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    <title>Lorin Lehawany on Insinuator.net - Bold Statements</title>
    <link>https://insinuator.net/authors/lorin-lehawany/</link>
    <description>Recent content in Lorin Lehawany on Insinuator.net - Bold Statements</description>
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    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-47237 – Overly Permissive Istio Permissions Allow Kubeflow Authorization Token Stealing</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2026/05/cve-2026-47237-overly-permissive-istio-permissions-allow-kubeflow-authorization-token-stealing/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 20 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2026/05/cve-2026-47237-overly-permissive-istio-permissions-allow-kubeflow-authorization-token-stealing/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Kubeflow is vulnerable to the theft of authorization tokens by any user of the&#xA;Kubeflow UI or APIs, such as the Dashboard, Pipelines API, or Notebooks. With&#xA;this token, the attacker can take over the user&amp;rsquo;s account and the data that is&#xA;processed by that user. The attacker needs a valid user with the &lt;code&gt;kubeflow-edit&lt;/code&gt;&#xA;or Contributor role in a random Kubeflow namespace to perform this attack. This&#xA;is given if &lt;em&gt;Automatic Profile Creation&lt;/em&gt; is enabled. A setup based on the&#xA;official manifests prior to version 1.10, and on most other packaged Kubeflow&#xA;distributions, is vulnerable.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The Istio edit permissions were removed by Kubeflow in a timely manner. Affected&#xA;users should update to the latest version to mitigate this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>KubeCon &#43; CloudNativeCon Europe 2026</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2026/04/kubecon--cloudnativecon-europe-2026/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2026/04/kubecon--cloudnativecon-europe-2026/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Exactly one week ago, Sven and I had the incredible opportunity to give our very&#xA;first talk at KubeCon + CloudNativeCon&#xA;2026: &lt;a href=&#34;https://kccnceu2026.sched.com/event/2CW2U/how-to-break-multi-tenancy-again-and-again-and-what-we-can-learn-from-it-lorin-lehawany-sven-nobis-ernw?iframe=no&amp;amp;w=100%25&amp;amp;sidebar=yes&amp;amp;bg=no&#34;&gt;How To Break Multi-Tenancy Again and Again …and What We Can Learn From It&lt;/a&gt;.&#xA;We discussed the challenges of namespace-based multi-tenancy and presented&#xA;real-world exploits in&#xA;Kubeflow, &lt;a href=&#34;https://insinuator.net/2026/03/security-considerations-on-istios-crds-with-namespace-based-multi-tenancy/&#34;&gt;Istio&lt;/a&gt;,&#xA;and Traefik that bypass threat boundaries between namespaces and workloads.&#xA;Based on these problems, we developed a methodology to assess and address them.&#xA;You can find the methodology discussed in the talk in&#xA;detail &lt;a href=&#34;https://insinuator.net/2026/03/methodology-for-assessing-namespace-based-multi-tenancy-setups/&#34;&gt;in another blog post&lt;/a&gt; or&#xA;on &lt;a href=&#34;https://github.com/ernw/k8s-multi-tenancy&#34;&gt;GitHub&lt;/a&gt;. You can also find the&#xA;slides &lt;a href=&#34;https://github.com/ernw/k8s-multi-tenancy/blob/main/Slides%20-%20How%20To%20Break%20Multi-Tenancy%20Again%20and%20Again%20...and%20What%20We%20Can%20Learn%20From%20It-%20KubeCon%20+%20CloudNativeCon%20Europe%202026%20-%20final.pdf&#34;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Methodology for Assessing Kubernetes Namespace-Based Multi-Tenancy Setups</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2026/03/methodology-for-assessing-kubernetes-namespace-based-multi-tenancy-setups/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 26 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2026/03/methodology-for-assessing-kubernetes-namespace-based-multi-tenancy-setups/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This page introduces our structured methodology for assessing security risks in&#xA;Kubernetes environments that use Namespace-based Multi-Tenancy. It addresses&#xA;weaknesses that break Namespace-based isolation that not well studied, yet. We&#xA;found this issues during our research and presented them together with this&#xA;methodology in our&#xA;&lt;a href=&#34;https://kccnceu2026.sched.com/event/2CW2U/how-to-break-multi-tenancy-again-and-again-and-what-we-can-learn-from-it-lorin-lehawany-sven-nobis-ernw?iframe=yes&amp;amp;w=100%25&amp;amp;sidebar=yes&amp;amp;bg=no&#34;&gt;Talk at KubeCon + CloudNativeCon Europe 2026&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The methodology assumes that industry best practices, such as NetworkPolicies,&#xA;Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), and Pod Security Standards, are already in&#xA;place. These measures provide a necessary baseline level of protection against&#xA;well-known isolation threats. However, they are insufficient to address a class&#xA;of more subtle attack vectors arising from interactions between tenants and&#xA;shared components. Such attack vectors may still compromise the confidentiality,&#xA;integrity, and availability (CIA) of the cluster and its workloads, even in&#xA;well-hardened environments.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Security Considerations on Istio’s CRDs with Namespace-based Multi-Tenancy</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2026/03/security-considerations-on-istios-crds-with-namespace-based-multi-tenancy/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 25 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2026/03/security-considerations-on-istios-crds-with-namespace-based-multi-tenancy/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;We reported a possible Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack scenario in which&#xA;a &lt;code&gt;VirtualService&lt;/code&gt; can redirect or intercept traffic within the service mesh.&#xA;This affects Namespace-based Multi-Tenancy clusters where tenants have the&#xA;permissions to deploy Istio resources (&lt;code&gt;networking.istio.io/v1&lt;/code&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;In collaboration with Istio, we&#xA;published &lt;a href=&#34;https://istio.io/latest/blog/2026/security-considerations-on-namespace-based-multi-tenancy/&#34;&gt;a guest submission in Istio’s blog&lt;/a&gt; (as&#xA;well as below),&#xA;a &lt;a href=&#34;https://istio.io/latest/news/security/istio-security-2026-002/&#34;&gt;Security Bulletin&lt;/a&gt;,&#xA;and an update to&#xA;their &lt;a href=&#34;https://istio.io/latest/docs/ops/deployment/security-model/#k8s-account-compromise&#34;&gt;Security Model&lt;/a&gt; to&#xA;address this issue.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;This blog post highlights the risks of using Istio in multi-tenant clusters and&#xA;explains how users can mitigate these risks and safely operate Istio in their&#xA;deployments.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Vulnerabilities in Broadcom VMware Aria Operations: Privilege Escalation (CVE-2025-41245 / CVE-2026-22721)</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2026/03/vulnerabilities-in-broadcom-vmware-aria-operations-privilege-escalation-cve-2025-41245-/-cve-2026-22721/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2026/03/vulnerabilities-in-broadcom-vmware-aria-operations-privilege-escalation-cve-2025-41245-/-cve-2026-22721/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;During a customer project, we identified privilege escalation vulnerabilities in&#xA;Broadcom VMware Aria Operations. It is possible to escalate the privileges of an&#xA;administrative vCenter user to an Aria administrator and take over systems&#xA;integrated in Aria. Meaning, the vCenter user can gain privileged access to&#xA;systems they have no access to. While both users might sound similarly&#xA;privileged, this is not true in most environments – especially not in complex&#xA;corporate environments: An insignificant vCenter user in a development&#xA;environment can take over all other vCenters in a complex corporate environment.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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