When looking at security measures in Microsoft Entra ID environments, a common
recommendation is to implement Conditional Access policies.
Whether Conditional Access is implemented can be quickly checked, and you can
put a check mark next to it in your best-practice compliance form. However,
simply implementing conditional access will not provide much security. A
phishing attack that we recently analyzed highlights this very well.
We are regularly offering a
GCP Incident Response and Analysis
training. In this training, we analyze resources in GCP cloud together with our
trainees that were successfully compromised by attackers, e.g., GCE instances
and Cloud Build projects. Therefore, we need tooling that quickly detects
misconfiguration of resources that helped the attacker during the compromise.
During the analysis of different tools and different kinds of misconfiguration
we realized that GCE instance access scopes are a blind spot of many (in fact
all that we tested) security audit tools. In this blog post, we want to
elaborate on the problems that arise from this behavior.
When you’re analyzing web applications as a pentester or reading pentest reports
about web applications, you will often see findings regarding cookies missing
certain security flags. The Set-Cookie HTTP header and the JavaScript
document.cookie API allow to use, for example, the
flags Secure, Path, and Domain.
Common audit and pentest tools will tell you when your web application does not
or just insecurely implements these cookie flags.
However, they do not provide optimal security even when using these flags
correctly. However, there are mitigations available that partly solve the
issues.
Recently, one of our customers contacted us to investigate the extent of some
unwanted and unexpected behavior regarding browsing data of employees.
Employees started contacting IT support because private browser bookmarks,
private login credentials etc. showed up on their work machines. All affected
employees stated that they never created these bookmarks on work systems. And
interestingly, the data seemed to have been collected over quite some time.
Our customer wanted to understand how private data ended up in their
environment. Obviously, private employee data in the enterprise landscape could
cause some data privacy trouble (GDPR).
Recently, we held a talk at the Winterkongress1 of the Digitale Gesellschaft Schweiz in Winterthur, Switzerland, about our research project on breaking German parcel tracking sites. We could not name all the parcel services for which we identified vulnerabilities respecting disclosure timelines. Today, we describe our findings at GLS, another player in the German parcel market, and the disclosure process of corresponding vulnerabilities.
Findings
Similar to the vulnerabilities previously disclosed for DHL2 and DPD3, and UPS4, we identified that the GLS parcel tracking website discloses the recipient’s geographic area by showing the name of the destination parcel center. Furthermore, the recipient’s ZIP code was used to unlock personal information (including the exact coordinates of the address) and features that influence the parcel delivery process. The website did not implement rate-limiting or other techniques to prevent brute-forcing ZIP codes using the API.
Today, we describe our findings at United Parcel Service of America, Inc. (UPS), another German parcel market player, and the corresponding vulnerabilities’ disclosure process.
Findings
Only a valid tracking number is needed to get the personal information of a parcel’s receiver, including the sender’s location, the recipient’s name, and the recipient’s location (city and country). It was possible to enumerate numerous tracking numbers during testing by iterating from known ones. Since the last digit of a tracking number is a checksum, it can be calculated. Also, certain businesses have a predefined prefix in their tracking numbers. This schema allows the enumeration of every parcel sent from a particular business.
Dennis and I already published blog posts about our research project dealing with vulnerabilities in parcel tracking implementations at DHL and DPD. At the Winterkongress (winter congress) in Winterthur, Switzerland, we had the great opportunity to give a talk about the matter. The talk was recorded and can be watched here.
DigiGes held the Winterkongress, which took place in Winterthur on 01.03. till 02.03.2024. The main topics are ethics, threats, and opportunities of IT. This year, many talks looked at AI in some way.
This blog post is the continuation of our parcel research. We already reported
about how we broke parcel tracking at
DHL
and the disclosure process of the identified problems. As DHL is not the only
parcel service in Germany, we also investigated the other available parcel
services. In this blog post, we want to talk about DPD, also called Geopost,
which belongs to the French Post Office.
Efficient Guessing of Tracking Numbers
DPD uses the recipient’s ZIP code to unlock detailed shipment information and
additional options. After trying some ZIP codes manually, we received CAPTCHA
prompts in the web interface (more on this later).
At Troopers 2023, we gave a talk on how to attack DHL parcel tracking
information based on OSINT. Since we previously had an exemplary disclosure
process about this attack with DHL, Mr. Kiehne (from DHL) joined us to provide
interesting background information and insights on how they addressed our
findings.
We want to thank DHL and especially Mr. Kiehne for sharing those insights with
us at Troopers 2023. It is the ideal case, but still not common that
organizations talk openly about their actions and views on a disclosure process.
The IMF Conference is the International Conference on IT Security Incident
Management & IT Forensics. This year it took place from May 23 to 24 in Munich.
The schedule lists
a lot of interesting talks.
One of the talks was my presentation on a paper about Ceph forensics, based on
my Master Thesis:
The concept of Software Defined Storage (SDS) has become very popular over the
last few years. It is used in public, private, and hybrid clouds to store
enterprise, private, and other kinds of data. Ceph is an
open-source software that implements an SDS stack.