As a follow-up to this post somebody pointed us to this interesting article on S/MIME support and associated certificate mgmt in iOS 5. Nice read which some of you may find worthwhile.
On a related note: if anyone is aware of an easy way/good (3rd party) solution for pushing certs to iOS devices (besides SCEP) we would be very interested in that one. In that case pls leave a comment or shoot us an email.
Continue reading Continue readingA few days ago (on 10/12/2011) Apple launched its new cloud offering which is called — who would have guessed 😉 — iCloud. Since we’re performing quite some research in the area of cloud security, we had a first look at the basic functionality and concepts of the iCloud. Its main features include the possibility to store full backups of Apple devices (at least, an iPhone, iPad or iPod touch running iOS 5 or a Mac running OS X Lion 10.7.2 is required), photos, music, or documents online. The data to be stored online is initially pushed to the cloud storage and then synchronized to any device which is using the same iCloud account. From this moment on, all changes on the cloudified data is immediately synchronized to the iCloud and then pushed to all participating devices. At this point, most infosec people might start to be worried a little bit: The common cloud concept of centralized data storage on premise of a third party does not cope well with the usual control focused approach of most technical infosec guys. The resulting concerns can be attributed to several main cloud computing related risks (which are proposed by ENISA and actually very valuable work:
Continue reading Continue readingWe recently performed a Proof-of-Concept (PoC) implementation of certificate based auth with iPads in some large environment. So far the focus has been mainly on WLAN access; VPN and EAS authentication are going to follow in the next step.
As we figure that the topic might be of interest for some of you, we’ve extracted a certain, not-too-customer-specific part of the deliverable and converted it into an ERNW newsletter. Special thanks go to Rene Graf for leading the project! 😉
Continue reading Continue readingI’m currently involved in a “Remote Access Security Assessment” and you might be wondering what exactly this means. Well, so did we. At least to some degree (btw: last year we provided some notes on types of security assessments here).
It happens quite often we’re brought into an organization to perform “a security assessment” of “some item” (“our network”, “that new procurement portal”, “the PKI” etc.). It happens as well the customer does not have a very clear idea of the way such an assessment should be carried out (telling us “you are the experts, you should know what to do”). Or the five people from the customer’s side present in the kick-off meeting have five different concepts (ok, four. as one of them only wants “to get that damned assessment done so we can finally go live”) and we end up moderating their arguments on what should be tested, how this should be done, when this is going to happen, which type of report format is needed (obviously, there’s different ones, depending on the goal/scope/methodology of the assessment…) etc.
Continue reading Continue readingInteresting presentation just given at Black Hat Vegas.
May be worth a read for those of you responsible for security in networks with MAC users.
have a great weekend,
Enno
Continue readingThis advisory describes an interesting attack vector:
“In the period of December 2010 until August 2011, Cisco shipped warranty CDs that contain a reference to a third-party website known to be a malware repository. When the CD is opened with a web browser, it automatically and without warning accesses this third-party website. Additionally, on computers where the operating system is configured to automatically open inserted media, the computer’s default web browser will access the third-party site when the CD is inserted, without requiring any further action by the user.”
Continue reading Continue readingHi everybody,
eye-catching title of this post, huh?
Actually there is some justification for it ;-), that is bringing
this excellent document covering the exact topic
to your attention.
Other than that this post contains some unordered reflections which arose in a
recent meeting in a quite large organization on the “common current iPad topic”
(executives would like to have/use an iPad, infosec doesn’t like the idea,
business – as we all know – wins, so bring external expertise in “to help us
find a way of doing this securely” yadda yadda yadda).
Which – given those nifty little boxes are _consumer_ devices which were
probably never meant to process sensitive corporate data – might be a
next-to-impossible task… at least in a way that satisfies business expectations
as for “usability”…[btw: can anybody confirm my observation that there’s a
correlation between “rigor of restriction approach” to “number of corporate
emails forwarded to private webmail accounts”?]
A couple of hours ago Christopher (Werny) and I gave this presentation well-organized event bringing together a number of practitioners from the field. While yesterday’s talks were dominated by a certain euphoria and optimistic pioneer spirit, the second day featured some security talks which induced slight shadows to the brave new world of IPv6 ;-). I particularly enjoyed meeting Eric Vyncke from Cisco (one of the two authors of this great book) and Marc “van Hauser” Heuse who released a new version of the THC-IPV6 tool set today. We had some fruitful discussions and we took the opportunity to test some of his newly implemented attacks against “RA Guard” running on a 4948E Chris and I had brought for a demo within our talk. Unfortunately – or fortunately in terms of a “from theory to reality” approach – I have to say that Marc found a quite clever way to circumvent RA Guard by putting the actual “RA payload” into a second frame following a first one mostly containing a “long & empty” destination option (after a fragmentation header pointing to the mentioned second one). To get an idea pls see these screenshots from Wireshark.
Continue reading Continue readingHi,
I’ve discussed the concept of evaluating the operational “feasibility” (or
“impact”, depending on your point of view) of security controls
before.
Some people approached me asking “which considerations should we take into
account when trying to understand or rate this for $SOME_SECURITY_CONTROL?”.
Therefore, in the following I’ll give an unordered list of factors to consider
to get an understanding of the “operational feasibility” of a given security
control. Two things should be noted in advance:
I can’t help myself. And I fully understand that some of you, dear readers, might get a bit annoyed by always hearing the same tune from our side. This post is, surprise!, about yesterday’s Microsoft Patch Tuesday which – as can be seen here and here – disclosed quite a number of vulnerabilities in various Microsoft components. To make the point evoked in this post’s title I’d like to draw your attention to two particular bulletins, both rated as critical.
Continue reading Continue reading