At CSA, I was talking about hypervisors, breakouts and an overview of security
measures to protect the host.
(Slides)
This ranged from the basic features some hypervisors provide out of the box to
advanced features like SELinux, device domain models and XSM-FLASK.
Most of the other talks were more targeted towards management level employees,
but even as a fairly technical person I found Mike Bursell’s
talk highly interesting. After my
talk about securing the host system from a malicious guest, he dealt with the
inverse: Technologies to protect a guest from a malicious or compromised host.
Just a short recap from my side regarding this year’s BSide in Las Vegas, NV. It
was my first time there and I pretty much enjoyed it. After entering the venue
on the first con day (Tuesday) I was a little bit shocked, as the staff sent me
to the “end of the line just around the corner” – the end being many corners and
many floors away 😉 Speaking to some guys while standing in line, time quickly
passed by and before finally hitting the registration desk, there were already
some people from the staff giving away the conference badges to the waiting
folks. The waiting time was no comparison to last year’s DEF CON, where I (and
obviously all the other “humans”, how attendees at DEF CON are called) had to
wait nearly _four_ hours to get a badge to enter the con. DEF CON staff
already calls this the annual “Line Con”. Enough bashing, back to topic 😉
I’m back from London where I gave a talk about security evaluation of
proprietary network protocols. I had a great time at
InfoSecurity Intelligent Defence
and BSides London, many thanks for
inviting me and giving me the opportunity to speak to so much nice people.
Find the abstract and the download link to the slides after the break.
Even in the time of Cloud-based security tools, behavior- and machine
learning-based APT detection and colorful security appliances, a lot of
vulnerabilities are still buried deep within the protocol layers. For security
researchers it is quite a challenge to find those in well documented protocols
(take SSL for an example), and when it comes to proprietary protocols, the bar
is raised even (significantly) higher. This keynote will show that there is
still an urgent need for security evaluation on (undocumented) network
protocols, discuss war stories on protocol fails, and also give an
introduction into the methodology of protocol reversing and how those protocol
fails could have been avoided.