When conducting pentests of Bluetooth devices or whilst working on Bluetooth related research, we often use Bumble. In this Blogpost I will present a solution to capture a live stream of Bumble Bluetooth traffic in Wireshark.
We are regularly offering a GCP Incident Response and Analysis training. In this training, we analyze resources in GCP cloud together with our trainees that were successfully compromised by attackers, e.g., GCE instances and Cloud Build projects. Therefore, we need tooling that quickly detects misconfiguration of resources that helped the attacker during the compromise. During the analysis of different tools and different kinds of misconfiguration we realized that GCE instance access scopes are a blind spot of many (in fact all that we tested) security audit tools. In this blog post, we want to elaborate on the problems that arise from this behavior.
About six months ago we released a security advisory on this blog about vulnerabilities in Airoha-based Bluetooth headphones and earbuds. Back then, we didn’t release all technical details to give vendors more time to release updates and users time to patch their devices. Around the time of the initial partial disclosure in the beginning of June, Airoha put out an SDK release for their customers that mitigates the vulnerabilities. Now, half a year later, we finally want to publish the technical details and release a tool for researchers and users to continue researching and check whether their devices are vulnerable.
This blog post is about CVE-2025-20700, CVE-2025-20701, and CVE-2025-20702.
Alongside this blog post, we also released a white paper. It contains some more technical details, as well as information on how to check whether your device might be affected.
Windows Hello for Business is a key component of Microsoft’s passwordless authentication strategy. It enables user authentication not only during system sign-in but also in conjunction with new and advanced features such as Personal Data Encryption, Administrator Protection, and Recall. Rather than depending on traditional passwords, Windows Hello leverages a PIN or biometric methods – such as fingerprint or facial recognition – to unlock cryptographic keys protected by the Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
During our recent research, we experimented with different Bluetooth USB dongles. There are tons of options, and sometimes, it’s challenging to determine what chipset a dongle actually contains, what Bluetooth features it supports, and whether it works on Linux. Inspired by the recent ESP32 Bluetooth research, we wondered whether we could turn our Raspberry Pi Pico Ws into a functioning Bluetooth dongle. We had a few lying around, and the advantage here is that we know exactly which Bluetooth controller it uses – the Infineon CYW43439. It’s also very easy to get one. You can just buy the Pico W for a few bucks, even cheaper than some Bluetooth dongles. You also have a controller family that has been researched quite a bit in the internalblue project. However, there was one disadvantage. We did not find any code that exposes the CYW43439’s HCI interface via USB. So we had to write that on our own.
Recently, one of our customers contacted us to investigate the extent of some unwanted and unexpected behavior regarding browsing data of employees.
Employees started contacting IT support because private browser bookmarks, private login credentials etc. showed up on their work machines. All affected employees stated that they never created these bookmarks on work systems. And interestingly, the data seemed to have been collected over quite some time.
Our customer wanted to understand how private data ended up in their environment. Obviously, private employee data in the enterprise landscape could cause some data privacy trouble (GDPR).
Our customer suspected that Microsoft Teams might be related to this because the company’s employees are allowed to join Teams meetings from private devices. Since this option was often used in many companies during COVID-related work-from-home times, we suspect that a larger number of enterprises may be affected by this problem.
In a recent incident response project, we had the chance to virtually look over the attackers’ shoulder and observe their activities. The attackers used the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) for lateral movement within the compromized environment and beyond (MITRE techniques T1570, T1021). As a matter of fact, RDP creates cache files that contain tiles of the transferred screen recording data. While this fact is well-known and there are existing tools, we found it worth reporting because of two different aspects:
On the one hand, we want to raise awareness for this valuable piece of evidence, explain how it works, how tooling works and how it can be used. In this particular case, the analysis of those cache files yielded valuable insights into the attackers’ activity and allowed further measures.
On the other hand, we found it exciting to look over the attacker’s shoulder, see the desktop as they saw it, and the commands they typed. We want to share parts of those insights as far as we are able to show them publicly.
Auracast, the new Bluetooth LE Broadcast Audio feature has gained some publicity in the past months. The Bluetooth SIG has introduced the LE Audio feature-set to the Bluetooth 5.2 Specification in 2019 and vendors are only now starting to implement it. Auracast facilitates broadcasting audio over Bluetooth LE to a potentially unlimited number of devices. It does not require pairing or interaction between the sender and the receivers.
We also presented this topic at 38c3. This blog post will contain similar contents albeit with some more details.
during a recent Red Teaming engagement Marius Walter from ERNW found a command injection issue in Progress (Kemp) LoadMaster. It was registered as CVE-2024-7591 and scores a CVSS of 10.0.
The vendor already has patches out, make sure to apply them as this is a high severe issue. You can find the official announcement and the patch references on the official support page.
Marius will follow up with a technical blog post on this issue once we think everybody had a realistic chance of applying the patches.
This article is about the massive BSOD triggered by CrowdStrike worldwide on July 19. Analysis and information from CrowdStrike or other sources are regularly published, completing what is expressed here. Updates may also be provided in the future.