Due to the new release of macOS Mojave in September we updated the El Capitan hardening guide.
The hardening guide received a little revamp on some chapters which are now obsolete or had to be changed due to the new features of macOS Mojave. Further, the hardening guide got extended for the new privacy features in macOS Mojave.
You can check it out here. We hope some of you might find it helpful.
Cheers,
Birk
Today I am proud to announce that another paper of my former colleagues from Heilbronn University and me was published in one of the journals with the highest impact factor for Medical Informatics research called JMIR mHealth and uHealth. There is a reason why we published in this journal besides its informatics focus. The journal is an open access journal. That means that readers are not charged on a pay-per-view basis or other business models to access the full text of the paper. In return, the authors need to pay publication fees. In my opinion restricting access to academic research is not a way to go. I think this isn’t a thing we see in the security community often anyway. But this is and was the standard in academia for years.
Last week Will “harmj0y” Schroeder published an excellent technical article titled “Not A Security Boundary: Breaking Forest Trusts” in which he lays out how a highly critical security compromise can be achieved across a forest boundary, resulting from a combination of default AD (security) settings and a novel attack method. His post is a follow-up to the DerbyCon talk “The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory” which he had given together with Lee Christensen and Matt Nelson at DerbyCon (video here). They will also discuss this at the upcoming Troopers Active Directory Security Track (details on some more talks, including Sean Metcalf’s one, can be found in this post or this one).
At this years ARES conference, Jonas Plum (Siemens) and me (Andreas Dewald, ERNW Research GmbH) published a paper about the forensic analysis of APFS, file system internals and presented different methodologies for file recovery. We also publicly released a tool implementing our presented approaches, called afro (APFS file recovery).
APFS is the file system for Apple devices that is used by default on all current iOS mobile devices, as well as macOS since High Sierra, and is thus currently rolled out on a large number of devices. By using afro, we evaluated and compared the different approaches amongst each other and identified the method that so far delivers the best results and compared it to photorec. This showed that AFRO outperforms photorec on the evaluated APFS dataset. In the presentations of this research we were often asked if other tools like Blackbags Blacklight do not already support this recovery process. So, we decided to compare the file recovery capabilities of BlackLight and afro. We wanted to compare afro to the sleuth kit as well, as at the DFRWS conference it was discussed about adding APFS Support to The Sleuthkit Framework, but no implementations are public yet.
Some weeks ago, I tweeted about grabbing clipboard content from KeePass with some PowerShell. From some reactions to this tweet, and after reading it a couple of times again, I realize it was sending the wrong message, and I would like to take a bit more than 280 chars to clarify what I meant when I posted that tweet…
TLDR: Password managers are a must, not using one exposes you to far more risks than using one. Do it.
During a recent customer project we identified several vulnerabilities in the VMware vRealize Automation Center such as a DOM-based cross-site scripting and a missing renewal of session tokens during the login. The vulnerabilities have been disclosed to VMware on November 20th, 2017. A security advisory for the vulnerabilities has been made available here on April 12th, 2018.
Just a few words regarding the cross-site scripting vulnerability. This vulnerability is present within a GET request to the URL /vcac/gadgets/ifr because of certain URL parameters whose values are directly passed to an eval function call. The vulnerable parameters are gwt:onLoadErrorFn and gwt:onPropertyErrorFn. It seems that these parameters are actually never used by the application and we only found them by looking at the source code.
In various scenarios it might be helpful or even required to have a statically compiled version of Nmap available. This applies to e.g. scenarios where only limited user privileges are available and installing anything to the system might not be desirable.
For such cases I’ve started to create recipes to build such binaries. Similar projects are already available on GitHub, but there are several reasons why I chose to create my own tools:
In this article, we describe the impact of the increased use of Docker in corporate environments on forensic investigations and incident analysis. Even though Docker is being used more and more (Portworx, Inc., 2017), the implications of the changed runtime environment for forensic processes and tools have barely been considered. We describe the technological basics of Docker and, based on them, outline the differences that occur with respect to digital evidence and previously used methods for evidence acquisition. Specifically, we look at digital evidence within a Docker container which are lost or need to be acquired in different ways compared to a classical virtual machine, and what new traces and opportunities arise from Docker itself.
A new ERNW whitepaper was just published. I wrote this whitepaper in the course of my bachelor thesis and it examines multi-factor authentication in Microsoft Windows environments:
Credential theft and the subsequent reuse of stolen credentials are a significant problem in today’s information security. To counter the associated risks, a planned approach is required as part of a comprehensive security architecture program. This includes the implementation of multi-factor authentication as an important building block. This whitepaper covers the relevant steps of implementing a multi-factor authentication system in an enterprise environment and closes with a security evaluation.
the last post was about a fuse filesystem which provides a read-only access to the proprietary bluecoat filesystem. After some further investigations based on the possibilities this offered us, I started to implement a tool which allows to modify parts of the filesystem.
Protection Mechanisms
Since last time, the discovered filesystem structures still had unknown fields. Some of those fields could be reconstructed and their purpose in the whole construct. The format of the Partition-Header for example could now be described as