today I want to talk about OSPFv3. I won’t cover the glory details of
OSPFv3, there are smarter guys than me out
there who did that
already 😉 and
there are great resources to familiarize yourself with the protocol. However, it
should be noted that OSPFv3 is not only OSPF for IPv6, OSPFv3 brought some major
enhancements compared to OSPFv2. Wouldn’t it be cool to benefit from the
enhancements in the IPv4 world as well?
Today I want to give you a little teaser about my upcoming talk at the
IPv6 Security Summit about
First-Hop-Security on HP devices. In the past I presented on about
First-Hop-Security in the
Cisco realm and
in virtualized environments.
Until recently, Cisco was mostly the only vendor who had a sufficient
implementation of various IPv6 security features on their access-layer switches,
but HP closed the gap considerably and it’s time to have an in-depth look
at their implementation of those features.
some of you may have seen my last
blog post
about the preparation of the Troopers network. Today I want to give you a little
teaser on what to expect for the
talk
I will present during the IPv6 Security Summit. As the title implies, it’s not
only about building a secure IPv6 WiFi, but also a reliable one. One might think
that there aren’t many differences in comparison to IPv4, but the heavy reliance
on multicast of IPv6 does have implications for Wi-Fi networks in general.
I am currently preparing the Troopers network in a
lab environment to ensure that we all will have a smooth Wi-Fi experience during
Troopers. I wanted to spice things up a little bit for the Wi-Fi deployment
(more on that in a following blogpost) and get rid of IPv4 wherever possible.
Our Wi-Fi infrastructure consists of typical Cisco Access Points (1602) and a
2504 Wireless LAN Controller. Beginning with WLC image 8.0 it is finally
supported to establish the CAPWAP tunnel between the AP and the WLC over IPv6,
which is awesome and I wanted to implement it right away.
Some weeks ago Hendrik explained in his blogpost
Security Analysis of VoLTE, Part 1
some attack vectors for Voice over LTE (VoLTE). One attack vector introduced was
Denial of Service (DoS), which I also discussed in my Masterthesis “Evaluation
of IMS security and Developing penetration tests of IMS”.
In general, DoS attacks aim to prevent a system or a network from efficiently
providing its service to legitimate users . The impact of such attacks can vary
from a big degradation of quality to total blockage. DoS can occur on users
level, where a user or a group of users cannot use the service. But the common
conception of DoS is on the service level, where the whole service is broken,
unstable or totally down. This blog post is about targeting DoS of the whole
VoLTE service by attacking IMS.
I am very happy to announce the second round of talks for the
TelcoSecDay 2016.
As mentioned in my
previous post
it will take place on March 15th. All invitations should be out by now; if you
think you can contribute to the group and you are willing to join us – please
let me know (hschmidt@ernw.de).
Still, not all talks are confirmed but the newly published talks will provide an
idea about TSD 2016 and its discussions.
In this part of the series (for the other parts see
[1],
[2],
[3],
[4],
[5]) we’ll
discuss approaches to implement security measures suited to protect from
IPv6-related threats on the host level.
These can be grouped into the following generic categories each of which will be
described in more detail in the following:
“Minimal machine” approach
Static configuration of IPv6 parameters
Tweaking the behavior of IPv6-related mechanisms/protocols
Local packet filtering
Some of you might recall that we published IPv6 hardening guides for both
Linux
and
Windows a
while ago and we’ll reference those exact documents below, by [Hard_Linux]
and [Hard_Windows] respectively.
In this year’s MSF training we will guide you through the typical steps of the
pentest cycle: information gathering, attacking and looting your targets. For
each step, demos and exercises will help you deepen and test your newly acquired
knowledge. In addition to the typical penetration-test scenarios you will also
learn several advanced aspects of the framework such as: how writing your own
metasploit modules works, how to export payloads and make them undetected. With
a final exercise each day you can finally challenge yourself and apply what you
have learned!
A while back Stefan and I held a little crash course/orientation run on hardware
hacking at a German Fachhochschule. Planning to use something “real” we went for
a simple electronic safe with a bunch of different vulnerabilities. I guess most
security guys who spend a fair amount of time in hotels will understand this
choice. As we needed something we could rely on would break, we stripped the
device and swapped the original electronics for our own. The result was the
“Damn Vulnerable Safe”.
Last year on the
Hex-rays plugin Contest the
Dynamic IDA Enrichment (DIE) plugin won first place, so we decided to have a
look and play around with it.
DIE extends IDA to add Dynamic Data to the static analysis. So after the
installation, we are able to perform the static analysis using a lot of
supporting information from the actual execution of the binary under assessment.
Since DIE is purely written in Python you will need at least Python 2.7 and IDA
Versions prior to 6.8 won´t work. In the current version DIE will only work on
Windows which will hopefully soon be available cross-platform.