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    <title>Dennis Heinze on Insinuator.net - Bold Statements</title>
    <link>https://insinuator.net/authors/dennis-heinze/</link>
    <description>Recent content in Dennis Heinze on Insinuator.net - Bold Statements</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Hacking a Bluetooth Printer Server: GATT to UART Adapter?</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2026/03/hacking-a-bluetooth-printer-server-gatt-to-uart-adapter/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2026/03/hacking-a-bluetooth-printer-server-gatt-to-uart-adapter/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This blog post describes the journey of how we discovered an interesting&#xA;Bluetooth SoC within the Datong NP330, a&#xA;&lt;a href=&#34;https://www.dtprinter.cn/upload/doc/NP330_NP332UserManual_en.pdf&#34;&gt;Printer Server IoT device&lt;/a&gt;.&#xA;Our initial goal was to reverse-engineer and analyze the Bluetooth controller&#xA;that is included in the device. So we wanted to be able to dump the firmware or,&#xA;if possible, get shell access on the printer server. During that journey we&#xA;found a few vulnerabilities that ultimately let an attacker fully compromise the&#xA;device. This is possible over Bluetooth or network via unauthenticated remote&#xA;code execution with root privileges.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Bluetooth Headphone Jacking: Full Disclosure of Airoha RACE Vulnerabilities</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2025/12/bluetooth-headphone-jacking-full-disclosure-of-airoha-race-vulnerabilities/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 28 Dec 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2025/12/bluetooth-headphone-jacking-full-disclosure-of-airoha-race-vulnerabilities/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;About six months ago we released a&#xA;&lt;a href=&#34;https://insinuator.net/2025/06/airoha-bluetooth-security-vulnerabilities/&#34;&gt;security advisory&lt;/a&gt;&#xA;on this blog about vulnerabilities in Airoha-based Bluetooth headphones and&#xA;earbuds. Back then, we didn’t release all technical details to give vendors more&#xA;time to release updates and users time to patch their devices. Around the time&#xA;of the initial partial disclosure in the beginning of June, Airoha put out an&#xA;SDK release for their customers that mitigates the vulnerabilities. Now, half a&#xA;year later, we finally want to publish the technical details and release a tool&#xA;for researchers and users to continue researching and check whether their&#xA;devices are vulnerable.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Security Advisory: Airoha-based Bluetooth Headphones and Earbuds</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2025/06/security-advisory-airoha-based-bluetooth-headphones-and-earbuds/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 26 Jun 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2025/06/security-advisory-airoha-based-bluetooth-headphones-and-earbuds/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Important note:&lt;/strong&gt; Some media coverage on this topic falsely or inaccurately&#xA;depicts the attack conditions. To be clear: Any vulnerable device can be&#xA;compromised if the attacker is in Bluetooth range. That is the only&#xA;precondition.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;hr&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;During our research on Bluetooth headphones and earbuds, we identified several&#xA;vulnerabilities in devices that incorporate Airoha Systems on a Chip (SoCs). In&#xA;this blog post, we briefly want to describe the vulnerabilities, point out their&#xA;impact and provide some context to currently running patch delivery processes as&#xA;described at this year’s&#xA;&lt;a href=&#34;https://troopers.de/troopers25/talks/fbnb8y/&#34;&gt;TROOPERS Conference&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Using the Raspberry Pi Pico W as a Bluetooth Dongle</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2025/06/using-the-raspberry-pi-pico-w-as-a-bluetooth-dongle/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Jun 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2025/06/using-the-raspberry-pi-pico-w-as-a-bluetooth-dongle/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;During our recent research, we experimented with different Bluetooth USB&#xA;dongles. There are tons of options, and sometimes, it’s challenging to determine&#xA;what chipset a dongle actually contains, what Bluetooth features it supports,&#xA;and whether it works on Linux. Inspired by the recent&#xA;&lt;a href=&#34;https://www.tarlogic.com/blog/esp32-hidden-hci-vendor-commands/&#34;&gt;ESP32 Bluetooth research&lt;/a&gt;,&#xA;we wondered whether we could turn our Raspberry Pi Pico Ws into a functioning&#xA;Bluetooth dongle. We had a few lying around, and the advantage here is that we&#xA;know exactly which&#xA;&lt;a href=&#34;https://www.raspberrypi.com/documentation/microcontrollers/pico-series.html&#34;&gt;Bluetooth controller it uses&lt;/a&gt;&#xA;– the Infineon CYW43439. It’s also very easy to get one. You can just buy the&#xA;Pico W for a few bucks, even cheaper than some Bluetooth dongles. You also have&#xA;a controller family that has been researched quite a bit in the&#xA;&lt;a href=&#34;https://github.com/seemoo-lab/internalblue/&#34;&gt;internalblue project&lt;/a&gt;. However,&#xA;there was one disadvantage. We did not find any code that exposes the CYW43439’s&#xA;HCI interface via USB. So we had to write that on our own.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>CVE-2025-20908: Use of insufficiently random values in Samsung&#39;s Auracast implementation</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2025/03/cve-2025-20908-use-of-insufficiently-random-values-in-samsungs-auracast-implementation/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 13 Mar 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2025/03/cve-2025-20908-use-of-insufficiently-random-values-in-samsungs-auracast-implementation/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;As part of our &lt;a href=&#34;https://insinuator.net/2025/01/auracast-part1/&#34;&gt;research&lt;/a&gt; into&#xA;the Auracast feature set in Bluetooth, we also started looking into vendor&#xA;implementations. At the time we started with our research, there weren’t a lot&#xA;of products on the market yet. But new products are coming out pretty frequently&#xA;now.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;One of the vendors that had Auracast implemented pretty early was Samsung. At&#xA;the time the Samsung Galaxy S23 and S24 phones were able to broadcast Audio,&#xA;while the Galaxy Buds were able to join these broadcasts.