<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
  <channel>
    <title>Erlang on Insinuator.net - Bold Statements</title>
    <link>https://insinuator.net/tags/erlang/</link>
    <description>Recent content in Erlang on Insinuator.net - Bold Statements</description>
    <generator>Hugo</generator>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 05 Oct 2017 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <atom:link href="https://insinuator.net/tags/erlang/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
    <item>
      <title>Erlang distribution RCE and a cookie bruteforcer</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2017/10/erlang-distribution-rce-and-a-cookie-bruteforcer/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Oct 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2017/10/erlang-distribution-rce-and-a-cookie-bruteforcer/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In one of the last pentests we’ve found an &lt;em&gt;epmd&lt;/em&gt; (Erlang port mapper daemon) listening on a target system (tcp/4369). It is used to coordinate distributed erlang instances, but also can lead to a RCE, given one knows the so called “authentication cookie”. Usually, this cookie is located in ~/.erlang.cookie and is generated by erlang at the first start. If not modified or set manually it is a random string [A:Z] with a length of 20 characters. If an attacker gains this cookie, a RCE is quite easy – as I like to describe below.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
