port scanning of (internal) systems via the URL http://hostname/CrystalReports/viewrpt.cwr?id=$ID&wid=$WID&apstoken=ip:port@$TOKEN. By accessing this URL, different responses were received depending on if the port (parameter port in the URL) of the system (parameter ip in the URL) was in the state “open” or “closed”. The original vulnerability has been fixed a long time ago (SAP security note 1432881), but the fix did allow for a slight variation to make the attack work again.

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Tavis did it again[1]. As stated in the title it is possible to remotely execute commands via the Chrome extension for the popular meeting software Cisco WebEx. This post summarizes the most relevant information for you.

A test page with working demo code is available to check for the issue on Windows systems [2]. From our point of view the Chrome extension is affected by this issue as well as the Firefox extension as both extension APIs are quite similar. However, Mozilla blocked the FireFox plugin to protect users from the risk of being exploited through the plugin[3][4]. IE seems to be fine thanks to Cisco’s decision to invoke the WebEx Meeting Center via e.g. ActiveX.

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Hi all,

i´ve looked a bit at the Insomni’hack CTF which took place on the 21st January and lasted for 36 hours.
For the sake of warming up a bit for our Troopers workshop Windows and Linux Exploitation,
I decided to create a write-up of the first pwn50 challenge.

To grab your own copy of the presented files you can also find it in our Github repository:

When downloading the first binary, we are presented with 2 files:

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While doing heap research on Linux processes (results are going to be published soon), I came across the bot from the Mirai Botnet. As already mentioned in the blog post by Brian, the Mirai bot uses obfuscated configuration data which contains e.g. the CnC server. When now confronted only with a bot (e.g. in the context of a running task or the ELF binary), but without the according source code, the decryption of this configuration data for e.g. incident analysis purposes might not be easily possible (with the python script from the blog post), if the key has been changed.
But in this case that is not a problem at all, because

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As you have probably already recognized, some of us here at ERNW are doing research in the area of smart home technologies e.g. KNX. Recently, we took a deeper look into a device which is used to control a smart home system produced by the vendor BAB TECHNOLOGIE GmbH called “eibPort”. This device can be used to control smart home systems based on different technologies e.g. EnoCean or KNX depending on the version of the device. The eibPort comes with a visualization running on a webserver to control the whole system e.g. open or close windows, changing the temperature in different rooms or turning the alarm system on or off by simply clicking on symbols. The following screenshots illustrate an example of such a visualization:

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As a part of our research time here at ERNW, last week we had an interesting time looking at one of the widespread and commonly adopted proxy appliance by many organizations Blue Coat Secure Gateway.

Introduction

The Blue Coat proxy Secure Gateway (SG) has been already in the market since 2001 [1]. The main aim of introducing the appliance was to achieve the following goals [2]:
• High performance optimization.
• Increasing the security measurements, by introducing malware/spyware protections, web based filtering, virus scanning and more.
• Flexible Access Control capabilities.

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Since BlackNurse was released on 10th of November, we asked ourselves whether this problem does also apply to ICMPv6 traffic. To answer this question, Christian Tanck (one of our students) build a lab with several firewall appliances. Kudos to him for testing and the following blog post.

Intro

 

On 10^(th) of November, 2016 the TDC Security Operations Center in Denmark published the BlackNurse Denial of Service Attack Report as an PDF download on their website and a blog post written by Erik Hjelmvik from NETRESEC. He was involved in the project by helping with the analysis of packet dumps, testing different systems, with ideas for test scenarios and at least inspired me with his blog post on how to build a test lab described later in this post. The attack on its own was discovered by the TDC analysts Kenneth B. Jørgensen and Lenny Hansson.

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