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    <title>Trust on Insinuator.net - Bold Statements</title>
    <link>https://insinuator.net/tags/trust/</link>
    <description>Recent content in Trust on Insinuator.net - Bold Statements</description>
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      <title>ERNW Whitepaper 67: Active Directory Trust Considerations</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2018/12/ernw-whitepaper-67-active-directory-trust-considerations/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Dec 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2018/12/ernw-whitepaper-67-active-directory-trust-considerations/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Last week &lt;a href=&#34;https://twitter.com/HarmJ0y&#34;&gt;Will “harmj0y” Schroeder&lt;/a&gt; published an excellent technical article titled &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/not-a-security-boundary-breaking-forest-trusts/&#34;&gt;“Not A Security Boundary: Breaking Forest Trusts”&lt;/a&gt; in which he lays out how a highly critical security compromise can be achieved across a forest boundary, resulting from a combination of default AD (security) settings and a novel attack method. His post is a follow-up to the DerbyCon talk “The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory” which he had given together with &lt;a href=&#34;https://twitter.com/tifkin_&#34;&gt;Lee Christensen&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&#34;https://twitter.com/enigma0x3&#34;&gt;Matt Nelson&lt;/a&gt; at DerbyCon (video &lt;a href=&#34;http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon8/track-2-03-the-unintended-risks-of-trusting-active-directory-lee-christensen-will-schroeder-matt-nelson&#34;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;). They will also discuss this at the upcoming &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.troopers.de/&#34;&gt;Troopers&lt;/a&gt; Active Directory Security Track (details on some more talks, including &lt;a href=&#34;https://twitter.com/PyroTek3&#34;&gt;Sean Metcalf’s&lt;/a&gt; one, can be found in &lt;a href=&#34;https://insinuator.net/2018/11/first-talks-of-troopers19-accepted/&#34;&gt;this post&lt;/a&gt; or &lt;a href=&#34;https://insinuator.net/2018/12/and-five-talks-more-were-accepted-at-troopers19/&#34;&gt;this one&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>#TR18 Active Directory Security Track, Part 1</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2018/03/%23tr18-active-directory-security-track-part-1/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Mar 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2018/03/%23tr18-active-directory-security-track-part-1/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This is the first post discussing talks of the &lt;em&gt;Active Directory Security Track&lt;/em&gt; of &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.troopers.de/troopers18/&#34;&gt;this year’s Troopers&lt;/a&gt; which took place last week in Heidelberg (like in the last nine years ;-). It featured, amongst others, a new track focused on Microsoft AD and its security properties &amp;amp; implications. &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.troopers.de/troopers18/agenda/#agenda-day--2018-03-15&#34;&gt;This&lt;/a&gt; was the agenda.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The idea for this special track was born out of two considerations:&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;ul&gt;&#xA;&lt;li&gt;we had noted there’s a lot of stuff going on in the space, both on the offense and on the defense side. And in pretty much every incident analysis &amp;amp; response project we were brought in recently Active Directory played a huge role…&lt;/li&gt;&#xA;&lt;li&gt;already in the early phase of the CfP several interesting submissions came in (maybe due to the fact that some big guns of the field had voiced &lt;a href=&#34;https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/906180147203645440&#34;&gt;very&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&#34;https://twitter.com/christruncer/status/845321214788849666&#34;&gt;kind&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&#34;https://twitter.com/harmj0y/status/710229755795144704&#34;&gt;words&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&#34;https://twitter.com/subTee/status/972191912277901312&#34;&gt;in&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&#34;https://twitter.com/Cneelis/status/845321978089295872&#34;&gt;the&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&#34;https://twitter.com/PyroTek3/status/918214609273868288&#34;&gt;past&lt;/a&gt;)… and creating an extra track simply relieved us from the burden to make a tough choice between those.&lt;/li&gt;&#xA;&lt;/ul&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;As this was the first Troopers since its creation where I didn’t have any official roles and out of personal interest (in a very distant past I happened to be the co-author of the first German book on &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.amazon.de/Security-unter-Windows-NT-4/dp/3778526707/&#34;&gt;Windows NT4 Security&lt;/a&gt;)  I decided to spend the majority of conference day 2 in the AD track. In hindsight I’m tempted to say that the track was a huge success: brilliant talks, pretty much always a packed room, and quite good discussions after the talks. (yes, of course I’m biased, what makes you think that?).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Cloud Security &amp; Trust</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2016/03/cloud-security-trust/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Mar 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2016/03/cloud-security-trust/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Hi,&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;I gave a presentation on Cloud Security, Compliance &amp;amp; Trust the other day. The basic message was to look beyond the Cloud buzzword and see the actual technologies which are used, understand which security principles still apply and which need to be re-thought, giving a rough direction about regulatory compliance in Cloud environments (which of course is non-binding, as I’m not a lawyer), and the importance of trust evaluations (especially) when it comes to Cloud services.