pytacle is a tool inspired
by
tentacle.
It automates the task of sniffing GSM frames of the air, extracting the key
exchange, feeding kraken with the key
material and finally decode/decrypt the voice data. All You need is a
USRP (or similar) to capture the GSM band and a
kraken instance with the
berlin tables (only
about 2TB 😉 )
I’ve posted a preview
before, take a look at the video to see the tool in action.
Microsoft takes this vulnerability quite serious and was acting fast. The
Microsoft Security Response Center announced the availability of a fix last
night in the
MSRC Blog.
The fix will be available via Windows Update on friday, the 21st of september.
So it’s time to get ready for this update ;-).
Actually a Windows Vulnerability
(Microsoft Advisory 2757760) related
to the Internet Explorer Version 7, 8 and 9 is in the news. Microsoft is aware
of the problem, but there’s no patch available yet. We call this a 0-Day :-).
Making the problem even worse, on monday reliable
exploit code
was released within the Metasploit project, so exploit code is already in the
wild.
Disabling Active X and Active Scripting in the Internet Settings
But both of them have some impact: EMET must be deployed before any usage (btw.
EMET can be configured via Group Policies) and disabling Active X and Active
Scripting might break some business relevant web sites (that can be added to the
“Trusted Sites” Zone, but might produce major operational effort).
In our last series of posts regarding the VMDK file inclusion attack, we focused
on read access
and
prerequisites
for the attack, but avoided stating too much about potential write access. But
as we promised to cover write access in the course of our future research, the
following post will describe our latest research results.
First of all, the same
prerequisites
(which will be refined a little bit more later on) as for read access must be
fulfilled and the same
steps have to
be performed in order to carry out the attack successfully. If that is the case,
there are several POIs (Partitions Of Interest) on a ESXi hypervisor that are
interesting to include:
Last week I read about the new networking features of the integrated vSwitch of
Hyper-V 3.0. I was quite surprised that RA Guard will be natively supported and
was curious about implementation and functionality. If you don’t know how RA
Guard works, I recommend reading our previous blog posts
here,
here,
here,
here
and
here,
or have a look at our workshop at
Troopers12.
I downloaded Windows Server 2012 RC to do some practical testing. Since my
girlfriend was working the whole weekend, I had plenty of time to play around
with all that stuff without risking trouble 😉
Some days ago another
advisory
related to a web application firewall (WAF) product was published. This time the
product Airlock by Ergon was affected by a vulnerability
that combines Encoding and NULL Byte attacks to circumvent the pattern based
detection engine. We have described these attacks in detail in our newsletter
“Web Application Firewall Security and The Swiss Army Knife for Web Application Firewalls”
because they belong to a well known category of attacks against WAFs.
As we are receiving a lot of questions about our
VMDK has left the building post,
we’re compiling this FAQ post — which will be updated as our research goes on.
** **
How does the attack essentially work?
By bringing a specially crafted VMDK file into a VMware ESXi based
virtualization environment. The specific attack path is described
here.
* *
What is a VMDK file?
A combination of two different types of VMDK files, the plain-text descriptor
file containing meta data and the actual binary disk file, describes a VMware
virtual hard disk. A detailed description can be found
here.
If you want to extract some data from a database you first need to gather
knowledge about the internal structure of the database.
One of the first steps (after determining the database type) is enumerating the
available tables and the corresponding columns. Most database systems have a
meta database called information_schema. By querying this database it is
possible to get information about the internal structure of the installed
databases. For example you could get the tables and their corresponding columns
in MS SQL and MySQL by injecting
“SELECT table_name, column_name FROM information_schema.columns“. Oracle
databases have their own meta tables, so you have to handle them differently.
For getting the same output in Oracle, you have to query the all_tab_columns
table (or user_tab_columns if you only want to search in the currently selected
database). If the found vulnerability only allows to receive a single column (or
if it is too complicated to identify two columns in the server response) you
could concatenate the columns to one single string, e.g. in Oracle:
“SELECT table_name||':'||column_name FROM all_tab_columns“.
As announced at last week’s
#HITB2012AMS, I’ll describe
the fuzzing steps which were performed during our initial research. The very
first step was the definition of the interfaces we wanted to test. We decided to
go with the plain text VMDK file, as this is the main virtual disk description
file and in most deployment scenarios user controlled, and the data part of a
special kind of VMDK files, the Host Sparse Extends.
There are some database specifics, every pentester should be aware of, when
testing for and exploiting SQLi vulnerabilities. Besides the different string
concatenation variants already covered above, there are some other specifics
that have to be considered and might turn out useful in some circumstances. For
example with Oracle Databases, every SELECT statement needs a following FROM
statement even if the desired data is not stored within a database. So when
trying to extract e.g. the DB username using a UNION SELECT statement, the DUAL
table may be utilized, which should always be available. Another point, if
dealing with MySQL, is the possibility to simplify the classic payload