At CSA, I was talking about hypervisors, breakouts and an overview of security measures to protect the host. (Slides)
This ranged from the basic features some hypervisors provide out of the box to advanced features like SELinux, device domain models and XSM-FLASK.
Most of the other talks were more targeted towards management level employees, but even as a fairly technical person I found Mike Bursell’s talk highly interesting. After my talk about securing the host system from a malicious guest, he dealt with the inverse: Technologies to protect a guest from a malicious or compromised host.
Just a short recap from my side regarding this year’s BSide in Las Vegas, NV. It was my first time there and I pretty much enjoyed it. After entering the venue on the first con day (Tuesday) I was a little bit shocked, as the staff sent me to the “end of the line just around the corner” – the end being many corners and many floors away 😉 Speaking to some guys while standing in line, time quickly passed by and before finally hitting the registration desk, there were already some people from the staff giving away the conference badges to the waiting folks. The waiting time was no comparison to last year’s DEF CON, where I (and obviously all the other “humans”, how attendees at DEF CON are called) had to wait nearly _four_ hours to get a badge to enter the con. DEF CON staff already calls this the annual “Line Con”. Enough bashing, back to topic 😉
I’m back from London where I gave a talk about security evaluation of proprietary network protocols. I had a great time at InfoSecurity Intelligent Defence and BSides London, many thanks for inviting me and giving me the opportunity to speak to so much nice people.
Find the abstract and the download link to the slides after the break.
Even in the time of Cloud-based security tools, behavior- and machine learning-based APT detection and colorful security appliances, a lot of vulnerabilities are still buried deep within the protocol layers. For security researchers it is quite a challenge to find those in well documented protocols (take SSL for an example), and when it comes to proprietary protocols, the bar is raised even (significantly) higher. This keynote will show that there is still an urgent need for security evaluation on (undocumented) network protocols, discuss war stories on protocol fails, and also give an introduction into the methodology of protocol reversing and how those protocol fails could have been avoided.