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>iTrust. Or not?</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2011/10/itrust.-or-not/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 23 Oct 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2011/10/itrust.-or-not/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A few days ago (on 10/12/2011) Apple launched its new cloud offering which is called — who would have guessed 😉 — iCloud. Since we’re performing quite some research in the area of cloud security, we had a first look at the basic functionality and concepts of the iCloud. Its main features include the possibility to store full backups of Apple devices (at least, an iPhone, iPad or iPod touch running iOS 5 or a Mac running OS X Lion 10.7.2 is required), photos, music, or documents online. The data to be stored online is initially pushed to the cloud storage and then synchronized to any device which is using the same iCloud account. From this moment on, all changes on the cloudified data is immediately synchronized to the iCloud and then pushed to all participating devices. At this point, most infosec people might start to be worried a little bit: The common cloud concept of centralized data storage on premise of a third party does not cope well with the usual control focused approach of most technical infosec guys. The resulting concerns can be attributed to several main cloud computing related risks (which are proposed by &lt;a href=&#34;http://www.enisa.europa.eu/&#34;&gt;ENISA&lt;/a&gt; and actually very valuable &lt;a href=&#34;http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/rm/files/deliverables/cloud-computing-risk-assessment/at_download/fullReport&#34;&gt;work&lt;/a&gt;:&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Broken Trust, Part 2: Applying the Approach to… Dropbox</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2011/10/broken-trust-part-2-applying-the-approach-to-dropbox/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 03 Oct 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2011/10/broken-trust-part-2-applying-the-approach-to-dropbox/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;After having introduced the basic elements of our concept of trust, control and confidence in &lt;a href=&#34;http://www.insinuator.net/2011/06/broken-trust-part-1-definitions-fundamentals-some-more-reflections-on-rsa/&#34;&gt;this&lt;/a&gt; post, today I’ll try to strengthen your (and maybe even my own as well ;-)) understanding of these ideas by applying them to another candidate, that is Dropbox. Hence this post is mainly about performing a certain analysis method to some object; conclusions as for the question if Dropbox is suited to be used in enterprise environments processing sensitive data are out of scope and are left entirely to you, the valued reader.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Broken Trust, Part 1: Definitions &amp; Fundamentals &#43; Some More Reflections on RSA</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2011/06/broken-trust-part-1-definitions-fundamentals--some-more-reflections-on-rsa/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 19 Jun 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2011/06/broken-trust-part-1-definitions-fundamentals--some-more-reflections-on-rsa/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This again is going to be a little series of posts. Their main topic – next to the usual deviations &amp;amp; ranting I tend to include in blogposts 😉 – is some discussion of “trust” and putting this discussion into the context of recent events and future developments in the infosec space. The title originates from a conversation between Angus Blitter and me in a nice Thai restaurant in Zurich where we figured the consequences of the &lt;a href=&#34;http://arstechnica.com/security/news/2011/06/rsa-finally-comes-clean-securid-is-compromised.ars%20&#34;&gt;latest RSA revelations&lt;/a&gt;. While we both expect that – unfortunately – not much is really going to happen (surprisingly many people, including some CSOs we know, are still trying to somehow downplay this or sweep it under the carpet, shying away from the – obvious – consequences it might have to accept that for a number of environments RSA SecurID is potentially reduced to single factor auth nowadays…), the long term impact on our understanding of 3rd party (e.g. vendor) trust might be more interesting. Furthermore “Broken Trust” seems a promising title for a talk at upcoming &lt;a href=&#34;http://www.day-con.org&#34;&gt;Day-Con V&lt;/a&gt;… 😉&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Trust &amp; Control in the Age of Virtualization and the Cloud</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2010/11/trust-control-in-the-age-of-virtualization-and-the-cloud/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Nov 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2010/11/trust-control-in-the-age-of-virtualization-and-the-cloud/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Two days ago I gave the keynote at an industry event, reflecting on the changing role of traditional security controls in the age of virtualization and the cloud. As this was an updated version of the stuff distributed in the conference proceedings, some people have asked for it. Voilà, &lt;a href=&#34;http://www.ernw.de/content/e7/e181/e1612/download1614/ERNW_LANline_VirtCloudSec_Keynote_ger.pdf&#34;&gt;here we go&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;have a good one,&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Enno&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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