It is possible to spoof the URLs that Plume will open to arbitrary locations
because of how Plume parses URLs. The preview of an URL in a tweet will show the
complete (at least the host name and the first few chars of the URL) but
shortened URL. However, if the URL contains a semicolon (;) the URL that will be
opened is the part after the semicolon.
An attacker can make use of this behavior by specifying a URL like the following
in a Tweet or direct message:
Lately, I’ve experienced some weird Pidgin crashes when I
was copy&pasting into chat windows. The strange part was: I didn’t even know
what triggered the crash because I actually didn’t know what was in my clipboard
at this exact point. This is a quick write-up of how I investigated the issue
and some interesting properties I found out about clipboards.
Everything started with a document that I was editing in a Windows VM in
Microsoft Word. At some point, I wanted to copy some lines of the document and
paste it into a Pidgin chat window on my Linux host system. As I did this, I
noticed that when I pasted the data into the chat window it included a lot of
white spaces. I thought something went wrong and just tried to delete it by
pressing CTRL+A (to mark everything) and press BACKSPACE. But this caused Pidgin
(2.13.0-5 on Arch Linux) to close with a segfault and created a core dump.
This is a write-up about how to use Frida to dump
documents from a process after they have been loaded and decrypted. It’s a
generic and very effective approach demonstrated on a piece of software from
North Korea.
Some time ago we received an ISO file which was a dump of a CD-ROM from North
Korea. The only information we got was that it included a document viewer and
various PDF documents. I started to dump the content of the ISO in order to
analyze what the reader was actually doing by mounting it:
Recently, we identified security issues in the Nexus Repository Manager software
developed by Sonatype. The tested versions were OSS 3.12.1-01 and OSS 3.13.1-01.
We identified a Java Expression Language Injection in the role and user creation
function. In order to exploit this issue, the attacker needs to be authenticated
with high privileges, the standard anonymous user is not sufficient.
We recently identified security issues in the UNIFY OpenScape Desk Phone CP600
HFA software. We disclosed the vulnerabilities to Unify, as a fix is now
provided we want to give a brief overview of the vulnerability affecting the web
interface.
We were able to identify the following vulnerabilities in the Web interface of
the telephone:
Command Injection in Picture Delete function of OpenScape Desk Phone Webportal
Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Access in the OpenScape Desk Phone Webportal
Memory Corruption in the OpenScape Desk Phone Webservice
Missing Hardening of the OpenScape Desk Phone Webservice Binary
Cross Site Request Forgery Missing in the OpenScape Desk Phone Webservice
For those who never heard of Sitefinity before, it is an ASP.NET-based Web
Content Management System (WCMS), which is used to deploy and manage
applications as other CMS‘s do. A bitter quick glance at Sitefinity and its
advantages can be found in
this overview.
Delving into the core of this blog post, recently I had the opportunity to look
at Sitefinity WCMS in which I found two reflectedCross Site Scripting
(XSS)
(CVE-2018-17053 and CVE-2018-17056), a* stored
XSS*
(CVE-2018-17054)
and an arbitrary file upload
(CVE-2018-17055)
vulnerabilities.
Recently, I had some time to play around with HEVD
[1], an
extremly vulnerable Windows driver available for 32-bit and 64-bit systems.
Since exploits for all vulnerabilities of the 32-bit variant are publically
available, I was wondering why this is not the case for the 64-bit version,
especially for the pool corruption and UAF vulnerabilities.
After digging around a bit, it turned out that the reason is the following. HEVD
uses a “special” sized object which is improperly handled such that a
Use-After-Free vulnerability arises.
Taking a look at the
CVE List for WordPress,
most vulnerabilities aren’t found within the WordPress core but inside of
third-party plugins and themes.
Today, let’s talk about WordPress.
Performing a WordPress assessment might seem boring at first as core
functionality [tested] and configuration does not allow for extensive security
misconfigurations. Luckily, most instances use plugins and themes to add
features not offered by the WordPress core.
In this blog post I would like to discuss the findings and how I discovered
them. Also, I will describe different vendor responsiveness reaching from not
responding at all, to not understanding the issue to fast and professional
responses kindly asking for a review of the updated code ready for deployment.
IoT is everywhere right now and there are a lot of products out there. I have
been looking at an IP Gateway lately and found some serious issues. The
Busch-Welcome IP-Gateway from Busch-Jaeger
is one of the devices that bridges the gap between sensors and actors in your
smart home and the network/Internet. It enables the communication to a door
control system that implements various smart home functions. The device itself
is offering an HTTP service to configure it, which is protected by a username
and password. Some folks even actually expose the device and its login to the
Internet. I tried to configure one of these lately and stumbled upon some
security issues that I would like to discuss in this blog post.
Lately I’ve been analyzing a .NET binary that was quite interesting. It was a
portable binary that shipped without any third-party dependencies. I started
looking at the .NET assembly with ILSpy and noticed that there was not that much
code that ILSpy found and there were a lot of references to classes/methods that
were neither in the classes identified by ILSpy nor were they part of the .NET
framework.
At some point I was going through everything that ILSpy displayed about the
binary, including the resources which were looking very interesting: