Events

Observations from the Cisco Live Europe Wifi Infrastructure

Given that Enno and I are network geeks, and that I am responsible for setting up the Troopers Wifi network I was curious which components might be used at Cisco Live and which IPv6 related configuration was done for the Wifi network to ensure a reliable network and reduce the chatty nature of IPv6. Andrew Yourtchenko (@ayourtch) already did an amazing job last year at Cisco Live Europe explaining in detail (at the time session BRKEWN-2666) the intricacies of IPv6 in Wifi networks, and how to optimize IPv6 for these networks. He was also a great inspiration for me when setting up the Troopers Wifi network a couple of weeks later. Thank You!

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Building

Evaluating Behavior-based Malware Detection

Quite some organizations complemented their traditional AV solutions with a technology that can best be described as behavior-based malware detection. While we all know we are talking about products like Fireeye Email/Network Security, zScaler Web Security/APT Protection, or Cisco WSA, there are a lot of terms around to describe this type of products (such as next generation malware analysis/detection, Secure Web Gateways, or behavior-based malware detection). Those offerings typically promise the detection of malware by analyzing the behavior of ‘samples’ (which are files captured in transit of different types, such as executables or PDF documents). However, beyond the taxonomy challenges, both assessment and consulting work gets us frequently in contact with those solutions. While the main task during assessments is to bypass those solutions, the main question in the consulting context typically is “to what degree are the solutions suited to protect from common targeted attacks in the enterprise context”. Luckily, the experience from assessment work allows us to tackle this question in a structured way (which is our approach for consulting anyways: Benefit from our assessment experiences in order to provide reasonable consulting advice…).

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Breaking

Riding the Z-Wave, Part 1

Simple everyday work dialog:
“The heater in the basement is still missing a proper thermostat, the ‘binary solution’ isn’t that effective”
–  “Buy one…”
–  “Ok”
–  “Get one you can break…”
– “Ok, but then I’d like a few tools, too”
– “Go for it.”
(That’s the way work should be!)
Result of the dialog: a Danfoss Living Connect Z ( 014G0013 ) and a TI CC1100 Wireless Mini Dev Kit plus a copy of Z-Force to start with.
Goal: Talk to the thermostat!

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Breaking

(In-)secure SD cards on WP8.1

During our first year of testing Windows Phone 8 applications we had yet another, let’s say: “surprising” finding. It all started with the first approaches on pentesting mobile applications on that  new and rather closed platform. Lacking jailbreak, root, and similar approaches we had a closer look at alternate approaches to have a look at an apps interior. We quickly hooked onto using modified firmwares (with deeper system access) and found a perfect solution in a little flaw concerning the handling of SD cards in WP8.1. A flaw that was, sadly for us, fixed silently….

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Misc

Skeleton Key – a Nasty Piece of Malware. Some Remarks.

Just recently, Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit(TM) (CTU) researchers published details (see http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/skeleton-key-malware-analysis/ ) on a especially nasty piece of malware that bypasses authentication on Active Directory (AD) systems which implement single-factor (password only) authentication. Once deployed the malware stays quite noiseless in the Domain Controller´s (DC) RAM, and the DC´s replication issues caused by it weren´t interpreted – in this case – during months as a hint for system compromise. Probably the malware´s modification on the LSASS process reduced the DC´s ability to perform DC-to-DC authentication, but this is only speculation and not where we would like to go today.

So, what to do? The relevant mitigations, pointed out by Dell´s CTU, as event log monitoring and scanning processes on suspicious systems with the published YARA signature should be applied.
Still, let’s discuss for a second which long-term, preventative measures could come into play as well. Continue reading “Skeleton Key – a Nasty Piece of Malware. Some Remarks.”

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Building

How To Configure Snort to Stop IPv6 Evasion Attacks

This is a guest post from Antonios Atlasis.

Hi all,

during our BlackHat US 2014 talk titled “Evasion of High-End IPS Devices in the Age of IPv6”, among others we discussed a Snort preprocessor rule (116:456) which, when enabled (not the case by default), triggers an alert when an IPv6 datagram with nine (9) or more IPv6 Extension Headers is used (such a header was used by us to evade Snort). However, we mentioned that:

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Events

31C3 Recap

As every year some of us used the holidays to visit the Chaos Communication Congress to socialize with like-minded people and to hear interesting talks.
I mean what other reasons than learning about security might exist to leave behind all your lovely in-laws you’ve been sharing some relative’s house with the days before … 😉
Here is a short recap of some of the talks we found most interesting:

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Building

DHCPv6 Guard: Do It Like RA Guard Evasion

Or: When Cisco ACL Can Count Up to Five 🙂

This is a guest post by Antonios Atlasis.

Hi all,

RA Guard Evasion is well-known in the IPv6 “circles”; there is RFC 7113 Advice for IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard) and many interesting blog-posts like this one here, here, and this excellent write-up here that discuss this issue.
Moreover, as Jim Smalls states in his comprehensive “IPv6 Attacks and Countermeasures” presentation given at the North American IPv6 Summit 2013, DHCPv6 Guard or a corresponding IPv6 ACL can stop a DHCPv6 Rogue Servers, but (only?) for non-malicious/non-fragmented DHCPv6 packets (slide 35). However, at that time there wasn’t any known attack tool in the wild that had the fragmentation evasion built in.

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