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Part I: Bluetooth Auracast from a Security Researcher’s Perspective</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2025/01/part-i-bluetooth-auracast-from-a-security-researchers-perspective/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 27 Jan 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2025/01/part-i-bluetooth-auracast-from-a-security-researchers-perspective/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Auracast, the new Bluetooth LE Broadcast Audio feature has gained some publicity&#xA;in the past months. The Bluetooth SIG has introduced the LE Audio feature-set to&#xA;the Bluetooth 5.2 Specification in 2019 and vendors are only now starting to&#xA;implement it. Auracast facilitates broadcasting audio over Bluetooth LE to a&#xA;potentially unlimited number of devices. It does not require pairing or&#xA;interaction between the sender and the receivers.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;We also presented this topic&#xA;&lt;a href=&#34;https://media.ccc.de/v/38c3-auracast-breaking-broadcast-le-audio-before-it-hits-the-shelves&#34;&gt;at 38c3&lt;/a&gt;.&#xA;This blog post will contain similar contents albeit with some more details.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Jasper Reports Library Code Injection</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2023/06/jasper-reports-library-code-injection/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2023/06/jasper-reports-library-code-injection/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;During the past year we had several projects where our target application used&#xA;&lt;a href=&#34;https://community.jaspersoft.com/&#34;&gt;Jasper Reports&lt;/a&gt; in some way. In a few of the&#xA;cases we found an API that offered to render a template along with some&#xA;arguments into a PDF file. This was done with the help of the Jasper Reports&#xA;Java library. Due to the way the library and the expression mechanism works,&#xA;this endpoint gave us the possibility to inject Java code and gain remote code&#xA;execution on the target systems.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Change Your BLE Passkey Like You Change Your Underwear</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2021/10/change-your-ble-passkey-like-you-change-your-underwear/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 21 Oct 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2021/10/change-your-ble-passkey-like-you-change-your-underwear/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Using a static passkey for Bluetooth Low Energy pairing is insecure. Recent&#xA;versions of the Bluetooth specification contain an explicit warning about this.&#xA;However, in practice, we often see static passkeys being used. Moreover, there&#xA;are no public implementations of proofs-of-concept that can practically show why&#xA;using a static passkey is an issue. This is why we implemented one.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;In a recent assessment, we were testing a device that offered a Bluetooth&#xA;interface for data export and configuration. This device uses Bluetooth Low&#xA;Energy (BLE), and a static passkey (or PIN) is required to pair with it. This&#xA;passkey is displayed for a few seconds when the device is booted and stays the&#xA;same on each reboot. In fact, it is derived from static, device-specific data.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fpicker: Fuzzing with Frida</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2021/03/fpicker-fuzzing-with-frida/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 15 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2021/03/fpicker-fuzzing-with-frida/</guid>
      <description>&lt;h2 id=&#34;introduction&#34;&gt;Introduction&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;In this post, I will introduce fpicker. Fpicker is a Frida-based&#xA;coverage-guided, mostly in-process, blackbox fuzzing suite. Its most significant&#xA;feature is the AFL++ proxy mode which enables blackbox in-process fuzzing with&#xA;AFL++ on platforms supported by Frida. In practice, this means that fpicker&#xA;enables fuzzing binary-only targets with AFL++ on potentially any system that is&#xA;supported by Frida. For example, it allows fuzzing a user-space application on&#xA;the iOS operating system, such as the Bluetooth daemon bluetoothd – which was&#xA;part of the original motivation to implement fpicker.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ACM WiSec 2020</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2020/07/acm-wisec-2020/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 26 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2020/07/acm-wisec-2020/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Last week I attended &lt;a href=&#34;https://wisec2020.ins.jku.at/&#34;&gt;ACM WiSec&lt;/a&gt;. Of course, only virtually. The first virtual conference I attended. Coincidentally, it was also the first conference I presented at. While the experience was quite different from a “real” conference, the organizers did a great job to make the experience as good as possible with, for example, a mattermost instance to interact with other conference participants.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;In the following, I will list a few talks and papers that I either found very interesting or that generally stood out to me:&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PSD2 – Mandatory Account Access for Third Party Providers</title>
      <link>https://insinuator.net/2019/09/psd2-mandatory-account-access-for-third-party-providers/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Sep 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://insinuator.net/2019/09/psd2-mandatory-account-access-for-third-party-providers/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;On September 14th the final deadline of complying with the new Payment Service Directive PSD2 will be reached. Among other things, this directive will bring quite a few technical challenges for credit institutions. These include new requirements on two-factor authentication and API access for third parties. In this blog post we will give a short overview of what this means for banks from a security perspective and outline a few of the security-related issues based on what we have been observing during recent assessments of such APIs.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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